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ABSTRACT 
 
The Algerian government pursues liberalisation and economic reforms to boost growth 
and diversify the economy from dependence on oil. It solicits foreign investment in 
infrastructure in sectors including telecommunications, roads, power and water supply. 
Still, the oil sector remains the main driver of GDP growth, leaving the Algerian 
economy exposed to fluctuations in the world oil market. 
This research assesses the attempt to develop one of these sectors, telecommunications, 
by encouraging foreign direct investment. This is a technologically advanced sector with 
the potential to increase productivity across the economy On the basis of an extensive 
literature review, I develop a model to assess the effects of FDI on the telecom sector. 
This model starts with the classical position that government policy is a key determinant 
of the extent and nature of FDI inflows, principally through incentives, specific 
regulations, specific benefits and subsidies, or general policies such as liberalisation, but 
also through second-round effects on the competitive structure of the market. The model 
differs from classical accounts of FDI in the attention it gives to rents and rent capture, 
which I argue strongly mediate the effects of FDI, particularly in developing economies 
where markets tend to be inefficient, and in sectors such as  telecommunications arising 
from the natural monopolies present. 
I apply this model to data collected from official sources and from multiple case studies 
from the Algerian telecommunications sector, involving 90 field interviews. The results 
suggest that the country has strongly benefited from the increase of FDI in the 
telecommunications sector, where this has been accompanied by new technology, 
finance, know-how and resources. Key reasons for this are government intervention on 
the market through liberalisation, specific regulation and specific benefits increasing the 
competitive rivalry and the rent capture via lobbying. The spillovers from FDI are also 
influenced by the mode of entry and management style, which is associated with country 
risk analysis. These benefits may be available for other sectors where the same 
conditions can be put in place. 
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Chapter I Section 1: FDI presentation and Research motivation 
 
I.1 Introduction: 
 
Foreign Direct Investment has been one of the most important driving forces for 
centuries in the exploration of natural resources and the improvement of economic 
conditions in both developed and developing countries. Recently, the scope of FDI has 
not only widened rapidly, but has also covered a wide spectrum of industries around the 
world. The role of foreign investment is increasingly significant in the world’s economy, 
as FDI could spur economic growth and create a better standard of living in the host 
countries. From an economic perspective, FDI mutually benefits both sides of the home 
and host economies; yet, there is still not an international FDI regime or thorough 
international agreement that fairly addresses both sides. Although many empirical 
studies confirm the positive impact of foreign investments in improving economic 
conditions in host countries as it yields capital, advanced technology and knowledge, 
many developing countries fear that by opening up their economies to foreign investors 
without any restriction, they will be forfeiting economic guiding power and will lose 
control of strategic industries.  
 
Among FDI, telecommunications is one of the most strategic industries of national 
economic control. Even though FDI in the telecommunication sector is assumed to be a 
major source for the transfer of advanced technology, knowledge and capital, as well as 
market competition and will benefit national telecommunications growth.  
 
However, telecommunication has a substantial and important influence on national 
security. Many developing economies’ governments either restrict or control foreign 
investment in telecommunications for national economic sovereignty purposes and to 
correspond to their economic and developmental strategies. 
 
The deregulation of the telecommunication sectors in developing economies should 
produce significant benefits not only within the country's telecommunication sector, but 
also for other industries, such as information technology and computing, education, e-
business and tourism.  
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The development of these industries has been constrained in many countries because of 
the lack of an adequate telecommunication infrastructure and high service charges. 
Inadequate telecommunications would also decrease efficiency throughout the economy, 
reduce the effectiveness of investments and development programmes, cause a 
comparative disadvantage in attracting foreign investment, and lower the quality of 
living standards as well as personal access to communication, which could isolate 
countries from the globalised world. 
 
Knowing the important role of FDI in boosting their economic transformation, many 
developing countries seek such investment to accelerate their development efforts. 
Consequently, developing countries are competing to attract foreign capital by 
deregulating and liberalising their restrictive investment laws, improving their business 
environment and upgrading their economic infrastructure. Unfortunately, many African 
countries continue to make unrealistic investment policies. Although there are numerous 
factors that determine why Africa receives the least FDI worldwide, the three main 
issues facing FDI promotion on the continent stem from restrictive foreign investment 
policies, the high degree of government involvement in political life and the 
misconception that excessive incentives would be most attractive to foreign direct 
investors. For instance, in Algeria, the country’s political and legal systems limit the 
country’s attractiveness to foreign investors. Privatisation of state assets is inconsistent; 
the banking sector suffers from weak infrastructure, poor management and bad loans to 
loss-making state firms, leaving limited credit for private investment.  
 
Recently, the Algerian government has embarked on ambitious economic reforms to 
improve growth and diversify from dependence on oil, seeking foreign investment in 
infrastructure, especially in telecommunications, roads, power and water. However, the 
lucrative hydrocarbon sector remains the backbone of the economy, accounting for more 
than 90% of the country’s exports, leaving the Algerian economy vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the world oil market (IMF, 2011). 
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I.1.2 Aims and objectives of the research 
 
The objective of this research is to investigate the contributions of FDI to the 
performance of the telecommunication sector of the Algerian economy, from both 
theoretical and empirical perspectives. FDI has customarily been treated in the 
macroeconomics framework as one form of international capital flow and fails to 
account for firm-specific assets that comprise a critical part of FDI. Aggregate figures 
have, therefore, generally been employed for conventional empirical investigations of 
FDI. But since FDI represents both the flow of monetary assets (ie: capital in a simple 
sense) and technological/managerial assets possessed by individual firms (ie: “firm-
specific”), conventional investigations into FDI remain limited. 
 
The aim of this research is to identify the contributions of FDI to the Algerian 
telecommunication sector. My research draws on Dunning’s (1977, 1980) “eclectic 
framework” as a useful categorisation of FDI determinants, according to the source of 
competitive advantages contributing to the choice of FDI. More specifically, ownership-
specific advantages, location advantages and internalisation advantages are considered 
pertinent to a firm’s FDI decision. The objective of the research is to investigate and 
analyse critically the participation of FDI within the Algerian economy, with reference 
to the telecommunication sector, by examining the literature on FDI effects, constraints 
and reviewing evidence from the sector. In light of this, I formulate my research 
question: FDI in the Algerian telecommunication sector. An analysis of motivations, 
constraints and effects  
 
In order to answer my research question I have formulated the following research sub-
questions:  
What are the potential FDI effects on emerging economies? Why are developing 
countries lagging behind in attracting foreign capitals? What is the possible relation 
between the mode of entry and effects by industries and markets? What is the potential 
contribution of FDI in the transfer of: technology, knowledge, capital and productivity 
spillovers in the Algerian telecommunication market? How could rent capture, political 
risk and institutional stability, economic determinants and the cultural distance effect or 
constraints FDI inflow to the Algeria in general, and the telecommunication sector in 
particular?  
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I.1.3 Research outline  
The dissertation is divided into five chapters; the first chapter is divided into two 
sections. The first section is a brief introduction to the research, explaining the rationale, 
the statement of the problem and the research questions presenting my research topic 
and its significance. In the next section, I will examine the major trend in the Algerian 
economy, and the effect of the new investment policy in driving or restraining FDI, with 
particular attention paid to the telecommunication sector 
 
Chapter two is divided into two sections; in the first I present a comprehensive review of 
the literature surrounding foreign direct investment analysing the theoretical arguments 
on the economic determinants of foreign direct investment, the choice of mode of entries 
in FDI, the potential FDI effects on emerging economies and its determinants. In the 
second section, I analyse the effect of constraints factors: economic, political, legal and 
cultural environments of the host country as important factors in the location choice 
decision of foreign investors. In this chapter, I introduce my hypothesis according to my 
research question and sub-questions. Based on the literature review, I will create my 
research model. The third chapter describes the research methods, including how cases 
are selected, the forms of data collection, how data are analysed, the research philosophy 
and process, potential ethical issues and the research limitations and future scope. The 
fourth chapter focuses on the empirical study, and is divided into two sections; in the 
first, I present my case studies, and in the second I examine critically the results of the 
case-by-case analysis. In this section, each case is described in great detail along with 
the main findings. 
 
In the fifth chapter, I discuss my findings and make comparisons with my research 
model, hypothesis and literature review, highlighting the strengths and limitations of my 
research as well as the future direction for my research. I conclude with 
recommendations along with the references used in all the chapters of this dissertation. 
There are also several appendices that include my interview Participant Information 
Sheet, interview consent form, questionnaires in both English and French, and the 
questionnaire response sheet. 
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I.1.4. FDI trends in the world 
As a result of globalisation, emerging markets have become among the major FDI 
recipients over the last decades. Multinationals expend their businesses aiming to 
maximise their profit in less saturated markets, driven by the emerging countries market 
sizes, fast growth, access to cheap resources (raw materials and cheap labour compared 
with the developed world).  
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2008) reports suggest that the 
global FDI flow grew strongly from the 1990s up to 2008 at rates well above those of 
global economic growth or trade. In fact, the table (1.1) indicates that the total FDI has 
grown from US$481.91 million in 1997 to almost US$ 958.69 billion in 2005. After 
more than 4 years of strong growth, reaching $1.9 trillion in 2007, FDI flow starts its 
decline from 2008 (-16%). The decline was more pronounced in 2009 (-37%) due to the 
global economic crisis, multinationals had to review their investment plan due to the 
recession in major economies, the stock-market crash, which led to tighter credit 
conditions, the decrease of asset value and the fall in corporate profit  (UNCTAD, 2011). 
 
In 2009, the total inflows had declined sharply in all groups: developed, developing and 
transition economies (Figure 1.1). This is due mainly to the climate of uncertainty 
following the world financial and economic crisis. Moreover, in 2010, the global (FDI) 
flow rose slightly to reach $1.24 trillion, but remains 15% below the pre-economic 
downturn average (Figure 1.1). 
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Table 1.1 FDI global flow in the world between 1997-2010 (Millions of dollars)  
 
Year world developed countries   developing 
countries 
share of developing countries 
by % 
1997 481.91 269.65 193.22 40.09 
1999 1079.08 824.64 222.29 21.25 
2001 823.83 589.38 209.43 25.42 
2003 632.59 442.16 166.34 26.29 
2005 958.69 611.28 316.44 33.07 
2007 1970.94 1306.818 573.032 33.69 
2008 1744.101 965.113 658.002 37.72 
2009 1185.030 602.835 510.578 43.08 
2010 1243.671 601.906 573.568 46.12 
Source: UNCTAD, 2011 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2011 
Figure 1.1 the FDI growth in the world from 1997-2010 (Millions of dollars) 
 
Furthermore, FDI in developed countries shrank by 40% in 2009, while developing 
countries demonstrated more resistance to the economic downturn with a decline of 
22%. UNCTAD (2010) suggests that “the falling profits resulted in lower reinvested 
earning and intra-company loans weighting on FDI flows to developed countries. At the 
same time a drop in leverage buyout transactions continued to dampen cross border 
M&As” UNCTAD (2010: 03).   
 
0
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According to the global investment reports (2009) and (2010), the shift of global FDI 
flow towards developing and transition economies will accelerate from 2011 onwards. 
This change was already apparent from 2007-2009 (Figure 1.1), due mainly to political 
and economic reforms engaged by these countries to attract foreign capitals. 
Likewise, total FDI flow will continue to increase in 2012 and is expected to peak in 
2013. This corroborates the UNCTAD survey (2010-2012), which predicted a modest 
recovery of 3% in 2011 and 2012, and predicts reaching $1.9 trillion in 2013, with 60% 
of the total inflow estimated to go to developing countries (Figure 1.2).  
This positive prediction does consider other global economic shocks arising from risk 
factors still in play, such as the financial crisis in the Eurozone that could jeopardise the 
future FDI in the EU and could benefit more the Asian and other emerging economies.                  
However, The UNCTAD survey (2009-2011) suggests that MNEs have expressed high 
concern regarding the consequences of the economic downturn, further economic shock 
and its repercussions in both the short and long-term. In addition to the raise of state 
protectionism and nationalisation in many developed and emerging market, many 
companies that took part in the survey stated that they have already shifted their FDI 
investment strategy from Greenfield and merger and acquisition to non-equity modes, 
such as franchising, licensing or outsourcing. 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2011 
 
Figure 1.2 the global FDI inflows and outflows between 2002 and 2010 and projection 
for 2011-2013 (Billions of dollars) 
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I.1.4.1 FDI trends by region 
 
When examining the FDI outflows in 2010, the global outflow is recovering from a high 
fall in 2009 (43%), rising to about 10% in the first quarter of 2010. With a large 
contribution of the developed countries, where outflows mainly surpass the inflows, 
outflows have risen in the first quarter of 2010 by 25%, compared with a drop of 23% in 
2009. The main reasons are the new wave of developing countries’ investment, the 
increase of the number and sizes of MNEs from developing and transition economies, 
increasing competition in their local market along with other regional factors 
(UNCTAD, 2010). In 2010, three emerging countries are listed in the top 20 FDI 
investors (China, Hong Kong and the Russian Federation, with India and Brazil very 
close to the top 20). Nevertheless, the gap between the FDI inflows and outflows in 
developing economies is quite high, as they are recipients rather than providers 
(UNCTAD, 2011). 
 
In terms of FDI recipients, the UNCTAD survey (2010-2012) and reports (2011) suggest 
that Asia, European Union and North America will remain the most attractive locations 
for investment. Moreover, three of the developing and transition economies are ranked 
among the 10 most popular FDI destinations, with the BRIC region forecasted to 
continue its remarkable growth due to the abundance of natural resources as well as the 
liberalisation of the economy and the natural resources. 
The Asian region is predicted to sustain its FDI growth, with seven countries among the 
top 20. In contrast, Africa languishes at the bottom of the league, with only South Africa 
present in the top 20, whereas some of the poorest regions continue to experience a large 
fall in FDI flows. In fact, flows to Africa, South Asia and other least-developed 
countries all declined with the distribution of FDI flow among the LDCs less developed 
countries remains uneven, as more than 80% of this flow goes to resource-rich countries 
in Africa, mainly in form of greenfield investment (Figure 1.3). 
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Source: UNCTAD, 2011 
Figure 1.3 global FDI inflows by developing and transition economies by region, 
average 2005-2007 and 2008-2010 (Billions of dollars) 
 
Many African governments have implemented ambitious frameworks to attract more 
foreign investment. Nevertheless, most foreign investment in Africa goes to natural 
resources in a relatively restrained group of countries that do not necessarily generate a 
positive impact on the local economy. While attracting investment into diversified and 
higher value-added sectors remains a challenge for Africa, constraints on investment, 
such as weak infrastructure and fragmented markets, also adversely affect FDI flows to 
Africa.   
Prior to the financial crisis, FDI to Africa had been rising strongly, driven by the high 
demand in price for raw materials, particularly oil, from emerging countries like China, 
India and Brazil, which produced a boom in commodity-related investment. The global 
turmoil led to a considerable slowdown, and the data for 2009 shows that investment fell 
by around 20% (UNCTAD, 2010). According to the UNCTAD (2010) report, the 
decline on FDI inflow to African countries is due to the decrease of global demand and 
prices of African export commodities. Although the decline was relatively low, it had a 
major impact for a region where FDI flows account for about one-fifth of gross capital 
formation and is a vital source of job creation and technology dissemination. While FDI 
flow to North Africa also declined, despite the fact that the sub-region’s more diversified 
sectors received FDI and sustained privatisation programmes. Southern Africa also saw 
its inflows decrease dramatically, even though it remained the largest recipient sub-
region (Figure 1.3).  
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Looking at the major African FDI recipients, Angola continued to be the largest, 
followed by Egypt and Nigeria. In terms of investment, South Africa was the largest 
investor from the region in 2009, after recording negative outflows in 2008 (Table 1.4). 
In 2009, Algeria ranked among the top 10 FDI in Africa. This is due probably to the 
authorities’ efforts to foster more FDI by offering investment incentives, restructuring 
local companies and increasing Algeria’s productive capacities, technology and 
knowledge transfer. As a result, FDI has raised dramatically in Algeria from $671 
million in 1999 to $2.646 billion in 2008, of which $200 million was in non-hydrocarbon 
industries, mainly the telecommunication sector (UNCTAD FDI /TNC database, 
November 2008).  
 
According to UNCTAD (2010), FDI inflow declined after 2008, falling by more than 
60% to $1.2billion in 2009, due to the deep recession in most of the Maghreb countries 
(-20% for the region) and the likely deterrent effects of new protectionist policies 
imposed by the Algerian government1.  
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2010 
Figure 1.4 the evolution of FDI inflow in Africa 2000-2009 (by percentage) 
 
 
 
1Chapter one section two analyses the Algerian economy and examines the impact of the new FDI policy in 
constraining FDI). 
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Table 1.2 Distribution of FDI flow among African economies by range 2009 
Range Inflows Outflows 
Above $3.0 
billion  Angola, Egypt , Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan   
$2.0 to $2.9 
billion Algeria, Libya and Congo   
$1.0 to 1.9 
billion Tunisia, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea and Morocco 
South Africa and 
Libya 
$0.5 to $0.9 
billion 
Zambia, Democratic Republic of The Congo, 
Mozambique, Uganda, Niger, Tanzania, 
Madagascar and Namibia Egypt 
$0.2 to 0.4 
billion 
Chad, Cote D'ivoire, Liberia, Cameroon, 
Mauritius, Seychelles, Botswana and Senegal 
Morocco, Liberia 
and Algeria 
below $0.1 
billion the rest of the continent  
Nigeria, Gabon, 
Tunisia Kenya and 
Sudan 
                                                      Source: UNCTAD, 2010 
 
In order to attract more FDI, some countries introduced a new investment policy; 
lowering corporate taxes and providing more incentives (Gambia and Morocco). Others 
embarked on drastic economic reforms to improve their countries’ business environment 
(Rwanda and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya). In divergence, some countries, like Algeria and 
Nigeria, wanted to control MNE operations by tightening the regulatory framework and 
adding local content requirements (Nigeria), or by introducing new foreign ownership 
limitations (Algeria). 
Besides, African countries are developing economic zones to attract FDI. Foreign 
capitals, notably from China, are promoting the creation of such zones, which provide 
employment, technology and knowledge spillovers to domestic economies and allow 
firms to benefit from better infrastructure and easier regulations. By investing in Africa, 
emerging countries also benefit from the preferential trade agreements of African 
countries with Europe and the United States. 
Although many African countries have embarked on major economic reforms, Africa is 
still lagging behind in terms of attracting foreign investment. Empirical evidence does 
show clearly that the rate of return on investment in developing countries is higher than 
some of the developed countries. Why then are developing economies not attracting FDI 
commensurate to this economic fundamental? There are a couple of studies that attempt 
to answer this question (UNCTAD, 2008).  
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The first set of explanations addresses the risk of investment in developing countries; for 
instance, the perception of Africa as a continent riddled with disease, civil unrest, war, 
poverty, disease and mounting problems.  
Rogoff and Reinhart’s (2003) study claims that war and civil unrest occur more 
frequently in Africa than other regions. These events could have adverse effects on the 
investment climate because they often bring along devastating effects like high inflation 
and higher levels of other distortions, such as capital controls and illegal currency 
markets that thrive and deter investments. Among the reasons for the low inflow of FDI 
to Africa is that the structural adjustment in many of the African countries has not been 
efficient compared with other global regions (Asiedu, 2004). 
Another factor is the FDI environment in developing economies which is still inadequate 
to attract high quality, efficiency seeking, “globalising” FDI. According to UNCTAD 
(2011), the general policy framework of FDI in the developing world has improved 
greatly in recent years, a trend that is continuing in many countries. However, the 
incentive framework continues to suffer from a number of deficiencies, such as the high 
barriers to entry; moreover, in some countries, some primary sectors are still reserved for 
local firms only. Almost everywhere, registration requirements for foreign investors are 
burdensome, thus raising transaction costs. 
 
The inefficiency of the domestic business environment is present in many developing 
countries, with a high degree of government intervention within the market as well as 
the rigidity of government policies towards trade liberalisation; the lack of privatisation 
programmes and the outdating investment codes, the non-adoption of international FDI 
agreements and the lack of effective regional trade integration efforts make developing 
economies lose out in terms of FDI. 
 
The deficient incentives for investment are also an important factor. Developing 
countries governments are making considerable efforts to streamline incentives and 
harmonise them through the ratification of regional agreements or Common Investment 
Charters. However, many developing economies retain generous investment incentives, 
and the authorities maintain considerable discretionary powers on the allocation of 
incentives. 
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Developing nations are also lagging behind in the development of their competitive 
factors of production. Economic, rather than policy factors are likely to be bigger 
constraints to FDI in many developing regions (UNCTAD, 2011). 
 
During the last 10 years, education, health and infrastructure indicators have worsened in 
many developing economies. Improving the competitiveness of developing economies’ 
investment climate is a major challenge in light of deteriorating education and health 
systems (at least in some countries), poor physical infrastructure and lack of support 
services for enterprises.   
 
Thanks to the G8 debt relief deal in June 2005, many developing countries could focus 
more on raising social indicators and physical infrastructure, and on rebuilding 
institutional capacity (UNCTAD, 2011). 
 
I.1.4.2 FDI trends by mode of entry 
 
According to the UNCTAD survey (2010-2012), greenfield investment was the major 
trend in FDI inflow to developing and transition economies, while merger and 
acquisition and other non-equity modes of entry were more significant in developed 
countries. Moreover, the interest to invest in developed economies has declined over the 
last few years and it seems to be continuing over the next few years. The main argument 
for MNEs is the consequence of the global economic crisis as well as the saturation of 
developed markets. The value of cross-border merger and acquisitions deals increased 
by 36 per cent in 2010 to $339 billion, although it was still far from the 2007 peak. 
Meanwhile, the number of greenfield projects fell marginally in 2010 (Figure 1.5). 
 
The world investment report (2011:10) suggests that “Developing and transition 
economies tend to host greenfield investment rather than cross- border M&As. More 
than two-thirds of the total value of greenfield investment is directed to these economies, 
while only 25 per cent of cross-border M&As are undertaken there. At the same time, 
investors from these economies are becoming increasingly important players in cross-
border M&A markets, which previously were dominated by developed country players”. 
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Table 1.3 the global net cross border M&A (by deals) vs the net Greenfield projects 
 
  net cross border M&A greenfield investments 
  2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 
world 5004 7018 6425 4239 5405 10560 12245 16422 14192 14142 
developed 
countries  3805 5187 4603 2920 3638 5145 6355 7526 6618 6766 
 developing 
countries 1062 1552 1501 975 1290 4509 5110 7728 6731 6470 
Source: UNCTAD, 2011 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2011 
Figure 1.5 the evolution of Greenfield, M&As Projects between 2005 and 2010 
 
 
For the prospect of FDI by mode of entry, market analysts suggest that the economic 
recovery would allow more capital abundance (that could be in favour of M&As). 
Moreover, the rise of developing and transition economies as a preferred destination for 
foreign investment would balance the choice between Greenfield and M&As. The 
growth of developing economies’ companies would increase the chance of M&As, while 
the increase of the rent capture within the market could increase Greenfield investment.  
 
The data collected from 2010 shows more dynamic growth for M&As than Greenfield. 
This tendency is estimated to be more significant in the next few years, and is expected 
to remain for the short to middle-term due to the high uncertainty in the world 
investment climate (UNCTAD survey, 2011-2013). 
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I.1.4.3 FDI trends by sector 
 
After a strong period of growth between 2005 and 2008, FDI inflows and outflows 
slumped in all three sectors (primary, manufacturing and services) in 2009. The global 
economic and financial turmoil continued to dampen FDI flows not only in sectors 
sensitive to business cycles, such as chemicals and the automobile industry, but also in 
those that were relatively healthy in 2008, such as pharmaceutical and food and beverage 
industries.  
 
However, the total value of FDI projects in manufacturing increased by 23% in 2010, 
compared with 2009, reaching $554 billion. The economic downturn had a negative 
impact on a range of manufacturing industries (Figure 1.6), but the shock could 
eventually demonstrate the benefit to the sector, as many MNEs were forced to 
restructure into more productive and profitable activities with attendant effects on FDI 
(UNCTAD, 2011). 
 
FDI in the primary sector decreased in 2010 in spite of rising demand for raw materials 
and energy resources, and high commodity prices (particularly from BRIC countries). 
FDI projects (including cross-border M&A and greenfield investments) amounted to 
$254 billion in 2010, increasing the share of the primary sector to 22% - an increase of 
14% compared with the pre-crisis period. Large natural resource-based MNEs, mainly 
from emerging economies, made some important acquisitions in the primary sector. For 
instance, Repsol (Brazil) was taken over by China’s Sinopec Group for $7 billion, and 
the purchase of the Carabobo block in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela by a group 
of investors from India for $4.8 billion (UNCTAD, 2011). 
  
In 2010, the service sector continued to decline sharply, in relation to both 2009 and the 
pre-crisis level of activity. Major Service industries (business services, finance, transport 
and telecommunications and utilities) fell, albeit at different speeds. Business services 
declined by 8% compared with the pre-crisis level, as MNEs are increasingly seeking to 
reduce their production costs by outsourcing a major share of their non-core businesses 
to external providers. 
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FDI in the financial industry was at the heart of the current economic crisis, and the 
sector is experiencing a severe decline. According to the UNCTAD survey (2011-2013), 
there is no obvious sign of sector recovery in the medium-term. Over the past decade, its 
expansion was instrumental in escorting emerging economies into the global financial 
system by providing emerging economies with a stable and efficient financial system. 
Conversely, it also produced a bubble of unsustainable lending, which had to burst. 
When erupting, this had a major effect on the current financial crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2011 
Figure 1.6 sectorial distribution of FDI project (Billion dollars and percentage) 
 
Looking at foreign investment by sector in Africa, manufacturing was under severe 
strain. FDI inflows to the primary sector were at a low level due to the fall in commodity 
prices and the lack of international financial resources; several mining exploration and 
exploitation activities were postponed or cancelled. The services sector, led by the 
telecommunication industry, became the dominant FDI recipient, attracting the largest 
share of cross-border M&As in Africa. While the distribution of FDI by industry shows 
a concentration in the mining industry in terms of value, the manufacturing sector 
accounted for more than 40 % of the total number of greenfield investment projects in 
2009 (UNCTAD,2011). 
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I.1.4.4 FDI in the telecommunication sector 
 
Foreign investment is increasingly playing a more important role in either the domestic 
or international telecommunication market. By increasing the amount of FDI in 
telecommunication sectors, foreign capital is raised either through a share offering or the 
sale of a minority share of the stated-owned operators to foreign partners. Under the 
process of deregulation and the privatisation of telecommunication industries, there are 
increasing numbers of opportunities for foreign investors to establish foreign 
subsidiaries or to combine with others in joint ventures.  
 
On the other hand, because telecommunications has tight links with major economic 
sectors, such as manufacturing, service and financial sectors, it has a dual role as both a 
traded product and service, and as a facilitator of trade in other products and services.  
 
Knowing the FDI positive effect, developing countries began privatising their public 
telecommunication market from the 1990s. By deregulating domestic 
telecommunication regimes, governments aim to make the telecommunication markets 
more efficient and attractive to foreign investors. This could increase competition and 
promote innovation, lowering prices for most businesses and consumers, providing wide 
choice services, improving the standard of living by the increase of technology and the 
stimulation of other sectors such as education, health etc. These positive effects would 
promote the capacity of telecommunication in developing countries and benefit the 
formation of a “world village.” 
 
Another reason is the willingness to be an integrated part of the global economy, by 
having access to high-speed data networks, cellular radio, mobile satellite services and 
expending Internet usage to households and schools. 
 
As an example, the figure below (1.7) demonstrates the impact of privatisation on 
mobile sector in some developing countries. In the three countries selected, the 
deregulation of the telecommunication sector has led to a significant increase of the 
penetration rate.  
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       Source: International Telecommunication Union, 2009.  
Note that year 0 represents the year of the liberalization of the sector  
        Figure 1.7 the impact of privatisation on mobile in some developing countries 
 
As a result of liberalisation, the telecommunication sector in developing economies, 
once comprised of monopolistic domestic providers, has become a multiplayer global 
sector.  
 
According to the World Telecommunications Report (2009), since the 1990s many 
developing economies began deregulating the sector either by opening the sector to local 
and foreign investors or through joint venture with local operators or by selling assets of 
state companies to foreign investors as a way to expand networks, develop new services, 
and generate revenue through license fees. FDI also brought stronger, longer 
commitments than other types of foreign investment, as well as capital, technological 
boost, new skills and management approaches. For instance, between 1990 and 2008, 
around 125 of 154 developing countries received foreign investment in 
telecommunications. The regulatory improvements required to achieve the deregulation 
goal often include opening markets to new players, rebalancing retail tariffs, establishing 
an effective cost-based interconnection regime and securing reasonable access to 
existing infrastructures. 
 
Consequently, international telephone traffic and revenue grew rapidly since the late 
1990s. This growth, along with the explosion of mobile phones and internet usage, 
encouraged large telecommunication corporations to expand from their highly 
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competitive home markets, which were characterised by relatively slow growth, into 
emerging markets with increasing growth and prospects. The figure below (1.8) 
highlights the evolution of the mobile subscribers in both developing and developed 
countries, while the growth of mobile subscribers in developed countries has stagnated. 
Due to the increase of FDI investment, the number of subscribers in developing 
countries has rocketed in recent years.  
 
This tendency is predicted to remain in the middle-term, as analysts suggest that the 
telecommunication sector is not suffering as a result of from the economic crisis. 
Consumers are still attracted by mobile technology; 3G, smart phones and improved 
infrastructures have only fuelled the continuing uptake of mobility around the world. 
The number of Internet subscribers continues to increase as the penetration of both fixed 
and mobile broadband becomes more accessible around the world. Large MNEs like 
Deutsche Telecom, Vodafone and France Telecom-Orange continue their expansion 
plans, especially in emerging markets. Furthermore, the growth of large 
telecommunication groups from the BRIC group (Brazil, China and Russia) for instance: 
VimpelCom (Russia), Zte and Huawei (China) are investing in both developing and 
developed countries. For example, VimpelCom has taken over Orascom, while Zte and 
Huawei are both investing in developing the network in Africa and Europe. The 
prediction for the coming years looks brighter for the telecommunication sector with 
investment more likely in M&As than greenfield operations (UNCTAD survey 2010-
2012). 
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       Source: International Telecommunication Union, 2009.  
 
Figure 1.8 the evolution of mobile subscribers in both developing and developed 
countries 
 
Strong telecommunication foreign direct investments, especially when accompanied by 
market reforms that introduce competition, have been shown to drive the build-out of 
national networks, enhance their quality and drive down their costs. These developments 
are subject to sound and reliable legal, political and regulatory frameworks, economic 
stability and a generally healthy business environment. 
 
I.1.4.4.1 the Impact of FDI in mobile sector and economic growth in developing 
countries  
 
Over the last five years, FDI in mobile sector has seen a sustainable growth and has a 
major impact on both the economy and society, particularly in the developing world. 
Apart from the anecdotal evidence about how mobile phones have created business 
opportunities particularly in developing economies, there is an emerging literature 
examining the link between the use of mobile phones and economic growth in 
developing countries. 
In fact, mobiles have spawned new content and equipment industries to serve the 
booming mobile sector and its users. Since in developing countries mobiles are 
substitutes for fixed lines while in developed countries they are usually complements, 
the latter group experiences a much higher growth dividend.  
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The world Telecom/ICT report (2010) suggests that the impact of mobile sector on 
economic growth could be twice as high in developing countries compared to developed 
countries since mobiles are not just a different or additional way of communication but 
have opened up entirely new communication means. The reports emphasis the role of 
mobiles in developing and low-income economies, as it can do for underserved areas 
what fixed telephone lines did in many other regions and countries years ago: widen 
markets, create better information flow, lower transaction costs, and substitute for costly 
physical transport. 
 
Besides, the spread of telecommunications should improve growth and consumer well-
being in emerging countries. Hardy (1980) found that the impact of telecoms investment 
was highest in the least developed economies and lower in advanced economies due to 
the wide availability of fixed-line telephony and other complementary technologies in 
the developed economies. UNCTAD (2008) suggests that wireless technologies are 
much lower cost to roll out over large areas than fixed line systems and state that internal 
rate of return generated by FDI investments in developing countries telecoms of around 
20% as a result, mobile can hypothetically play a vital role in economic development of 
these economies. 
FDI in mobile telecommunications in Africa and the developing world is a remarkable 
story. There have been large infrastructure investments, which have enabled millions of 
people to communicate better. While many researches tend to focus on low absolute 
rates of mobile penetration, this underestimates the real impact that FDI is having 
through the innovative and entrepreneurial ways in which the technology, knowledge 
and know-how have been extended beyond the model of individual ownership. Millions 
of jobs have been created and some very successful joint venture companies and local 
SMEs have emerged. Some examples of success stories of the impact of FDI in mobile 
sector come from: Bangladesh, South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria. 
 
One of the most popularly cited mobile business success stories is that of 
GrameenPhone, taking place in Bangladesh. Based on the concept that ‘good 
development is good business’, the mobile operator, which first launched its services in 
Bangladesh in 1997, has done a fair job at combining social and economic development.  
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Through its low pricing strategy, According to the World Telecommunication/ICT 
report (2006:51) “the company was able to increase competition, quickly bring down 
prices in the telecommunication sector and help increase mobile penetration from 0.3 
percent in 1997 to over six percent by the end of 2005. Besides connecting previously 
remote and unconnected areas, the company’s Village Phone (VP) Program has allowed 
mainly low-income women in rural areas to borrow enough money to buy a handset, a 
subscription and cover incidental expenses so as to start their own pay phone 
service…..telecom services and enhancing the social status of women, GrameenPhone 
has had a major macroeconomic impact and created new employment opportunities. In 
addition to employing over 1’000 people, the company has created more than 100’000 
jobs, including for dealers, agents, contractors, suppliers, and Village Phone operators. 
GrameenPhone is also one of Bangladesh’s largest private sector investors, as well as 
one of largest taxpayers in the country”. 
 
In South Africa, Vodafone’s subsidiary Vodacom, supplies community phones in phone 
shops run by local businesses under franchise. “Vodacom offers business training and 
support to franchisees to help them make their business a success. Around 5’000 
community phone shops have been established, either housed in customised shipping 
containers or, for example, as part of spaza shops (small grocery stores in the country). 
Apart from providing access to telecommunications for people who cannot afford their 
own phone, phone shops are also bringing additional benefits. More than 20’000 jobs 
have been created and the shops help attract many other businesses, boosting local 
economies. In addition, the franchise system adopted by Vodacom is helping to 
empower women, with around 40 percent of franchises held by women” (World 
Telecommunication/ICT report, 2006:51). 
 
In Nigeria, since the deregulation of the telecommunications industry, the number of 
telephone lines has grown from about 400,000 to approximately 30 million users.  In 
addition to increasing the teledensity ratio in the country, telecom industry have created 
employment and spurred growth in ancillary industry. The telecommunication regulator 
(NCC) estimated that in March 2004 alone, the telecom sector created 5’000 new jobs 
directly and primarily due to the growth in the mobile sector (World 
Telecommunication/ICT report, 2006). 
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In Algeria, The Algeria Telecommunications and Postal Reform Loan (a TA and 
investment loan), for instance, helped the Government to create an independent regulator 
and to introduce competition in the mobile and data sector. Two new mobile licenses 
were awarded to private operators in 2001 and 2004 through a transparent and 
competitive bidding process for a total cost of $737million and $421 million 
respectively. Algeria, previously a laggard in telecommunications reform, has jumped to 
the forefront in the region. The number of mobile subscribers increased from about 
100,000 in 2001 to about 33 million by the end of 2011, improving the penetration from 
5.6 percent to 65 percent. The country attracted a total of $7 billion foreign direct 
investment in the telecommunications sector over the life of the project from 2001 to 
20012 and is effectively contributing to reduce the high unemployment rate of the 
country (Oxford Business Group, 2011). 
 
I.1.5 Conclusion 
 
During the last few decades, FDI has increased rapidly worldwide, and has improved 
economic growth in both developed and developing countries. It represents a major 
source of capital, technological and managerial capabilities, industrial upgrading labour 
force, as well as the introduction of modern management and accounting methods. 
 
By bridging the gap between domestic savings and investment and by improving 
knowledge spillover, FDI could play a vital role in economic growth in the developing 
countries. Although, most of the developing countries governments have been taking 
drastic reforms to attract FDI by restructuring their economy, liberalizing their policy 
strategy and offering various incentive packages; such as tax concessions, trade 
liberalization, creation of special economic zones and access of credit lines for foreign 
investors only a few of them, mostly Asian countries with large domestic market are 
successful in attracting FDI. 
 
The telecommunication sector plays a dual role in economic activities, not only a distinct 
circle in economic system, but also a supplying mean for other important sectors. FDI in 
telecommunication would allow technology transfer, more abundant capital and 
increased market competition, which would benefit the entire host country economy. 
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Chapter I Section 2: Algeria and the Telecommunications Industry 
I.2.1 The Algerian economic background 
In an effort to increase the competitiveness of the economy, the authorities launched in 2004 
a US$200 billion public investment programme (PIP) to enhance or build new 
infrastructures. Moreover, a set of rules (such as trade liberalisation, public sector enterprise 
restructuring and privatisation, support to private investment or financial sector reforms) 
were adopted since the late 1990s to help promote the diversification of the economy based 
on a vibrant domestic private investment sector. So far, the adoption of these measures has 
yielded mixed results and has failed to boost significantly domestic private investment. 
 
Rigorous economic management, plus significant revenues from the hydrocarbons exports, 
have allowed the country to enjoy a fiscal surplus and improve its external position in recent 
years. The Algerian government has accumulated its savings in an oil stabilisation fund 
(Fonds de Régulation des Recettes, FRR) that has, in part, financed a sizeable public 
infrastructure programme. Thanks to the increase of government expenditure, GDP 
continued to grow even during the global economic downturn. In fact, the non-hydrocarbons 
GDP grew by more than 9%, regardless of a considerable fall in hydrocarbons-related GDP, 
and overall GDP increased by 2.4% in 2009 (IMF, 2011). However, resulting from a decline 
in government revenues and an increase in expenditures, public finances suffered during 
2009, when the economy has seen its first fiscal deficit in a decade. According to the IMF, 
in 2008 the fiscal surplus amounted to 8% of GDP, while the loss was around 7% in 2009 
(IMF, 2011). 
 
In 2010, as oil prices recovered, the deficit declined to 4% of GDP. This constant fiscal 
shortfall is at least partly due to the costs linked to the 2010-14 government to improve the 
country’s economic infrastructures and human capital (Public Programme for Economic and 
Social Development). The authorities have injected around €222 billion in the local 
economy to upgrade the country’s infrastructure; including the completion of major public 
works including infrastructure for public works, transport, and improving social 
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development such as health and education, the construction of 2 million affordable houses 
by the end of 2014 (IMF, 2011).  
 
Thanks to the growth of hydrocarbon revenue and the government’s strategy to reduce 
imports, the country has been able to maintain a positive current account balance. However, 
when oil prices dropped in 2009, Algeria’s current account went from a surplus of nearly 
20% of GDP in 2008 to less than 1% in 2009. The country’s balance of payment achieved a 
surplus of 8.5% of GDP for 2010 and projected a positive balance of 9.3% in 2011 (IMF, 
2011). The country has also been able to amass significant foreign currency reserves, 
estimated at approximately €117billion at the end of 2010. Algeria has also been able to 
reduce dramatically its external debt. 
 
Regarding the debt repayment, the country has paid out more than $118billion; of which 
$85billion was in debt reimbursement and more than $35billion was paid out as interest. 
The aim of the Algerian government is to become debt-free by obtaining sovereign rating 
with international agencies, such as Standard & Poor’s Fitch ratings. The challenge facing 
authorities is to allow the benchmark of sovereign that helps to maintain a healthy finance. 
This is a direct result of the government’s attempt to achieve a debt-free country. 
Consequently, the external debt as a percentage of GDP averaged 34.1% between 2000 and 
2005, but had fallen to 2.8% by the end of 2010 (IMF, 2011). 
 
Apart from a high level of public spending and substantial oil revenues, Algeria’s central 
bank has been effectively retaining low core inflation. However, in 2009, due to increasing 
food prices, consumer inflation reached 5.7%. In response, the government imposed price 
limits and subsidised prices for basic product consumption. In 2010, consumer inflation fell 
again to 5.5%, but continued price increases have affected the nation’s purchasing power 
and caused a social unrest, prompting the government to temporarily eliminate taxes on 
certain consumer items in early 2011. The IMF predicts that price increases will continue to 
ease in 2012, projecting inflation around 5%.   
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Another key determinant of the economy is the unemployment rate. According to the IMF, 
unemployment remains the biggest challenge facing the Algerian authorities. In spite of the 
government’s determination to diversify the economy, the hydrocarbon sector still 
dominates the economy, limiting job creation, especially in labour-intensive agribusiness 
and manufacturing. The unemployment rate has undeniably improved in recent years, 
stabilising at 10% during 2010. However, youth unemployment remains high, at 21% at the 
end of 2010, recovering from an average of 50% only a decade ago.  
 
The visit of an IMF delegation at the end of May 2010 culminated in a positive report about 
the progression of the country, highlighting the government’s efforts to reshape the 
economy. However, the commission warned that the country still relies heavily on the 
hydrocarbon sector, and called for Algeria to encourage internal and external investments in 
other sectors of the economy. In fact, according to the Minister of Energy and Mines, both 
the government and the IMF agreed that Algeria will inject $140billion over 10 years to 
build and upgrade its economic infrastructure, promote FDI and local investments. This will 
support the development of the local small and medium companies as well as the private 
sector in the country (IMF, 2010). 
 
“Doing Business 2012”, published by the World Bank, analyses the business environment 
and the degree of openness of the economy in 183 countries. As Figure 1.9 indicates, 
Algeria is ranked 148th, down by 5 places from 2011 (143th), and ranked136th which 
indicates clearly that the business climate in the country is regressing. Compared with the 
Middle East and North African countries, it placed 15th out of 18 countries. The report 
blames the poor ranking on recurrent problems with taxes and customs procedures, and 
other obstacles linked to the Algerian regulatory environment.  
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Source: World Bank, 2012 
 
Figure: 1.9 Algeria’s business environment ranking 
 
 
Despite the country’s low rankings, the World Bank has praised the Algerian government 
for its efforts to improve the country’s business and legal environment. The government 
agreed a new building code and reduced the costs involved in registering property. A tax on 
property-linked capital gains was also removed. In terms of judicial reforms, the country has 
modernised its infrastructure by computerising its courts and introducing a new code of civil 
procedure. IMF experts criticise Algeria for having a “stop and go” relationship with the 
liberalisation of its economy. Political decisions are often conditioned by the short-term 
outlook for oil revenue; thus, providing that the cash inflows are high, policies are allowed 
to shift towards liberalisation. When the outlook becomes more sensitive, protectionism 
becomes a bigger priority. Recently, the country has introduced two new measures that aim 
to improve the business climate, adding to remaining uncertainty over the legal framework.  
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I.2.2 The impact of the new investment legislation on FDI flow to Algeria  
The 2009 additional budget law and the 2010 supplement to the money and credit law 
introduced a new FDI policy, which could have important economic implications for 
Algeria. Although the stated goal is to promote domestic private investment by supporting 
local SMEs, this new strategy could have negative repercussions and may hamper efforts to 
diversify the country’s economy out of the hydrocarbon sector. 
The new investment decree was approved in May 2009, imposing all trading companies 
registered with local authorities to open 30% of their capital to domestic partners. The 
measure was followed by the complementary finance act (LFC) 2009, published on July 26, 
2009. According to this law, all foreign direct investment (FDI) projects are required to 
have an ownership structure of 49-51%, in which the domestic partners own the majority 
stake, removing, therefore, ownership by foreign investors. Furthermore, a new tax was 
introduced by the government on 01 January 2009. This consists of 15% tax transfers on 
capital abroad from MNEs operating in the country. This tax was not only applied to the 
energy sector, but also in other sectors, such as the pharmaceutical industry where a few 
international firms were granted four years of free taxation whereby laboratories could 
import without restrictions. However, after this grace period, the government obliged them 
either to invest in the production of drugs or to leave the country (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2010). 
The Algerian government justified this measure by arguing that MNEs tend to be profit-
based and they tend to transfer their entire profit to their home countries rather than 
reinvesting it in the local economy. It could also bring a pool of domestic investors into key 
projects. Despite their minority stakes, MNEs can still control the management, but are 
expected to transfer the knowledge and skills to their local partners. 
Although the main objective was to improve economic growth, the new FDI rules 
introduced tax concessions for local entrepreneurs, and new tax rules for the import of 
goods and services, a series of actions to encourage the contribution of domestic financial 
institutions in the economy, and a more restrictive FDI regime. The FDI rules also included 
some measures to reduce the imports bill, which had grown considerably in recent years and 
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was considered a potential risk to economic stability. These restriction measures included 
more severe controls on external trade operations and a ban on consumer credit (excluding 
mortgages). 
The government’s new investment legislations were criticized by foreign investors, who 
accused the government of creating barriers to investment, intervening in the market and 
acting in favour of a few firms, and warn that this new shift towards investment would 
jeopardise the presence of multinationals in the country. The European Union, led by the 
French, British, Italian and Spanish ambassadors in Algeria, have urged the government to 
withdraw the new law regarding foreign investors, removing all barriers of entry to the local 
market as well as respecting the bilateral agreement between Algeria and the European 
Union (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010). 
According to the ministry of investment figures, in 2010 nearly 200 foreign firms withdrew 
from the Algerian market (mainly in the energy sector) due essentially to the new energy 
law allowing the national companies Sonatrach and Sonalgaz to be associated with all 
foreign investment in the country’s hydrocarbon sector. While the economic analysis 
suggests that the introduction of new investment policies shows a growing confidence by 
the Algerian government to manage its own business without a foreign hand, aiming to 
encourage local investment and continue to stimulate the foreign investment and partnership 
(The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010). 
Furthermore, the state also retains pre-emptive rights in the sale of assets and requires that 
the National Council of Investments approve all new projects. For all external trade 
operations, MNEs are now required to file a letter of credit (crédit documentaire; 
CREDOC). Tax identification numbers are also required for all external trade transactions. 
 
A tax cut for leasing purchases, known as credit bail, was presented as proof that the 
authorities wanted to encourage private domestic investment. The government has injected 
€1.47billion in capital over to the National Investment Fund and transferred AD48m 
(€471,000) to a public investment fund that gives assistance to small and medium-sized 
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enterprises (SMEs). Finally, the cap on government guarantees for SMEs loans was raised 
to AD250m (€2.45m), up from AD50m (€491,000) (IMF, 2011). 
 
Unlike other middle-income economies, Algeria has failed to attract large amounts of FDI. 
Figure 2.3.2 shows the evolution of FDI flows to Algeria in comparison with countries from 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, middle-income countries, the BRICs 
(Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and a group of diversified commodity exporters from 
1980 to 2009.  
 
 
                                                                       Source: IMF, 2011 
 
Figure 1.10 FDI flows to Algeria in comparison to (MENA) region, middle-income 
countries, the BRICs and a group of diversified commodity exporters from 1980 to 2009 
 
 
The figure shows that Algeria is not an attractive country for investment as it received little 
FDI. Most foreign investment (36 percent of total) is focused on the hydrocarbon sector, 
which is well below MENA and income level averages. Moreover, the group of diversified 
commodity exporters and the BRICs received large amounts of FDI flows, well above the 
middle-income category. 
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Another concern is the country’s attractiveness to FDI lowering further after the 
enforcement of the FDI rules. Figure 1.11 highlights the evolution of FDI to Algeria from 
2003 to the first semester of 2010 (excluding the hydrocarbon and financial sectors). The 
figure indicates a significant fall of FDI in 2009 with no significant recovery in 2010, 
whereas other emerging economies have experienced a visible FDI recovery. 
 
 
 
                                                                                   Source: IMF, 2011 
 
Figure 1.11 FDI net inflow to Algeria by sector, USD billion, 2003 -2010 
 
In contrast, the lack of FDI flow could have a negative impact on the country’s growth 
prospects, as both theoretical and empirical frameworks suggest a positive impact of FDI on 
economic growth (Dunning, 1980, 1988; Borezstein, de Gregorio and Lee, 1995; and Ram 
and Zhang, 2002).  
 
Moreover, in a global economy where control of knowledge and technology are key factors 
for multinational enterprises success, ownership limits, such as those described in Algeria’s 
new investment policies, could discourage MNEs. For multinational prospects, sole venture  
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investments are indispensable for operating overseas in order to protect the firm’s 
competitive advantage and safeguard its internal knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1993) 
 
An additional consequence of FDI restriction policy is the possible negative effect on export 
and economic diversification. Banga (2006) and Buckley et al (2002) argue that FDI can 
help stimulate export diversification and performance. These results suggest, in the case of 
Algeria, that the fall in FDI could hamper the government’s efforts to diversify the economy 
and make it more dependent on the energy sector. 
 
In terms of the possible impact of the world financial crisis and the crash of oil prices, the 
Algerian Prime Minster, Mr Ahmed Ouyahia, declared in October 2010 that Algeria is 
supposed to be safe and not likely to be hit by any financial shock as the Algerian stock 
market is pretty new and not fully integrated in the world financial stock markets. 
 
This opinion was supported completely by the IMF commission experts who insisted that 
Algeria will not suffer from the financial crisis. The IMF expert warned that, due to the 
inflexibility of the Algerian economy and the lack of openness in the world market, the 
country’s heavy dependency on hydrocarbon revenue could weaken the its financial 
position, especially in the event of an oil price drop. The IMF commission highlighted that, 
with a tradition of high savings, abundant of skills workers, diversity of natural resources, 
and an advantageous geographic location, the country has a huge potential for swift and 
sustainable growth in all economic sectors. A more favourable business environment is 
needed to support the development of the emerging private sector, as the vital pillar of 
sustainable growth and employment generation strategy, as well as reducing the country’s 
dependence on the oil sector (IMF, 2011). 
 
2012 is announced to be very promising with the accomplishment of major new investments 
in the country and the upgrade of the existing infrastructure, which will probably expose 
Algeria to new economic areas. Furthermore, joining the Arab Free Trade on 01 January 
2009, and the new deal to join the world trade organisation by mid-2012, would create new 
prospects for the country while encouraging FDI flow and strengthening its position as one 
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of the major players in the Mediterranean region. In addition, the country’s wealthy reserves 
could help protect Algeria from the global financial crisis as the debt is kept down to $600m 
and foreign exchange reserves reached $150billion in October 2010, making Algeria the 
first African and Arabic country and the fourteenth in the world in terms of foreign 
exchange reserves (IMF, 2011). 
 
After examining the Algerian economy, and in order to improve the economy and make it a 
more attractive destination for FDI, I suggest the following based on the World Bank (2009) 
report: 
First, infrastructure development and macroeconomic stability are essential for export 
diversification. Algeria should continue upgrading its economic infrastructures, improving 
its business climate. In this respect, the country is lagging behind its North African 
neighbours due to inefficient structural reform measures. Reforms in key sectors, such as 
banking and finance as well as exploiting the country’s potential in the service industry, are 
essential to promote the economic diversification and increase the country’s attractiveness 
to foreign capitals.  
 
Second, the policy towards FDI is also vital for the development of a private sector-led 
export industry. FDI to Algeria has been traditionally scarce and has been flowing mostly to 
the hydrocarbon sector. Third, the new FDI law is likely to discourage MNEs by putting 
restrictions on control ownership and tax profits. The government should review its FDI 
strategy to attract more foreign capital by creating a more FDI-friendly regime. 
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I.2.3 Overview of the Algerian telecommunication sector 
 
Investment in telecommunications is essential for broad-based economic development. The 
dual role of telecommunications as both a traded service and a vehicle for trade in other 
service sectors means that price reductions, improvements in the level of investment and the  
development of infrastructure and services through liberalisation would provide the 
necessary platform for the growth of the other economic sectors.  
 
In late 1999, the Algerian government decided to deregulate the telecommunication sector. 
Poor services provided by the sole player in the sector - the state-owned company (Algerie 
Telecom) led to shortages of supply, obsolete technology, limited and poor quality of 
services, unbalanced tariff structure, very high tariffs for long-distance communication and 
abnormally low rates for local communication, monthly subscription charges and 
inappropriate regulation (World Bank, 2003). 
 
The government wanted to improve the sector’s internal ef¿ciency and strengthen its 
competitiveness through market liberalisation which allows the creation of a multi-operator 
market structure to mobilise private sector participation. The establishment of a sound 
regulatory framework, promotion of private investments by stimulating the participation of 
the local SMEs in the market, ensure a sound access to telecommunication services and 
information networks by the rural population and other disadvantaged groups. The 
government anticipated the impact that rural connectivity will have on achieving a balanced 
economic development, as well as its significant contribution in curbing the country’s 
insecurity. By doing this, the Algerian authorities hope to build a reliable national network 
connected to the Internet and consider that telecommunication reform was the key driver to 
modernising the country’s economic infrastructure and attractiveness to local foreign 
investment. 
Since the deregulation of telecommunication, the sector has continued to grow gradually, 
from a turnover of AD51.6billion (€506.6m) in 2002 to AD361.2billion (€3.55bn) in 2008. 
Although its contribution to GDP declined from 6.3% in 2002 to 4.05% in 2008, this is due 
largely to an increase in international oil prices.  
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As a percentage of GDP, Telecommunication has actually improved from a low of 3.55% in 
2007, a trend in-line with the fall in oil prices. With 8,700 people working in the mobile 
segment alone as of 2008, and an estimated 10,000 people by mid-2012, the sector 
represents a significant source of employment (ARPT, 2011). 
 
From the MNE perspective, since the liberalisation and deregulation of the country’s 
telecommunication market, the sector has become a huge potential for investors. According 
to the regulatory authority for telecommunications report (2010), the motivation for MNEs 
to invest in the Algerian sector was driving the country’s market size with significant 
consumer base of almost 36 million people and its hydrocarbon wealth. The Algerian 
market was underexploited as it was monopolised by the state-owned Algerie Telecom 
(AT), which controlled both the fixed-line and mobile telephone services. Deregulating the 
telecommunication sector, the Algerian government decided to offer private licenses to 
investors from around the world. The government incentives and the overall stability of the 
tax regime, a relatively stable political environment after a decade of civil war and the 
political effort to improve the country’s image and openness to international trade through 
different agreements, represent important determinants for investment decisions. 
 
But, according to the Oxford Business Group report (2011), there is another key dimension 
for multinationals to choose Algeria as a location for investment. This is the opportunity to 
capture monopoly rents that could be earned by taking advantage of government legislation 
and policies; for example, after negotiating with the Algerian government, Orascom 
Telecom Algerie, the first MNE to invest in telecommunication, agreed to invest and 
upgrade the outdated infrastructure. Conversely, the government agreed to allow the firm to 
be the sole MNE in the sector for four years. Because of the lack of competition in the 
market and the inefficiency of the state-owned company, the firm could set a price that is 
significantly higher than the marginal cost of producing the service, so, in this case, we 
revert to a monopolistic market. 
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For a general overview of the Algerian telecommunication sector, the mobile market 
exceeded all expectations in 2005 when it continued to grow by around 200% for the fourth 
consecutive year and soared past the 50% market penetration mark. Mobile subscriber 
numbers soared from just 86,000 in 2000 to over 30 million in December 2010; the latter 
represents a 91.68% penetration rate (ARPT, 2011). The dynamic growth of the mobile 
sector has come at the expense of the fixed-line market, which slowed as mobile subscriber 
numbers accelerated. The fixed-line penetration stood at 7.22% in 2009, down from 8.97% 
in 2008, and fixed-line provision remains the preserve of state-owned Algérie Télécom 
(AT), after private operator Lacom withdrew in November 2008. Although the volume of 
land-line subscribers is not insignificant, with Algeria ranking second in North Africa and 
fourth in the Arab world after Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, it has hardly expanded beyond 
3 million subscribers since 2006. There should be potential for growth in fixed-line 
subscriptions as there is a huge appetite and the availability of ADSL increases. 
 
According to the ARPT figures, Internet usage grew gradually from 2004, with penetration 
rates increasing in 2008 and 2009. From just 50,000 users in 2000, the sector accounted for 
more than4.1m users in 2009, up from 3.5m in 2008, representing a penetration rate of 12% 
(ARPT, 2011). Although the sector regulatory body ARPT (Autorité de Régulation de la 
Poste et des Télécommunications; created in 2000 the ARPT is responsible for setting the 
regulatory framework of the sector, as well as for awarding licences and authorisations to 
operators and settling disputes the market is heading toward saturation.) has licensed more 
than 80 Internet service providers (ISPs) since the sector opened up in 1998, AT remains the 
main dominant with a market share of 95%. Although ARPT continued to licence many 
firms, the hegemony of AT remains a considerable obstacle facing local or foreign 
investments. Table 2.3.1 shows the evolution of Internet subscribers and the penetration rate 
before and after the liberalisation of the market. 
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Table 1.4 The evolution of Internet subscribers in the Algerian Telecommunication sector 
 
Year Subscribers Population Penetration 
rate 
2000 50,000 31,795,500 0.2 
2005 1,920,000 33,033,546 5.8 
2007 2,460,000 33,506,567 7.3 
2008 3,500,000 33,769,669 10.4 
2009 4,100,000 34,178,188 12 
                                                   Source: ARPT, 2010 
 
Despite the government’s continued efforts to modernise it, the Internet sector remains 
underdeveloped and lags behind the neighbourhood North African countries, particularly in 
terms of service provision. The growing population, large local market and strong state 
commitment all suggest that expansion lies ahead. If the regulatory environment is opened 
up, especially for ISPs, and investments in the necessary infrastructure continue apace, the 
potential for growth is high (Oxford Business Group, 2011). According to the ARPT, 
telecommunication development remains promising after a flattening of penetration rates at 
around 80% in 2007 and 2008. Subscriber numbers rose by a further 21% from end-2008 to 
end-2009, and overall sector growth stood at 13% in 2008. 
 
Furthermore, the government is engaging in a very ambitious and challenging plan creating 
an electronic government. The project, called “e-Algérie 2013” is a wide-ranging and 
ambitious five-year plan to regenerate the ICT environment by developing a high-quality 
and high-speed telecommunication infrastructure As well as boosting the Internet 
penetration and the extension of Internet use in homes, schools and the public sector, the 
government is using financial and tax incentives to attract more MNE IT companies 
(Oxford Business Group, 2011). 
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I.2.4 Analysis of the mobile sector:  
 
The mobile sector is considered as the backbone of the Algerian telecommunication market. 
Liberalised in 2002, Algeria's mobile market is experiencing a big boom by achieving more 
than 26 million subscribers in June 2009, and expects to reach 33 million by December 
2011(ARPT, 2011). With a penetration rate close to 63.7 %, compared with 0.26% in 2000 
to 91.68% in 2009, it represents remarkable growth over a nine-year period. Total 
subscriber numbers reached 32.73m in 2009, up from 27.03m in 2008, and a massive jump 
from 72,000 in 1999. The Algerian telecommunication market is becoming one of the 
fastest growing in the Middle East and Africa regions (Oxford Business Group, 2011). The 
sector is now served by three operators: AT, Orascom Telecom Algeria and Wataniya 
Telecom Algeria.  
 
The market had a relatively slow start until it was first stimulated by the entry of the second 
mobile operator, Orascom Telecom Algeria, who paid US$737 million for its mobile license 
in February 2002. The sector growth accelerated considerably in 2003 after the state-owned 
company, AT, created a new mobile subsidiary and rebranded its mobile activities as 
Mobilis. In addition, Wataniya Télécom Algérie, 80% owned by Qatar’s Qtel, entered the 
market in August 2004 under the trademark Nedjma, aggressively marketing and promotion 
offers; the first operator to offer multimedia, Internet and social network services. Since the 
entry of the third operator, the mobile segment has grown exponentially since liberalisation. 
In terms of figures, in August 2010 the Algerian market accounted for around 33 million 
subscribers. Djezzy led the sector with 14.6m subscribers and a market share of 44.66%; 
Mobilis ranked second with 9.4m subscribers and a market share of 30%; while Nedjma 
accounted for 8.2m subscribers and a 27% share. Analysts suggest that, by November 2011, 
the Algerian market will reach 35 million with a penetration rate of nearly 95%. Table 2.3.2 
analyses the evolution of the mobile subscribers and the penetration rate before and after the 
liberalisation of the market (ARPT, 2011). 
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Table 1.5 Mobile indicators, 1998-2010 
 
Year Subscribers Penetration rate 
1998 18,000 0.06 
1999 72,000 0.24 
2000 86,000 0.28 
2001 100,000 0.32 
2002 450,244 1.5 
2003 1,446,927 4.67 
2004 4,882,414 15.26 
2005 13,661,355 41.52 
2006 20,997,954 63.6 
2007 27,562,721 81.5 
2008 27,031,472 79.04 
2009 32,730,000 91.68 
2011 
estimated 35,228,893 95.00 
                                            Source: ARPT, 2011 
                                          
Growth across the mobile sector reached its highest point in 2008 as a result of the ARPT 
introducing an obligatory SIM registration scheme. The scheme aimed to tackle the 
country’s security issues and control illicit practice in the sector. As a result, the number of 
subscribers fell to 27.03m in 2008, from 27.56m in 2007, but picked up in 2009, 2010 and 
2011, due mainly to the price war and an aggressive marketing strategy engaged by the 
three players (Oxford Business Group, 2011). 
 
According to marketing consulting firm “TeleGeography”, expansion in Algeria’s mobile 
sector has matched growth across Africa, reaching 31.3% in 2009, and coming close to the 
2007 continental average of 31.8%. Among countries in the Arab world, Algeria has a high 
mobile penetration rate but is still far behind major markets such as the United Arab 
Emirates, where the penetration rate exceeds 190% and is expected to hit 250%, with 
Emirates Telecommunications Corporation (Etisalat) and Emirates Integrated 
Telecommunications Company (Du) aiming to launch 4G services by mid-2012 (Oxford 
Business Group, 2011). 
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Although ARPT was aiming to launch the 3G by winter 2006, an international call for 
tenders for 3G licensing suggested that customers may not be prepared for this cutting edge 
technology. Consequently, the ARPT decided to postpone the launch of the 3G licensing till 
the first quarter of 2011. But, because of the Djezzy crisis and the government’s negotiation 
to purchase the firm from its new Russian owner (Vimpelcom), the bid for the 3G licenced 
has been delayed again to mid-2012 (Oxford Business Group, 2011).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The implementation of a liberalised telecommunication sector in Algeria has significant 
benefits not only within the sector, but also for the national economy as a whole. The 
opening of Algerian telecommunication markets has facilitated the entry of domestic and 
foreign private capital, and technological skills that have, in turn, accelerated network build-
out, the provision of new services and improvements in the quality of service. Market 
liberalisation also has a profound effect on promoting development in other sectors, such as 
information technology and computing, which depend heavily on good, reliable and low-
cost telecommunication.  
 
The telecommunication sector is expected to enter a new era as mobile operators turn away 
from the chase for subscriber numbers in an increasingly saturated market, and look to offer 
value-added services and improved customer service, network coverage and introduce new 
product and services. In particular, the provision of data services is likely to ensure 
increased consumer spending which could increasingly boost the average revenue per user 
(ARPU).  
Furthermore, the important roles played by information and communications technology 
networks as a major determinant of the country’s degree of development pushed the 
Algerian government to introduce 3G to stimulate not only telecommunications, but all 
industries. The 3G technology could play a key role in achieving the government’s E-
economy goal by increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the education system, 
business and government. 
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Chapter Conclusion  
Over the past few decades, foreign investment has increased significantly among countries 
and has enhanced global economic growth. Empirical evidence shows that there is a positive 
a correlation between economic development and foreign direct investment inflow. For the 
emerging countries, for which FDI is an important source of technology, finance and 
knowledge, a major challenge is how to improve the country’s business environment in 
order to enhance their attractiveness for MNEs. Furthermore, Additional FDI in 
telecommunications would ease technology transfer and additional capital, and increase 
market competition, which should benefit national telecommunication development. 
Increasing foreign investment and deregulating telecommunication markets in developing 
economies would result in substantial progress in meeting developing countries’ basic 
telecommunication requirements. Of equal importance, telecommunications also have a 
substantial and important influence in sustaining national security, social stability, economic 
growth and many industrial sectors. 
 
Knowing the importance of FDI, Algeria welcome foreign investment as the country 
requires additional cash and access to credit to ensure sustained economic growth. 
Authorities will evaluate any foreign investment proposal for its long-term potential 
contribution to increase Algeria’s productive capacity, non-hydrocarbon exports, and 
technology transfer. As a result, the Algerian government is continuously seeking to 
improve the business environment by improving its investment policies, giving more 
guaranties to MNE’s as well as encouraging local entrepreneurs to contribute more 
effectively to the economic growth. However, the new investment code restricting full 
ownership of investment for MNE’s is hardly criticized by foreign investors as they accuse 
the Algerian government of putting barriers to investment which could jeopardize the future 
of FDI to the country. 
In the next chapter, I begin by analysing the motivation for FDI, looking at both theoretical 
and empirical studies. The second section examines the four main determinants to FDI 
effect to constraints: rent capture, political risk and institutional stability, economic 
determinants and the cultural distance between the home and host country, and I will 
formulate my research hypothesis throughout. 
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Chapter II: Literature review  
Section1: FDI Motivations and Effects 
 
Introduction 
Nowadays, the issue of foreign direct investment (FDI) is being paid more attention, 
both at national and international level. There are many theoretical papers that examine 
FDI issues, and much research on the motivations underlying FDI importance as key 
element of economic development in all countries, especially the developing ones. 
 
The boom of FDI flows to developing countries since the early 1990s show that 
multinationals have increasingly considered these host countries to be profitable 
investment locations. At the same time, researchers like Kokko (2002) argue that the 
determinants of and motivations for FDI in developing countries have changed in the 
process of globalisation. As a consequence, it would not be good enough for developing 
economies governments to offer promising markets in order to induce FDI inflows. 
Policymakers would rather face complex challenges in striving for location 
attractiveness to FDI.  
Given the potential role played by FDI sustaining growth and improving economic 
transformation in developing countries by allowing the transfer of providing capital, 
foreign exchange, technology and by enhancing competition and access to foreign 
markets (Dunning, 1980; UNCTAD 2006; Crespo and Fontura 2007; Romer, 1993). As 
a result, there is an increase in competition between developing countries, where 
investment demand is higher compared with their domestic savings rate to attract FDI. 
This is done by embarking on drastic economic reforms, investing in the country 
business infrastructure, liberalising their policy regimes and offering various stimuli 
packages, such as tax royalties, trade liberalisation, establishment of special economic 
zones and incentive packages to the foreign investors (UNCTAD, 2011). 
 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (1998: 111) suggests that “FDI 
are increasingly pursuing complex integration strategies as multinationals are 
increasingly seeking locations where they can combine their own mobile assets most 
efficiently with the immobile resources they need to produce goods and services for the 
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markets they want to serve”. Therefore, the question arises of what determines the FDI 
flow to developing countries? 
The relative importance of FDI location determinants has changed. Even though 
traditional determinants and the types of FDI associated with them have not disappeared 
with globalisation, their importance is said to be on the decline. More specifically, "one 
of the most important traditional FDI determinants, the size of national markets, has 
decreased in importance. At the same time, cost differences between locations, the 
quality of infrastructure, the ease of doing business and the availability of skills have 
become more important" (UNCTAD, 1996: 97).  
Dunning (1990) argues that there are multidimensional factors influencing the FDI 
inflow; this is due to the different types of motives work behind the decision of 
investment in foreign countries by the MNEs. For instance, some MNEs seek large 
domestic market (market-seeking FDI) while others look for the supply of natural 
resources (resource-seeking FDI), or simply just to relocate their production facilities to 
reduce their production cost in order to be more competitive in their home market 
(efficiency seeking FDI). Later, the scholar demonstrates that FDI in developing 
countries has shifted from market-seeking and resource-seeking FDI to more (vertical) 
efficiency-seeking FDI (Dunning, 1999).Table 2.1 summarises the determinants of FDI 
in developing countries. 
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Table 2.1 Host country determinants of FDI 
 
Host countries determinants Type of FDI 
classified by motives 
of firms 
Principal economic determinants in 
host countries 
 
Policy framework for FDI 
 
x Economic, political, and 
social stability 
x Rules regarding entry and 
operations 
x Standards of treatment of 
foreign affiliates 
x Policies on functioning and 
structure of markets 
(especially competition and 
policies governing mergers 
and acquisitions) 
x International agreements 
on FDI 
x Privatisation policy 
x Trade policy (tariffs and 
nontariff barriers) and 
coherence of FDI and trade 
policies 
x Tax policy. 
 
Market-seeking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resource/asset-
seeking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Efficiency seeking 
 
 
 
 
x Market size and per capita 
income 
x Market growth 
x Access to regional and global 
markets 
x Country-specific consumer 
preferences 
x Structure of markets 
x Raw materials 
x Low-cost unskilled labour 
x Skilled labour 
x Technological, innovative, 
and other created assets 
(for example, brand 
names), including as 
embodied in individuals, 
firms, and clusters 
 
x Physical infrastructure (ports, 
roads, power, 
Telecommunications) 
x Cost of resources and assets 
listed above, adjusted for 
labour productivity 
 
x Other input costs, such as 
transport and communication 
costs to/from and within host 
economy and other 
intermediate product 
 
x Membership of a regional 
integration agreement 
conducive to the 
establishment of regional 
corporate networks 
 
Economic determinants (see 
table on the right) 
Business facilitation 
x Investment promotion 
(including image-building 
and investment-generating 
activities and investment- 
x facilitation services) 
x Investment incentives 
x Hassle costs (related to 
corruption and 
administrative efficiency) 
x Social amenities (for 
example, bilingual schools, 
quality of life) 
x After-investment services 
Source: Compiled from different issues of UNCTAD, World Bank 
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Lucas’ (1993), and Jun and Singh’s (1996) research focuses on the effect of business 
environment indicators on motivating the flow of FDI. They identified three main 
determinants: macro-economic stability; and economic and political risk. For instance, 
the degree of market openness, growth, inflation, exchange-rate risk, institutional 
stability - such as policies towards FDI, tax regimes, the transparency of legal 
regulations, the scale of corruption, and political stability, ranging from indicators of 
political freedom to measures of surveillance and revolutions.  
 
Other empirical studies suggest that there is an extensive range of indicators on what we 
refer to as the business environment. These indicators could be classified into four main 
groups: a) macroeconomic stabilisation; b) quality of governance including the 
performance of law and contract enforcement institutions; c) regulation of trade, 
industry, and factor markets; and d) quality of physical infrastructure, including power 
supply, postal and telecommunication, and transport (UNCTAD, 2008). 
 
In the present research I will focus mainly on the Dunning (1977, 1980, 1988) OLI 
framework to explain the determinant of FDI. 
 
II.1 Theoretical arguments on the economic determinants of FDI 
From a macroeconomic point of view, FDI takes the form of capital flows across 
borders, from countries of origin to host countries, which are found in the balance of 
payments. The variables of interest one is: capital flows and stocks; returns obtained 
from investments. 
 
The microeconomic perspective tends to determine and analyse the motivations for 
investment across borders from the point of view of the investor. It also investigates the 
consequences to MNEs and home and host countries, of the operations of the MNEs 
rather than investment flows and stock (Lipsey, 2001). 
 
After the Second World War, international production was considered a small part of 
international affairs, while the attention was directed towards those components which 
had an important share (e.g. international trade). Since the 1960s, the phenomenon of 
transnational corporations and FDI has begun to gain importance. 
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Although, the term “FDI” is relatively new, the concept itself can be traced back to 
Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, which was considered as the first attempt to 
explain Trade. However, FDI cannot be explained by the comparative advantage theory 
as this theory is based solely on two countries, two products and a perfect mobility of 
factors at local level, and fails to explain the rising share of FDI. Other frameworks were 
also used to explain FDI, such as portfolio investment, which assumes, that under perfect 
market where there is no risk or barriers associated with free capital movement, the 
capital will go from countries with low interest rates to countries with high interest rates. 
But these claims have no basis in reality, and assumption that the capital can move freely 
in any direction erodes the reliability of the theory. 
 
Hymer (1960) was the first to explain that there is a difference between FDI and 
portfolio investment, which is defined as an inter-country flow of capital acting in 
response to differential rates of return on capital; interest rates (Dunning and Rugman, 
1985). He focused mainly on why MNEs finance their foreign assets in their domestic 
currencies and explains the choice of FDI in terms, “monopolistic advantages”, which 
means the ability of MNEs from countries with strong currencies to raise capital cheaper 
in foreign markets compared with competitors from countries with weaker currencies. 
He attributes the firm’s motivation of FDI to structural failure, or market imperfections, 
of international financial markets, allowing MNEs in a strong financial position to 
acquire of foreign assets. 
 
Hymer illustrates that, when the interest differential theory was applied to FDI, a number 
of inconsistencies arise. For instance; firms that chose direct investment were also 
borrowing abroad. As Hymer observed, if FDI is encouraged by higher interest rates in a 
foreign country the practice of borrowing considerably abroad is seen as bizarre. 
Another paradox pointed out by Hymer was that investment flow has a constant 
industrial distribution and this distribution is identical in all countries where FDI in 
undertaken.  
 
So, it is not apparent that capital movements encouraged by interest-rate differentials 
should have such an industrial distribution. On the contrary, observations of FDI flow 
over time have shown that foreign investment is limited between number of countries; 
mainly developed countries such as: USA, EUROPE and JAPAN. He also, identifies a 
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correlation between market failure and FDI and MNEs. Hymer also suggested that the 
significant theoretical limitation of the interest differential theory was that it did not 
clearly explain the notion of “investment control”.  
 
Under Hymer’s theory, FDI is considered an international operation; equity or non-
equity ownership, licensing, franchising, strategic alliances, formal cartels or implicit 
collusions, in which firms of a home country can control the decision making of another 
(in the host country). Movements of capital associated with FDI were, therefore, not 
driven by higher interest rates in host countries but took place in order to finance 
international operations. In other words, Hymer recognised that FDI is a firm-level 
strategy decision rather than a capital-market financial decision.    
 
Hymer (1960) developed the concept of firm-specific advantages He also demonstrated 
that FDI only takes place when the benefits of exploiting firm specific advantages across 
borders allow overcoming the additional costs of doing business abroad. He was 
concerned specifically with the international operations of national firms and focused 
mainly on why MNEs undertake FDI rather than explaining their growth. He 
distinguished the costs of international operations were of two sets: the first is fixed and 
non-recurring, language and cultural clashes, lack of familiarity with the customs, 
politics and economies of host countries; the second is frequent costs that involve 
political risk discrimination by national governments, the business climate, consumers 
and suppliers, and, exchange-rate risks (which, according to Hymer, represent the most 
important factor). In other words, Hymer recognised that FDI is a firm-level strategy 
decision rather than a capital-market financial decision.   
 
Furthermore, Hymer (1968) offers a contemporary view of the determinants of FDI, 
pointing out that FDI involves the transfer of a set of resources of firm-specific assets, 
including managerial and technological skills, and not just the financial flow of capital. 
Moreover, he stated that, for firms to own and control foreign production facilities, they 
must possess “monopolistic” and unique advantages in their firm-specific assets, which 
is sufficient enough to offset the disadvantage they face in operating their facilities in 
foreign jurisdictions. Kindleberger (1969) distinguished between four types of 
advantages possessed by monopolistic firms: 1) production differentiation, marketing 
skills, pricing policy; 2) patented or secret technology, and easier access to capital; 3) 
Chapter II: Literature review Section1: FDI Motivations and Effects  
 48 
 
Economy of scale; 4) Government policies regarding imports and custom unions. This 
“monopolistic-competition approach” or so called “Hymer-Kindleberger theory” (1969), 
originally formulated by Hymer (1960) and expounded by Kindleberger (1969), states 
that consideration for firm-specific assets is essential in explaining economic 
determinants of FDI.  
 
The Hymer-Kindleberger theory was deeply expounded by Kindleberger (1973). 
According to Kindleberger, oligopolistic firms pay great attention to what their rivals are 
doing and therefore, they feel that their export markets are severely threatened if a rival 
establishes a plant there. This motivation of FDI could be understood as “created” 
locational advantage and with this “dynamic” revision, the Hymer- Kindleberger theory 
is considered even more valid. 
 
Although, as pointed out by Buckley and Casson (1976), while the Hymer-Kindleberger 
theory does not explain how the advantages are generated, it provides useful insight into 
economic determinants of FDI, stating that MNEs internalise their production activities 
abroad in order to exploit their firm-specific advantages. Such advantages are regarded 
as intra-firm public goods, in the sense they require relatively low additional cost to 
exploit internationally through establishing foreign production facilities.  
 
Also, they arise partly from economies of scale with respect of intangible assets such as 
skilled managerial capacity (Buckley and Casson, 1976). However, they state that MNEs 
should be included in the analysis as they are cost-associated with the acquisition of 
foreign assets. If, after taking account these cost, it is still “worthwhile” or more 
economical for MNEs to undertake FDI. 
 
However, while Hymer included in his concept the problem of information costs facing 
foreign firms’ vis-à-vis host country competitors, discriminatory treatment by their home 
host countries governments, and foreign exchange risks, the responsibility of foreign 
concepts is more narrowly focused on institutional differences among nations.  
The resulting hazards of unfamiliarity and discrimination, as well as relational hazards, 
could force MNEs to face additional adaptation costs when operating abroad (Eden and 
Miller, 2004).  
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Other models, like Vernon’s (1966) production cycle theory, attempt to explain certain 
features of FDI made by American manufacturing companies in Western Europe after 
the Second World War. Vernon (1966) suggests a framework based on four stages of 
production cycle: innovation, growth, maturity and decline. According to Vernon, in the 
first stage, MNEs create new innovative products for domestic consumption and export 
the surplus in order to the foreign markets. According to this theory, producers have an 
advantage by possessing new technologies, as the product develops also the technology 
becomes known. Manufacturers will standardise the product cross border through 
exports. But due to the technology leakage other companies will start imitate the actual 
product so the original manufacturers lose their competitive advantage. Vernon (1966) 
took the example of the US firms exporting to Western Europe and how European firms 
starting imitating their products. As a consequence, US firms were pushed to open 
subsidies on Western Europe in order to maintain their market shares. 
 
This theory succeeded in explaining some aspects of American firms’ investments in 
Western Europe made between 1950 and 1970. But it fails to explain the areas where US 
companies have not possessed the technological advantage and FDI was made during 
that period. 
 
One of the most important explanations of FDI is internalisation theory. This theory tries 
to explain the growth of MNEs and their motivations for achieving FDI, explaining 
which parameters would stimulate firms to expand across borders, and on entry mode 
choice.  
 
Developed by Buckley and Casson (1976) and then by Hennart in 1982 and Casson in 
1983, the theory was launched by Coase in 1937 in a national context and by Hymer in 
1976 in an international context. The internalisation theory demonstrates that the MNE 
organise their internal activities so as to develop specific advantages, which then to be 
exploited as a form of firm-specific advantages (FSAs) in knowledge and other types of 
intermediary products. The exclusive ownership of the firm specific advantages serves to 
overcome the externality of knowledge being a public good.   
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Given the presence of market failure, performing activities inside the MNE could act as 
a governance mechanism to develop and exploit firm specific advantage.  The scholars 
suggest that any type of market imperfection across both products and factor markets 
could force the MNE to internalise.  
 
In a related paper, Dunning (1977) also popularised the Hymer approach and contrasted 
this with the international economics factor-cost explanation of international trade. 
Dunning (1980) later combined this thinking into his eclectic paradigm, in which 
location advantages capture differences among countries and regions, while 
internalisation and ownership advantages reflect firm-level strategy decisions and the 
outcomes thereof. 
 
Dunning (1977, 1980, 1988, 1993) explains the micro-level that a business firm will 
engage in FDI in three closely associated “advantage” conditions are satisfied, the 
ownership-specific advantages, the location specific advantages and internalisation 
advantages. He, therefore, suggested a theoretical paradigm known as the OLI 
framework. It is also referred to as the “eclectic paradigm” due to its “all-encompassing” 
orientation.  
 
According to Dunning (1977), the extent to which a firm possesses its firm-specific 
assets (O-advantages) vis-à-vis firms of other nationalities in a particular market 
functions as a determinants of FDI. These O-advantages largely take the form of the 
privileged possession of intangible assets; these are, in some ways, exclusive possessors 
of the company and may be transferred within MNEs at low costs, leading either to 
higher incomes or reduced costs.   
 
In addition, there are those that arise as a result of the common governance of cross-
border value adding activities, assuming that the above conditions are satisfied 
(Dunning, 1977). But MNEs operating cross-borders could face additional costs. To 
effectively enter an international market, MNEs should possess certain advantages that 
could allow them to triumph over operating costs internationally. These advantages are 
the property competences or the specific benefits of the MNE. The firm has a monopoly 
over its own specific advantages and using them abroad generating a higher marginal 
profitability or lower marginal cost than its competitors (Dunning, 1977, 1980, 1988). 
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Furthermore, Dunning (1977, 1980, 1988) identified three main types of specific 
advantages: first, is the monopoly advantages that could take form of privileged access 
to markets through ownership of natural limited resources, patents and trademarks. The 
second concerns possible technology; knowledge broadly defined so as to contain all 
forms of research and development, enterprise and innovation activities. The last one 
would take advantage of large economies, such as those of scale and scope, learning or 
even better access to financial capital. 
 
Assuming the first condition is satisfied, the extent to which the global interests of the 
firm are served by creating or utilising its O-advantages in a foreign location functions is 
the second determinant of FDI. These resources and capabilities, or O-advantage, are 
assumed to be uneven. Therefore, location-specific, L-advantage, is critical in 
determining the geography in which to utilise the O-advantage. Location advantages of 
different countries could be an important factor in determining who will become host 
countries for the MNE operation. 
 
Dunning (1977, 1980, 1988) clusters the specific advantages of each country into three 
categories: The economic benefits involving the production factors, market size, 
transport costs, infrastructure availability, telecommunications and the country business 
environment. The second category is linked to the potential gain from the political 
advantages, common and specific government regulations, incentives offered to 
foreigners as well as government intervention and other factors that could affect FDI 
flows. The final category is related to the eventual social advantages including: distance 
between the home and home countries, cultural diversity, attitude towards foreigners etc. 
 
Assuming the above three conditions are satisfied, it would be lucrative for the firm to 
use o these advantages, in association with other factors outside the home country 
(Dunning 1977, 1980, 1988). 
 
Another component of FDI determination is the extent to which the firm perceives it to 
be in its best advantages to add value to its O-advantages rather than to sell them, or the 
right to use them to foreign firms. These advantages are named I-advantages since 
market mechanism are internalised by organisational regulation systems, and could be 
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linked to Coase’s (1937) transaction cost argument adapted to specific context of FDI 
determinants.  
The, I-advantages offers a framework for understanding and assessing different ways in 
which the company will exploit its powers from the sale of products and services to 
various arrangements that might be signed between the firms. The higher the cross-
border market internalisation benefit, the more the firm would be motivated to to engage 
in foreign production rather than going for other non-equity modes like: licensing or 
franchising (Dunning 1977, 1980, 1988). 
 
The eclectic paradigm OLI shows that its factors are different from firm to another 
depending on different variables, such as the economic context and the political, social 
characteristics of the host country. Therefore, the motivation of the MNE to invest is 
subject to the firm’s global strategy, the challenges, opportunities and incentives offered 
by the host countries. 
 
One criticism of the OLI paradigm is that is eclectic in nature, with a little original 
insight into determinants of FDI in that derives from a variety of theoretical approaches 
(international trade theory, the theory of the firm, institutional theory and location 
theory). At the cost of being eclectic, though, it is comprehensive enough to incorporate 
the widely differing attributes of MNEs. 
 
Another criticism came from Casson (1986, 1987), who states that these OLI 
components are not mutually exclusive. As a matter of fact, “O-advantages” could be 
viewed as a special type of “I-advantages”. This critique supports the view that 
economic determinants of FDI can be divided into two sorts of advantages those external 
to the firms (L-advantages) and internal to them (O-and/ or I-advantages).  
 
Buckley and Casson (1992) studied the internal advantages of FDI decisions. They 
suggest that internalisation of the production of intermediate goods can be advantageous, 
due to the technological “inseparability” of production process, or market failure in 
technology market which is related directly to the economic determination of FDI by 
MNEs. This could be linked to the more general transaction costs theory of Coase 
(1937) and Williamson (1975), explaining why it is more advantageous to engage in 
certain production activities within the firm, rather than choosing market transactions to 
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achieve the same objectives. In this sense, Buckley and Casson’s argument constitutes 
one of Dunning’s OLI components (the I or internalisation advantages). 
Accordingly, the Hymer–Kindleberger theory, and it is emphasis on the economics of 
internalisation argued by Dunning, constitutes part of Dunning’s OLI framework; 
specifically, the “O-component or ownership-specific advantage, due to its consideration 
for firm’s monopolistic or ownership-specific advantage. This theory could be 
appropriate to the “I-component” or internalisation advantage of Dunning’s framework, 
since it considers a firm’s internal aspects as a personification of the monopolistic 
advantages. In this light, the OLI framework is somewhat “redundant”. The OLI 
framework assumes market imperfection through the explicit introduction of both “O-
advantages”, just as the “revised” international trade theories attempt to do with the 
general equilibrium approach. Although less strict than the revised international trade 
theory the OLI framework, it merits an empirical application. 
 
Another point is that Dunning’s OLI paradigm argues that the act of internalisation is 
vital to dynamic innovation processes, a point already made by Buckley and Casson 
(1976). By removing the distinction between O and I, the concern arises that researchers 
would only focus on internalisation to protect existing firm-specific advantages. 
However, the decision of internalisation should take into consideration not only the 
MNE’s level of firm-specific advantage, but more importantly the possible contribution 
of internalisation to future firm development, whether in the form of conventional, asset-
based FSAs or transactional specific advantages. The latter would involve the potential 
gain resulting from the firm’s internalization such as: the ability to effectively manage 
new subsidiaries or the aptitude to reconfigure operations in function of external or 
internal circumstances (Rugman, 1985).  
 
Recognising the need to reshape the OLI paradigm, Dunning (1988a) analysed the new 
trends in international trade and suggests that MNEs should now be seen as “organisers 
and coordinators of clusters of cross-border producing and transacting activities; to 
which a latitudinal dimension, which embraces a series of cooperative inter firm 
relationships is added” (Dunning 1988a: 345). He concludes that there are three key 
drivers of the new style of multinationals: the increasing importance of information 
technologies; the role of non-market forces especially government policies for FDI; and 
the rise of international alliances. 
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In 1995, the scholar added the notion of “alliance capitalism” to his framework. He 
argues that MNEs “revert” back to a Hymer-type situation of creating alliances to 
protect and develop ownership advantages, rather than for market power. He highlights 
that hierarchical capitalism tends to replace the external market with the internal 
hierarchy, whereas alliance capitalism was similar to a “voice” strategy since firms 
adopt cooperative solutions within the market (Dunning, 1995).   
 
Dunning (1999) dealt with the resource-based view in the context of globalisation of 
economic activity during the 1990s. He explains that the world was shifting from 
hierarchical to alliance capitalism, where factors such as knowledge, regional and global 
activities and intra- and inter-institutional alliances were getting increasingly important. 
The scholar argues that the resource-based view and evolutionary theories of the firm 
were highly correlated to the O in the OLI paradigm. However, the strategic 
management theories took as their focus the creation and upgrading of these advantages, 
whereas the eclectic paradigm focused on their utilisation. 
 
Recognising that strategy is missing from the eclectic paradigm, Dunning’s solution was 
to add it on at the end as a “dynamic add-on”; thus, creating OLIS. He recognises that 
OLI could induce strategy, but that strategy could also affect OLI. He argued that firms 
with different OLI configurations would adopt different S (where S includes 10 elements 
such as technology, sourcing, HRM, marketing). As a result, he decided that S should be 
added to OLI as a fourth component.  
 
Other scholars, such as Loree and Guisinger (1995), revised the OLI paradigm to OLMA 
by looking into the micro level of the firm and replacing the “ I” with “M” (mode of 
entry) and adding a new factor  “A” (adaptation of businesses processes to the 
environment) to the end, where A is basically S (strategy formulation and 
implementation). Furthermore, Dunning adopted the same approach as Porter’s diamond 
of competitive advantage, where he incorporated international dimensions (defined as 
multinational business activity) into each of the diamond factors (Dunning, 1992).  
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In contrast, Devinney, Midgley and Venaik (2000, 2005) provide an explanation of how 
strategy and the OLI paradigm can be integrated. They argue that the eclectic paradigm 
pays insufficient attention to activity inside the firm; that is, the role played by managers 
and the dynamic evolution of the MNE.  
 
Looking at the interaction between the different OLIS factors they recognised that O, L 
and I affect S and that S also affects O, L and I, they develop a theory where OLI is both 
exogenous and endogenous. The initial environment (O, L and I) determines the set of 
all possible strategic orientations for the firm. The MNE’s existing structure acts as 
restraint, determining the technologically feasible set of strategic orientations open to the 
multinational corporation.  
 
Another development of the post OLI theory is the Dunning (1993, 1999) framework; 
where he identified four types of foreign direct investment motivations: natural resource 
seekers (that could be linked to natural resource depletion and rent capture), market 
seekers, efficiency seekers and strategic asset or capability seekers and later added 
relational assets within the O variable, in which he splits firm-specific advantages into 
tangible and intangible assets; intangible assets into intellectual and relational assets; and 
relational assets into private and social assets. “Relational” assets were defined as 
facilitating assets that had to be used jointly with the relational assets of another actor.  
 
After reconsidering the implications for the OLI paradigm, Dunning concluded that O 
needed to be modified to include: the creation, coordination and sustenance of relational 
assets; L, the presence/absence of networks of related activities; and I, a better focus on 
cooperative non-equity economic connection (especially networks). Finally, the scholar 
suggests that incorporation of asset-augmenting FDI into the eclectic paradigm requires 
reconfiguring the traditional OLI variables, but leaves the overall paradigm intact 
(Dunning, 2002). 
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II.1.2 The choice of mode of entries in FDI 
The choice of entry mode is an important part of a firm's foreign investment strategy. 
Firms are not only concerned about what foreign markets to enter and what activities to 
perform in those markets, but how to enter: whether by greenfield investment, 
acquisition or joint venture. Choosing one or another entry mode can have enormous 
strategic consequences for the firm. Not surprisingly, there has been considerable 
research into the patterns and determinants of foreign entry modes. 
 
Greenfield investment is the most costly in terms of time and resource allocations, as 
MNEs have to build an entire new subsidiary transferring management, technology and 
know-how cross-countries, allowing the new affiliate to be integrated in the investing 
company as an independent entity with its own production facilities, sales force and 
market share.  
 
According to the UNCTAD (2006), greenfield investment is becoming a dominant 
feature of the increase of FDI in emerging markets; a Greenfield project gives the 
investor a unique opportunity to build a new organisation specified to its own 
requirements. As an example, the total of greenfield investment accounted for more than 
95% of the total investment in 2008in Algeria ($5,582 million in the energy sector and 
$4,950 million in the telecommunication sector). However, the new investment law 
adopted from the beginning of 2009 allows FDI to only perform under “partnership” in 
which local partners would represent more than 51% of the share capital. 
 
The figure below examines the evolution of foreign investment by entry modes (Figure 
2.1). From 2008, and due to the uncertainty which characterised the investment climate 
due to the global economic turmoil, a shift in MNE mode strategy was observed; merger 
and acquisition as well as the non-equity modes: exporting, licensing, outsourcing tend 
to be more dominant due to the low risk associated comparing to greenfield investment 
this trend is predicted to be more pronounced in the short-term (UNCTAD survey, 2009-
2011).  
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Source: UNCTAD survey (2009-2011) 
Figure 2.1 the different modes used by MNEs 
 
The second mode of investment is merger and acquisition, which use primarily assets of 
a local business and combine them with the investors. Furthermore, the aim from an 
acquisition is to reduce costs, to benefit from the facilities and knowledge of local 
business and to get immediate access to local networks and business licence. However, 
in certain cases, especially in emerging markets, acquisitions tend to transform to 
greenfield investment as the required company, and may need a deep restructuring 
process to overcome the gap between companies. According to Meyer and Estrin (2001), 
the choice between greenfield and acquisition is foremost a decision over the origin of 
the resources for the new ventures which means that a start-up investment utilise the 
resource of a local firm and combine them with investors assets and capitals. 
 
Furthermore, there are other determinants of the choice of entry: the strategic objectives 
of the project; the resources that are found; competition policy; taxation system; profit 
repartition rules; the degree of government intervention in the market; protection of the 
property rights; and the strategic intent to penetrate the market. In this case, we have to 
distinguish between the market-seeking and resource-seeking notions. According to 
Dunning (1993), market-seeking FDI could look into the local partner to provide market 
intelligence, or distribution networks (the use of brand name, the market share). In 
contrast, resources seeking might aim to utilise the local human capital to strengthen the 
global research and development of the investor. Previous research (Peng 2000; Meyer, 
2001; Dunning, 1993) concludes that less-developed local institutions are associated 
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with more Joint-Ventures, while weak local firms would lead investors in favour of a 
start-up entry. 
 
Furthermore, literature on mergers and acquisitions, including Ethier and Markusen, 
(1996); Markusen (2001); Saggi (1996, 1999); and Yu and Tang (1992), discuss several 
potential motivations for international acquisition of firms. These include the following: 
cost reduction, risk sharing and competition reduction. Other research observes that 
when firms are symmetric, they will always prefer direct entry to acquisition when there 
is more than one target firm in the market (Salant et al., 1983; Kamien and Zang, 1990). 
Scholars like Head and Ries (1997) study incentives for national and supra-national 
merger regulations to authorise mergers in the presence of international trade, while 
Horn and Levinsohn (2001) focus on the substitutability between trade policy and 
competition policy. 
  
The third major entry mode is Joint-Venture, which is defined as an investment with 
local partner providing an access to selected resources contributed by the partner without 
the responsibilities that arise from taking an existing organisation or sharing the control 
that multinationals prefer to avoid. The negative aspect of Joint-Venture is the shared 
control aspect of the investment that can lead to conflict between the partners, especially 
if their objectives are not compatible. Also, language and culture barriers could increase 
the conflict. 
 
Anderson and Catignon (1986) suggest that Joint-Venture is only used if specific 
conditions apply. The investment depends on resource contribution for more than two 
partners; the non-feasibility to internalise the whole operation with one partner taking 
over the others. Moreover, the transaction costs are high and could not be handled by a 
single investor. 
 
Another fact is that, in emerging markets, Joint-Venture could be seen as the only way 
of penetration due to legal requirements. For instance, Saudi Arabia, India till the late 
1990s, Algeria since 2009 and other Gulf states have placed the upper limit on the 
maximum share of equity that foreigners were allowed to hold (I will go into more detail 
in the next section). 
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Recent literature suggests that new hybrid forms of investment emerge, such as 
“Brownfield” and partial acquisition. Meyer and Estrin (2001) defined Brownfield as a 
foreign acquisition undertaken as a part of the establishment of local operations. From 
the outset, its resources and capabilities are provided primarily by the investor, replacing 
most resources and capabilities of the acquired firms. Moreover, the initial 
organisational arrangement may be temporary, and from the beginning the investing 
company may arrange to setup resources, developing a Brownfield, or fully take over a 
Joint-Venture or partial acquisition.  
 
Scholars like Grönroos (1999) distinguish a new mode of entry, which is the Electronic 
mode. This illustrates the impact on the Internet in boosting company sales by offering 
world wild services as well collecting customer data, consumption habits and 
preferences for a better quality service, as well as arranging payment and shipment. For 
example, e-retailers could be dependent on other firms like (delivery and shipment 
services), which, in the case of a delivery problem, will alter the e-retailer brand image 
not the shipment company. Another issue is identity fraud. Hackers on the web could 
usurp other people’s identities and bank accounts and use them for their own benefit.  
 
II.1.2.1 Factors influencing mode of entry 
 
Previous research in the area of international business has identified some key factors 
influencing the mode of entry in target markets. For instance, Dunning (1977,1980, 
1988) in his OLI framework examines the effect of the ownership advantage, location 
advantage and internalisation advantages of integration transaction within the firm. 
Inspired by the Dunning paradigm, scholars such as Caves (1982), Davidson and Mc 
Fetridge (1984, 1985), and Hennart (1982,1991) focused on explaining the choice 
between sole and joint ventures, and the ownership and control issues involved by the 
different mode of entries. Meanwhile, Cespedes’ (1988), Stopford and Wells’ (1972) 
research findings suggest that the choice of mode of entry could be also factor to 
resource availability. 
 
Others studied the possible effect of cultural distance, country risk, and level of 
economic development on the mode of entry (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Anderson and 
Gatigon, 1986; Cho and Radmanabhan, 1995). Root (1994) assumes that the choice of 
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investment depends on the managers’ way of deciding, as MNEs have a choice either the 
follow a unplanned way, naïve mode which is more spontaneous, risky and therefore the 
firm take it just to save time looking for another entry mode or to opt for a more realistic 
mode taking into consideration internal and external factors, or just follow the company 
strategic objectives and policies when investing abroad. 
 
Luo (2001) examined the MNE’s choice of investment in emerging countries (the case 
of China) and proposed a model of four factors that determines the binary choice 
between the joint venture and wholly owned (country, industry, firm and project). Tse et 
al, (1997) examined how host and home country, and industry-specific factors and 
transaction costs could affect foreign firm's choices among the conceptual or investing 
mode of entry, and Root (1994) suggested a model of six critical factors influencing the 
entry mode and classified them in two major categories involving: target country market 
factors; target country environmental factors; target country production factors; home 
country factors; and internal including (company product factors, company 
resources/commitment factors). Both groups are summarised in Figure 2.2. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
External factors 
Internal factors 
 
 
 
Source: Root (1994, p.9)  
Figure 2.2 the factors influencing entry decision 
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The external factors could be recognised as those factors that commonly cannot be 
influenced by the managers decision as it is external to the firm and rely more on the 
market features, production factors and the business environment in both home and host 
economies. In general, the literature suggests three main external factors that could 
influence the entry decision: host country market factors; target country production 
factors host and countries business environment factors. Pan and Tse (2000) looked at 
the choice between equity and non-equity modes as the first level of hierarchy (equity-
based on whole ownership and joint venture and while non-equity-based modes are 
contractual). These modes could bring more understanding to the MNE’s choice of 
investment and could help the firm between the equity or non-equity modes.                      
 
Anderson and Gatignon (1986), and Chen and Hu (2002) examine the location-specific 
factors and suggest that they could be examined at different stages. At the national level, 
emerging economies are characterised generally by extensive state agreements and 
exports, high government intrusion in business decisions, shortage of reliable business 
information and, more significantly, lack of effective institutional arrangements to inflict 
contracts These location-specific features could result from the host country lack of 
experience in economic reforms, liberalisation and openness to the rest of the world 
(Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Another point is the institutional regime’s weaknesses. 
Supporting business operations makes transactions in emerging market less efficient 
which, according to Isobe et al, (2000), could generate significant uncertainty from an 
investor’s perspective. Tse et al. (1997) suggest that all the reforms made by emerging 
countries to attract MNEs may assist the adoption of more equity-based entry modes 
versus export or licensing. By gaining experience in working with foreign firms, the host 
market becomes skilled in creating an attractive and stable business environment (Zhan, 
1993), which could result in the increase the level of confidence and the decrease the 
level of uncertainty according to the MNE’s point of view . 
 
Despite the importance of the external factors on the choice of the entry mode, there are 
other internal variables that play an important role in decision making. The literature 
identifies two main internal determinants: product factors, firm resources and objectives 
variables. 
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In this paper, I will focus on the OLI framework to explain the choice of mode of entry. 
The figure below (2.3), developed from the Dunning (1977, 1980, 1988), paradigm 
explains and summarises the factors influencing the entry modes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Dunning, 1977 
Figure 2.3 factors influencing the entry modes 
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Linking the second component of the OLI paradigm to the choice of entry modes, 
literature suggests two determinants in the localisation advantages of the market 
potential (market size and market growth) and the investment risk. Empirical evidence 
found by Sang, Tschoegl and Yu (1986) suggest that, in high market potentials, equity 
entry modes are expected to generate high returns compared with the non-equity ones. 
This is due to the opportunity to lower costs through achieving economy of scale and 
scope. Other studies suggest that, in the short-term, the scale of economies is not 
significant, as MNEs could opt for equity modes of investment since they procure the 
possibility to establish long-term presence in the host market.  
 
Another important factor is the investment risk, which is linked to the host country 
economic factor, political conditions, the degree of government intervention and policies 
towards FDI and could be critical of the MNE profitability in the host country.  
 
Relating to the concept of internalisation advantages and the choice of entry modes, 
Williamson (1985) suggests that low control modes would be more beneficial as it allow 
the MNE to benefit from the market opportunities on one hand, and to avoid any form of 
discrimination such as bureaucracy, favouritism to local firms on the other. However, 
the low control modes could have a higher costs compared to assimilating the assets and 
skills within the company if managers are not capable to predict future eventualities. 
This was demonstrated by Williamson (1985) under the problem of bounded rationality 
versus external uncertainty and if the local market could not provide competing 
alternative; the scholar explains that transaction costs of collaboration may vary 
according to the degree that opportunism and bounded rationality impact transfers and 
they vary based on inherent inefficiencies in the transfer of knowledge. In other words, 
certain types of knowledge are more difficult to transfer and are more subject to the 
negative effects of bounded rationality and/or opportunism than others and, therefore, 
involve higher transaction costs if transferred to outside partners. In this case the most 
appropriate entry modes would be either exports or wholly venture as they allow better 
control due to a retaining of the skills and assets within the MNE. 
 
 
 
Chapter II: Literature review Section1: FDI Motivations and Effects  
 64 
 
II.1.2.2 Entry mode and effects  
FDI has become an important source of private external finance for developing 
countries, as it represents investment in production facilities. Its significance for 
developing countries is much greater. Not only can FDI add to investible resources and 
capital formation, it also allows the transfer of  production technology, skills, innovative 
capacity and organisational and managerial practices between locations, as well as of 
accessing international marketing networks. The first to benefit are enterprises that are 
part of transnational systems (consisting of parent firms and affiliates) or that are linked 
directly through non-equity investment, but these assets can also be transferred to 
domestic firms and the wider economies of host countries if the environment is 
conducive. The greater the supply and distribution links between foreign affiliates and 
domestic firms, and the stronger the capabilities of domestic firms to capture spillovers 
(that is, indirect effects) from the presence of and competition from foreign firms, the 
more likely it is that the attributes of FDI that enhance productivity and competitiveness 
will spread. The extent to which a host country can secure these benefits of FDI is likely 
to depend upon the mode of entry of foreign firms. The aim of this section is to shed 
light on the relationships between mode of entry and the degree of technology, capital 
and knowledge transfer. 
According to UNCTAD (2006), the degree of technology transfer and the intensity of 
market competition depend upon the mode of entry chosen by the foreign firm. The 
competition improving effect of FDI is higher under greenfield investment. However, 
one mode does not unambiguously dominate the other in terms of the extent of 
technology transfer. On the one hand, the relatively larger market share that could the 
foreign firm benefit under acquisition increases its incentive for transferring costly 
technology (scale effect). While, on the other, strategic incentives to transfer technology 
in order to gain market share away from domestic rivals can be greater in more 
competitive environments (strategic effect). 
The report also suggests that divergence between the foreign firm’s choice and the 
welfare interest of the host country would create a basis for policy intervention. More 
specifically, it shows that, for high costs of technology transfer, domestic welfare is 
generally higher under merger and acquisition relative to greenfield, whereas the foreign 
firm chooses greenfield investment. Thus, restricting direct entry in order to induce 
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acquisition can improve welfare, even in highly concentrated markets. However, if the 
cost of technology transfer is low then domestic welfare is higher under greenfield 
relative to acquisition, whereas the MNE prefers acquisition to direct entry. As a result, a 
constraint on the acquisition of a domestic firm could help enhancing host country 
welfare by encouraging direct entry by MNEs. Finally, for intermediate costs of 
technology transfer, both the government and the foreign firm prefer acquisition to direct 
entry. 
Additionally, Lee and Shy (1992) demonstrate that restrictions on foreign ownership 
could negatively affect the quality of technology transferred by the foreign firm. While 
Mutinelli and Piscitello (1998) argue that foreign firms could prefer to opt for joint 
ventures rather than full ownership under certain business environment conditions and 
provide evidence for Italian MNEs investing abroad.  
As a result, restrictions on FDI in developing economies would not be to limit inflows of 
FDI, but rather to encourage foreign firms to adopt the socially preferred mode of entry 
in the host country. More specifically, it is shown that restrictions on the degree of 
foreign ownership, even when applied symmetrically to both modes of entry (merger 
and acquisition and greenfield), could push MNEs to adopt the host country’s preferred 
mode of entry. MNE could earn rents from the different mode of entry; licensing, 
franchising, turnkey contracts or by creating a subsidiary or engaging in a joint venture 
in a foreign country through the ownership advantages that can take the form of a higher 
technology, knowledge and expertise or efficient managerial and marketing skills. 
Assessing the value of intangible assets is difficult as it is associated with information 
asymmetry.  
The investor may not receive adequate payment since he may not be able disclose the 
full potential of future profits generated by a given technology to at the host country 
without giving away private information on the technology itself (Dunning, 1988). Thus, 
MNEs with advanced technology could face uncertainty in pricing and may select 
wholly-owned projects to joint venture or arm’s length transactions. 
Furthermore, the choice of the form of investment is often associated with the type of 
industry, for instance a greenfield investment might be preferred to shared ownership in 
order to guard against leakage of sensitive information, which is often happening in high 
technology industry, aviation industry, and other industries that requires high technology 
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and heavy investment in R&D. MNE could also be concerned about the fail of venture 
or a dissolution, the local partner will remain in possession of the technology acquired 
from the MNE and could become a fierce competitor in third markets. Frequently, the 
joint venture contract do not offer a full protection against this possibility since it may be 
difficult to specify all possibilities in the contract. Moreover, the local partner may use 
copyrighted information obtained from the MNE in its own wholly owned operations, 
harming the partnership (Gomes-Casseres, 1989). The MNE could also fear that if the 
host country partner controls the employment policy. As a result of a non-efficient 
retention strategy, the employees could leave and diffuse their knowledge or reveal 
important information to competitors.  
MNEs investing heavily in advertising also have reasons to opt for a greenfield 
investment. The local partner might have a strong incentive to free ride on the reputation 
of a foreign partner by debasing the quality of the product carrying the foreign 
trademark. In that case, the domestic partner acquires the full benefits of debasement at 
insignificant costs (Caves, 1982; Horstmann and Markusen, 1987).  
Meyer (1998) analysed characteristics of British and German companies engaged in 
minority and majority of greenfield and strategic alliances projects in the region. For 
each of these clusters, he estimated a model with the dependent variable equal to one if 
the particular entry mode was chosen and zero otherwise. His results suggest a positive 
correlation between a firm’s R&D intensity and the probability of a greenfield subsidiary 
and a negative relationship with the likelihood of a joint venture. The latter result 
occurred in the case of minority, majority or all types of joined venture combined. 
Gomes-Casseres (1990) investigates the choice between wholly and shared ownership in 
the framework of bargaining theory. Among other variables, his model involved 
industry-level R&D spending as well as its interaction with a dummy variable for 
countries controlling the extent of foreign ownership. A positive correlation between the 
interaction term and the probability of a greenfield subsidiary would indicate that 
investors in more R&D-intensive sectors can more easily negotiate full ownership. In 
fact, neither of the two variables turned out to be statistically significant. 
To conclude, the literature suggests that firms with greater intangible assets should 
prefer full ownership to joint ventures or other strategic alliances. The preferences of a 
host country government regarding the extent of foreign ownership may differ from 
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those of a MNE. Consequently, the entry mode used could be a result of a bargaining 
procedure between the two partners. Gomes-Casseres’ (1990) study of the bargaining 
approach predicts that MNEs in R&D-intensive industries enjoy a greater bargaining 
power in negotiations with the host country’s government (Gomes-Casseres, 1990, 
UNCTAD, 2008). 
 
In light of this literature, I formulate the following hypothesis: 
H1: Entry mode has an important impact on FDI spillovers in the Algerian 
telecommunication sector. 
 
 
II.1.3 The potential FDI effects on emerging economies 
Emerging economies are increasingly looking at FDI as a source of growth and 
development. Countries have liberalised their FDI regimes and pursued other policies to 
attract investment. 
They have addressed the issue of how best to pursue domestic policies to maximise the 
benefits of FDI in the host economy. In general, the study of the FDI impact on 
developing economies focus on the overall effects of FDI on macroeconomic growth and 
other welfare increasing processes, and also on the channels through which these 
benefits take effect. Depending on the domestic country policies and a basic level of 
development, a majority of studies shows that FDI triggers technology spillovers, 
supports human capital formation, encourage international trade integration, helps create 
a more competitive business environment and enhances enterprise and innovation. 
All of these could contribute to enhancing the economic growth, which is the most 
effective tool for alleviating poverty in developing countries. Furthermore, beyond the 
strictly economic benefits, FDI may help bettering environmental and social conditions 
in the host economies by, for example, transferring “more efficient and cleaner” 
technologies and leading to more socially responsible corporate policies. 
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II.1.3.1 Technology, knowledge, capital and productivity spillovers 
In recent decades, FDI has played an important role in achieving economic growth and 
development, especially for developing countries. FDI brings capital and introduces new 
technology. Moreover, the new technology can also spill over to the local firms in the 
host country. For this reason, FDI is often considered as the most significant channel for 
technology knowledge and capabilities transfer. 
 
In fact, FDI could not only bring in capital but also introduce advanced technology that 
can enhance the technological capability of the domestic firms. More significantly, the 
technological benefit is not restricted to MNEs subsidiaries but could also generate 
technological spillovers to the domestic firms and SMEs. Furthermore, the increase of 
FDI flow may boost competition in the host country economy. The competitive pressure 
may force domestic companies to operate more efficiently and introduce new technology 
to cope with the changes in the local market. Actually, literature suggests that external 
effect or spillovers from FDI is the most important channel for the dissemination of 
developed technology, rather than formal technology transfer arrangement (Romer, 
1993; Blomström, 1989). Additionally, the increasing competition could improve local 
firm’s productivity as it pushes them to use their existing resources more efficiently, 
spending more on R&D or to be more creative and search for new technologies 
(Blomström and Kokko, 1998).  
 
UNCTAD (2008) suggests that aiming to gain from technology spillovers, many 
emerging countries offer different incentive packages to attract FDI. Consequently, the 
past two decades have observed a considerable growth in the f FDI flow to emerging 
markets; significantly faster than trade flows among the most developed countries, and 
became the largest source of external finance for developing countries (UNCTAD,2008).  
 
Furthermore, FDI could have a direct or indirect effect on the host country economies. 
FDI could directly affect an economy by increasing employment, capital and 
technological transfer. Due to the high technological capabilities of MNEs, it is assumed 
that they show higher levels of productivity than local firms (Lipsey, 2002). As a result, 
the presence of foreign firms would enhance host country productivity. Indirectly, FDI 
can improve host economy productivity through a variety of technological spillovers to 
local firms. This could possibly be explained as the technology accompanied with MNEs 
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has some public good qualities which cannot be fully internalised; thus, the localisation 
of the foreign firm could possibly create positive externality in terms of technological 
benefit to the domestic firm. These benefits could appear in the form of various types of 
externalities. A variety of externalities from FDI, so called “spillovers”, is considered as 
the most significant benefit from FDI. Blomström and Kokko (1998) used the term 
“technological spillovers” to characterise the externalities. Technology spillovers 
involved product, process and distribution technology, as well as knowledge, 
management and marketing skills. 
 
Blomström and Kokko (1998) categorised the spillovers based on their effect on local 
firms’ performance. They classify them into two main types: productivity and market 
access. Productivity spillovers are linked to the positive effects of MNEs on the 
productivity and/or efficiency of the host country’s local firms, while market-access 
spillovers occur whenever domestic firms have access to international markets due to the 
presence foreign investments; mainly through non-equity mode of investment such as 
export-oriented MNEs. Technology spillovers might also take place within (intra-
industry) as well as across (inter-industry) industries. Blomström (1991) identifies three 
possible channels of intra-industry spillovers: demonstration, competition and labour 
mobility. While the inter-industry spillovers come from the vertical linkages of MNEs 
with domestic firms who become their suppliers and customers. Consequently, there are 
four potential channels of spillovers: demonstration effects; labour turnover; vertical 
linkages; and competitive effects.  
 
The demonstration-effect argument states that the exposure to the higher technology of 
MNEs could push domestic firms to update their own production procedures through 
imitation or reverse engineering (Das, 1987; Wang and Blomström, 1992). By adopting 
new production methods, managerial practices, local organisations could improve their 
level of technology, and therefore increase their productivity and efficiency. 
 
Das (1987) presents a model to analyse the transfer of technology from the mother firm 
to its subsidiary in the domestic country. The model suggests that domestic firms learn 
from the MNEs and become more efficient. However, the increase in the productivity 
among in the local firm is assumed to be exogenous, and therefore costless to them.  
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The model also acknowledges that the MNE affiliates are aware of the technology 
leakage and determine their technology transfer behaviour based on this recognition.  
 
Wang and Blomström (1992) developed a model in which they assume that technology 
spillovers result from the strategic interaction between foreign subsidiaries of MNEs and 
the local market firms. The model explicitly analyses the cost of transferring technology 
within MNEs and learning cost of the domestic companies, and treats technology 
transfers in a theoretic context where domestic firms and legal policies, as well as the 
host country business environment, directly affect their behaviour and play an important 
role in the technology transfer process. Another interesting point highlighted by Wang 
and Blomström model is that technology transfer through FDI is positively related to the 
level of domestic firm’s learning capacity. Moreover, their model recognises that MNEs 
respond to domestic competition by introducing newer technologies faster. Labour 
turnover; adoption to new technology might could arise through labour turnover. 
Commonly, MNEs seek highly skilled labour in host economy. Consequently, the local 
affiliate will be investing in developing human capitals by developing training 
programmes. In that case, spillovers arise when the staff trained by MNEs shift or 
collaborate with domestic firms or even set up their own companies, transferring with 
them the technological, technical and managerial knowledge that they have learned. 
While this channel is probably the most significant channel for spillovers, it is hard to 
establish importance of labour turnover because it necessitate tracking employees who 
have worked for MNEs and then determining their impact on the productivity of the 
domestic workers. 
 
Fosfuri, Motta, and Ronde (2001) presented a framework where spillovers are generated 
by labour mobility. Technological spillovers form when the trained person is hired by 
the domestic firm. They found that technology spillovers did not take place if the joint 
profit of the MNE and domestic firm is higher than when MNE can use the technology 
as a monopoly. The implication is that one should expect higher labour mobility and 
more spillovers when domestic firm could manufacture complimentary MNE’s product. 
Another observation is that spillovers could occur in the case of a general job training 
rather than specific, and when the absorptive capacity of the domestic firm is high.  
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Another possible channel for a technology, capital and knowledge spillovers is the 
backward and forward linkages generated through market transactions. The transfer 
could take form of licensing or partnership agreement for particular technology, 
knowledge, management or marketing (Navaretti and Venables, 2004). Rodriguez-Clare 
(1996) presented an explicit model of linkages in which he demonstrates that MNEs 
improve welfare only if they produce linkages over and beyond those generated by the 
domestic firms they displace. Accordingly, the scholar pointed out the significance of 
vertical linkages as a channel for technology, capital and capabilities transfer from FDI.  
 
According to Rugman (1981) and Dunning (1993), MNEs exist because they possess 
some firm specific advantages or ownership advantages outside their home countries, 
usually these advantages are knowledge-based. Blomstrom and Kokko (2002); 
Markusen (1998); Hymer (1976); and Caves (1974) developed the “knowledge capital 
model” as a basis for the analysis of the impact of FDI in technology and knowledge 
transfer linkage. This model, developed by Rugman (1981) and Dunning (1993), 
suggests that MNEs arise because they possess technological advantages. They are seen 
as firm-intensive in the use of knowledge capital and, therefore, are estimated to exploit 
this knowledge via their affiliates throughout the world. Consequently, MNEs are 
expected to be a major source of technology transfer between firms and from developed 
to developing countries. Under this theory, spillover from affiliates into the wider host 
economy is assumed to follow from that centrally-driven technological advantage. 
 
The knowledge and skills transfer s are seen as the foundation for competitiveness in the 
host countries especially in the emerging markets that seek to create “technological 
capabilities” that are “skills, technical, managerial and institutional” (Lall, 1996). More 
often, managers in developing countries are not well prepared to face the economic 
environment changes due mainly to their unfamiliarity to the competitive market 
economy. Child (1993) recognises three levels of knowledge that help managers to 
develop their managerial and organisational capabilities:  
x At the technical level, specific and advance techniques have to be obtained such 
as methods for quality measurement, scientific and engineering techniques and 
market research. At the systemic level, new practices have to be implemented, 
which could involve integrative learning emphasizing co-ordination and 
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relationships. For instance, managing integrated production systems or 
production control and budgeting systems.  
x At the systemic level, new systems and procedures have to be adopted, which 
requires integrative learning emphasising co-ordination and relationships. 
Examples include co-ordination of integrated production systems, or production 
control and budgeting systems. 
x At the strategic level, senior managers have to develop cognitive frameworks for 
conducting the tasks of strategic management, including reassessment of criteria 
of business success and factors contributing to that success. This requires 
understanding of technological and managerial processes in such depth that 
managers can engage in innovation, select and adapt technology and take 
strategic decisions. 
 
Further, FDI could be seen as a good source at both technical and systemic levels by 
allowing the transfer and generation of skills and know-how to host countries, thus the 
generation of embedded knowledge motivate the development of indigenous and locally-
adapted capabilities. In fact, the prime objective of emerging market governments, when 
encouraging the flow of foreign investment, is to develop new capabilities when 
interacting with MNEs. However, the main strategies are to generate more profit from 
their investments and, therefore, they  are not willing to transfer their knowledge 
capabilities without obtaining a suitable return for it which does not fit and contradict  
the positive spillovers definition; benefit obtained by others without paying the full price 
(Meyer and Estrin, 2003). 
 
Another important point is that, in major cases, MNEs do not generate knowledge and 
skills at the high managerial level as they transmit the needed technology and knowledge 
for specific operations or productions, but not the deeper knowledge required for the 
independent technological innovations in host countries. Meyer and Estrin (2003) state 
that the knowledge spillovers start with the knowledge transfer within investing MNE, 
as this would lead to an increase in the productivity of the subsidiaries in the host 
market. This could have a positive impact on the balance of payment, tax revenue, 
national income and employment, and possibly create positive spillovers to the host 
economy. 
 
Chapter II: Literature review Section1: FDI Motivations and Effects  
 73 
 
However, recent literatures (UNCTAD, 2006, 2008) suggest that MNEs transfer 
knowledge that exclusively serves the subsidiaries to achieve their objectives. This 
depends on the affiliate role and the host economy competitive environment. Kokko and 
Blomstrom (2002) suggest that a subsidiary engaged in R&D or in application of latest 
technology in the production process would naturally receive more knowledge from the 
parent than subsidiary manufacturing products at later stages of the product cycle. 
Furthermore, subsidiaries facing competition from technologically advanced local firms 
may meet that challenge by upgrading technology with additional support from the 
parent MNE. Consequently, the technology transfer within an MNE can be expected to 
increase with the technological sophistication of the local environment. 
 
Conversely, scholars such as Young et al. (1989) and Dunning (2003) suggest that there 
are other forms of international trade (licensing, franchising, strategic alliance etc) that 
could boost the knowledge and capabilities diffusion. However, firms prefer direct 
investment to avoid undesired knowledge diffusion specially products that involve high 
technology or product that the firm has a technological advantage over its rivals. In these 
cases, FDI could be seen as good mode internalisation as it might prevent undesired 
know-how diffusion.  
 
From the host country’s perspective, the diffusion would represent a desirable positive 
externality. However, governments must acknowledge that, unless they offer the foreign 
transfer protection of his intellectual property, they may not gain access to the know-
how at all. This leaves a mutual bargaining situation.  
 
In addition, Kokko and Blomstrom (2002) argue that competitive advantages of firms 
are based on often organisationally embedded knowledge (tacit knowledge), which 
cannot be learned rather than adopted from blueprints but can only be transferred 
through personal interaction. Its transfer requires a complex learning-by-experience 
process that cannot be organised via markets. The transfer of tacit knowledge is, in fact, 
fairly expensive due mainly to the changing nature of technology that necessitates 
different acquisition strategies as more complex and tacit knowledge becomes, the less 
feasible is licensing. Thus, FDI becomes the most suitable mode for importing implicit 
managerial know-how.  
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However, Kokko and Blomstrom (2002) study the link between entry modes and FDI 
spillovers, and suggest a strong link between technology and knowledge spillovers and 
the MNEs mode of investment. The UNCTAD (2008, 2010 and 2011) reports argue that 
not only does greenfield investment have positive technological spillovers, but so does 
Joint-Venture. The UNCTAD (2009-2011) global survey found that more than half of 
the 41 respondents to the question on the mode of entry to foreign markets (33) had 
some form of joint ventures abroad. For almost a quarter of respondents, joint ventures 
accounted for more than 40% of their foreign affiliates. A relatively high share (30%) of 
joint ventures is focused on primary activities.  
 
Given their limited experience, developing-country MNEs are more likely to involve a 
local partner who is familiar with host-country bureaucracy and the business 
environment in general. The advantage of forming a Joint-Venture from the perspective 
of technology diffusion within the host economy is that the local partners and the 
affiliate, which would be vested with a certain amount of technological and managerial 
expertise transferred from the parent firm, are likely to have close contacts and 
exchanges of personnel. Forming a Joint-Venture is, therefore, most evident, less risky 
and potentially the most effective means by which local firms can acquire knowledge 
from MNEs (UNCTAD, 2008). 
 
In contrast, recent studies using panel data have found mostly non-significant or 
negative technological spillovers when the host region is industrializing. Blomstrom and 
Sjoholm (1999); Atiken and Harrison (1999); and Lipsey (2002) proposed the 
hypothesis that the absence of technology spillovers is due mainly to the local firms’ 
inability to absorb the major technological know-how capabilities that FDI brings to 
their affiliates. Other studies, such as Konings (1999); Kinoshita (2000); Murali (2002); 
and Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter (2002), confirm this hypothesis but no empirical 
evidence has been found related to the importance of absorptive capabilities. Also, 
different researches used different measures of “absorptive capabilities”, such as 
productivity levels or R&D expenditures. However, the results differ according the 
methodology and the specific country characteristics.  
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The notion of “absorptive capacity” was developed by Cohen and Levinthal (1990). 
They define the concept as the firm capability to recognise and assimilate valuable 
knowledge effectively. Boosting its resources and skills, and widening its knowledge 
capacities, could effectively lead to innovation. The scholars suggest that, at MNE level, 
divisions with a high level of absorptive capacity could benefit from other units 
knowledge and technology transfer that is generally subject to the firm potential learning 
capacities, technological abilities and the investment degree in R&D; that represents a 
vital factor in generating innovation. Consequently, host countries domestic firms can 
benefit from technology and knowledge when interacting with foreign corporations on 
condition that domestic organisations has the adequate level of human capital to be able 
to gain from the know-how transfer. They also need to organise and develop their own 
R&D and training programs to promote more innovation within the organisations 
(Kathuria, 2001). 
 
Scholars such as Liu, Wang and Wei (2000) found that FDI has a positive impact in 
increasing domestic labor efficiency and effectiveness. They also suggest that the degree 
of local firms benefit from FDI spillovers depends heavily on their own technological 
capabilities; as an important element of the “absorptive capacity”. Mowery, Oxley and 
Silverman (1996) explain that absorptive capacity is subject to two main determinants: 
regular knowledge gathering and the continual investment in technological-based 
capacities. Other scholars, such as Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and Tsai (2001), suggest 
that the notion of absorptive capacity goes beyond the external knowledge incorporation 
as it engages the capacity to apply the gained knowledge in business purpose for profit 
maximisation. They have also viewed it as an effective tool to reduce technical and 
managerial risks due to the engaged interaction within units in organisation. Huber 
(1991) described knowledge as a social creation that implies multifaceted social 
procedures, wherein different organisation elements interrelate together.   
 
Zahra and George (2002:191) found that absorptive capacity has four facets; acquisition, 
assimilation, transformation and exploitation. They conclude that the first two can lead 
to a possible absorptive capacity, while transformation and exploitation have a more 
comprehensive impact on the absorptive capacity. The scholars state, “firms can acquire 
and assimilate knowledge but might not have the capability to transform and exploit the 
knowledge for profit generation”.  
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The researchers conclude that more consideration should be paid to the firm’s ability to 
control the knowledge that has been previously absorbed. In the same optic, Lane et al. 
(2001) state that firm’s absorptive capacity imply its ability to identify, comprehend and 
incorporate external knowledge before applying it. The first three steps - identify, 
understand and assimilate - are interdependent and separate from the fourth (applying). 
Lyles and Salk (1996) have analysed the role of international joint ventures (IJV) in 
knowledge acquisition from an external partner. They conclude that the ability to learn 
mainly creativity and flexibility are gauging the knowledge transfer. 
 
Other scholars, like Kokko’s (1994) research in the case of Mexico, corroborate the 
importance of domestic absorptive capabilities for technological spillovers. In the same 
line, Koning (1999) for Polish and Bulgarian firms but working with R&D expenditures 
(as a measure of domestic absorptive capabilities) found that only domestic firms 
engaged in R&D experience positive spillovers. However, other studies, such as 
Kinoshita (2000) using the case of the Czech Republic, did not reach the same finding. 
He found that domestic firms R&D and FDI are substituting instead of complementary 
in explaining productivity growth of domestic firms.  
 
Haskel et al. (2002) found the relationship between total factor productivity and foreign 
investment in developed country (the case of the UK) to be stronger for domestic plants 
that are smaller, less technologically advanced, and less skil- intensive. Accordingly, 
they conclude positive spillovers from FDI accrue predominantly to lagging domestic 
plants, not leading ones. Borensztein (1995) and UNCTAD (2004, 2006) suggest that the 
host country may not benefit from knowledge spillovers when the technology gap 
between foreign, and domestic firms are too wide. This is generally the case in poorer 
countries. The literature also found the effect of FDI on growth to be a factor in the 
presence of skills that facilitate absorption of new knowledge due to relatively low levels 
of skill accumulation, low-income countries are not able to experience more favourable 
effects of FDI. Furthermore, some papers have observed an insignificant or adverse 
effect of FDI on low-income countries and a more favourable effect on middle-income 
countries (Blomstrom et al., 1994; De Mello, 1999; Xu, 2000).  
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Therefore, not only inward FDI is concentrated in relatively richer countries, but also 
these countries are able to experience favourable spillovers than poor countries. Further 
research, such as that by Liu et al. (2000), analyse the non-linear relationships between 
the technological gap and productivity spillovers received by local firms. Blomström and 
Sjöholm (1999) demonstrate that the potential of know-how spillovers increase with the 
technology available in the FDI firm, which increases with the gap. However, spillovers 
decline as firms fall too far behind to be able to absorb the technology, which declines 
with the gap. Such non-linearity between strategic targets and prior knowledge has also 
been shown in firm level studies in transition economies as a result of, among other 
causes of cognitive gaps of managers (Newmann, 2000). 
 
Another study by Markusen (2002) considers the potential for intra industry FDI flows 
to be a very important criterion in matching any model to the data, not just as a clever 
mechanism to generate two way flows. The research looked also at the question why 
countries with very low wages do not attract investment even for productions that 
require only unskilled labour.  
He developed the knowledge capital model based on three assumptions relating to 
knowledge-based assets. First, the services of these assets used in foreign production 
facilities. Second, the production of knowledge-based assets is a factor in the skilled-
labour intensity. The last one, knowledge-intensive assets, could reach their full 
productivity in multiple locations simultaneously. While the first two assumptions 
support vertical firms, the third favours horizontal multi-plant firms.  
This model allows for vertical fragmentation of production within a single firm across 
two countries by assuming that production using unskilled labour requires some fixed 
input of technical and managerial know-how from skilled labour. He demonstrates that 
countries with skilled labour scarcity will attract almost no FDI. The scholar views the 
vertical feature of the micro-level literature’s knowledge capital model as essential to 
generate relationship between trade and investment that have driven the growth of intra-
firm trade. He also considers that MNEs are more engaged in industries that are 
intensive in R&D and skilled labour to be of central importance in his models. He 
discards the idea of FDI flows being a factor to endowments of physical capital as being 
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Moreover, the knowledge-capital model suggests that foreign affiliate production and 
trade should be linked to the difference of sizes between firms, skilled and unskilled 
labour endowments and trade and investment (including bilateral relationship) cost 
barriers for two countries. Bergstrand and Egger (2007) added an extension involving 
physical capital as a third factor and a third country. Other factors including competition 
among host countries for inward investment along with integrating factors such as 
internalisation/outsourcing into the ownership/location models would be an add-on for 
the knowledge-capital model making knowledge easy to transfer and easy to absorb 
through agent opportunism.  
 
II.1.3.2 Competitive effects 
The early research, for instance Kindleberger (1969), states that FDI results from 
oligopolistic competition in home countries, and could not exist in a world of perfect 
competition pattern. Other scholars (Hymer, 1970; Vernon, 1970; and Newfarmer, 1979) 
developed this theory and suggested that FDI was a device for restraining the 
competition. Knickerbocker (1973) argued that oligopoly propels outgoing FDI and that 
inward FDI recreates the oligopolistic industrial structure in the host countries, as the 
same firms competitively invest abroad and compete in similar ways.  
 
Consequently, the research agenda shifted towards exploring the impact of FDI on 
competition in host countries rather than explaining the motivation of outward FDI. 
Buckley, Casson (1992);  Frischtak and Newfarmer (1994); and Nelson and Silvia 
(1985) explained the emergence of MNEs as an effort to internalise imperfect factor 
markets and then by Dunning who proposed the eclectic theory of FDI (the eclectic 
paradigm), which provides a real explanation of the impact of FDI in the host countries. 
  
Besides, most empirical studies have shown a positive correlation between FDI and 
competition, indicating that FDI entry boosts competitiveness in the host country. 
Scholars (Goreski, 1976; Frischtak and Newfarmer, 1994) suggested that, in the 
presence of entry barriers; tariffs, quota, economies of scale, technology, MNE entry 
could actually lower concentration and increase competition. 
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In addition, the impact of FDI in competition could be factor of the MNEs modes of 
entry. UNCTAD (2008) reports explain that greenfield investment would increase 
competition and, therefore, benefit consumers through lower prices or higher quality. 
For tradable goods, openness of the international trade regime may be sufficient to 
generate competition. Also, greenfield entry would add one more firm to the industry, 
which reduces the market power of incumbent.  
 
When acquisition entry does not increase the number of competitors on the market, it 
may change the pattern of interaction between the competitors. Caves (1971) argued 
that, in any market situation, “entry by a foreign subsidiary is likely to produce more 
active rivalries behavior and improvement in market performance than would a domestic 
entry at the same initial scale”. Wang and Blomstrom (1992; Glass and Saggi (1998) 
developed Caves’ research and suggested the entry of foreign firms in the host country 
market may increase competition and force inefficient local firms to upgrade their 
technology more efficiently, while the least efficient firms may be driven out of the 
market. The remaining domestic firms would understand that, to compete with FDI 
firms, they have to invest in advanced technology to increase their productivity. 
 
Conversely, a positive contribution of an FDI project to a firm’s competitiveness is not 
the only condition for the investment to be of net benefit to the host economy overall. 
Due to the possible divergence of private and public interests, the MNE interests and 
objectives are usually not at the same level as the government expectations. This adds to 
the possibility of market or government failures. FDI could have an effect on the host 
economy through its direct effect on that country’s economic activity, as well as indirect 
effects through various ways by which MNEs might transfer to the host economy and 
hence improved the market competitiveness.  
 
The FDI impact on competitiveness could also be subject to effect on the 
competitiveness of industries; in terms of efficiency and productivity and the consequent 
upgrading and restructuring of industries in the home economy industrial 
competitiveness. Kaplinsky and Morris (2001) suggest that the enhancement of 
industrial competitiveness in an economy involves four interrelated types of upgrading 
of industries in general: process upgrading, product upgrading, functional upgrading 
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(expanding activities in the value chain) and chain upgrading (moving to a new value 
chain). Outward FDI can help promote competitiveness of all these types.  
 
According to UNCTAD (2006) report, FDI is playing a key role in strengthening 
competitiveness of particular industries, especially the high-tech industry. For instance, 
IT services and software in India, telecommunication equipment manufacturing in 
China, PC peripherals and semiconductors in the Taiwan Province of China and biotech 
in Singapore, and other ranges of manufacturing and service industries in Hong Kong, 
China. The report, also suggests FDI could help developing the competitiveness of 
emerging markets. To the scope that MNEs are significant part of particular industries, 
those industries are directly affected.  
 
More significantly, this enhancement can be transmitted to other economic players in 
home countries within the industries concerned as well as outside through various 
channels, resulting in a wider influence on the performance of various industries. The 
channels include; linkages with local firms, spillovers to local firms, competitive effects 
on local businesses, R&D and the technology innovation. Yeung (2009) explains that the 
impact of developing-country MNEs on industrial competitiveness in their home 
economies when interacting with other firms depends heavily on the internationalisation 
path that the firm follows.  
 
Another major factor, is the gap in the in developing countries industries which possibly 
would result in an uneven internationalisation of firms from an economy, led by the 
more advanced sectors/industries. This might have serious repercussions for the 
development and competitiveness of less-advanced industries. This depends on the 
degree, nature and scope of connection that exist between the internationalised and 
primarily domestic industries and between firms in the more and the less-advanced 
clusters of industries.  
 
Zander (1999); and De Propris and Driffield (2006) argue that those spillovers from the 
MNEs to other domestic firms are subject to the existence of industry clusters in the 
home economy. These clusters represent the effective spillovers from firms engaged in 
outward FDI in terms of competition effects. However, Aitken and Harrison (1999) 
demonstrate that FDI could have a negative competition spillover which may results 
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from the “market stealing effect”; that is, foreign investment reduces plant productivity 
in the short run by forcing domestic firms to cut production.  
 
If local firms are forced to exit (or are taken over), it can lead to oligopolistic market 
structures that may hinder endogenous technological development, reverse the 
downward pressure on prices, and even trigger adverse political economy effects. In a 
worst-case scenario, the foreign investor may attain monopolistic market power and thus 
extract rents in imperfectly competitive markets that are transferred out of the country. 
This, however, would only occur in very specific cases; notably if competition is 
constrained by high barriers to entry.  
 
Likewise, FDI leads to efficiency enhancing or anti-competitive behaviours on the part 
of MNEs. The question of which of the two effects dominates depends on the structure 
of the domestic market (to what degree domestic firms are competitive), and on a 
possible policy intervention by competition authorities. In terms of relation to R&D and 
innovation, this depends largely on the extent of clustering of private and public agents 
of technological progress located in the home territory, including partnering between 
MNEs and other firms, and between MNEs and universities, public research institutions 
and other public entities (UNCTAD, 2006). 
 
Conversely, Chen and Lin (2005) have considered the FDI impact on changing the 
structure of the home economy. They studied the “hollowing out” of the domestic 
production in a sample of Asian countries. Manufacturing hollowing-out in a wide sense 
implies a state of manufacturing decline demonstrated by the turn down in the domestic 
market caused by increased imports. Another way of describing this phenomenon is 
“changes in business structure” according to changes in the market structure. 
Manufacturing hollowing-out in the narrow sense involve lowering employment level in 
domestic industries caused by direct foreign investment.  
 
Chen et al. (2005) also observed a substantial shift of labour-intensive industrial 
operations, during the 1980s, which effectively changed the nature of the home economy 
in numerous Asian countries (especially China). They examined the data of the Hong 
Kong Labour Department; from 1987 to 1992, almost 400,000 manufacturing jobs were 
lost in the territory, whereas 450,000 jobs in service sectors were created. The main 
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issue was to help retrain the manufacturing workers in more vocational skills, with 
special emphasis on middle-aged workers. Retraining proved to be crucial as parent 
firms located in Hong Kong moved quickly towards high-value added activities, such as 
design, marketing, management and consumer-oriented production. The Thai experience 
in managing hollowing-out has been completely different to its neighbours, 
demonstrating  the differences in the structure and size of the home economy, as it 
specialised more in electronics production, and its upgrading resulted in higher-value 
added manufacturing more than services (Schive and Chen, 2004).  
 
To sum-up, competitive effects could be another important source for technology capital 
and knowledge spillovers. In the recent years, literature has focused on the competitive 
effects as another significant mechanism of spillover (Wang and Blomström, 1992; 
Glass and Saggi, 1998). Therefore, the increase of FDI flow to developing economies 
would improve competition in domestic markets. This could push domestic firms to 
either upgrade their technology or use existing technology more efficiently, yielding 
productivity gains. Additionally, the increase in competition in the local market could 
increase the speed of adoption of new technology or the speed with which it is imitated. 
 
However, some scholars, for example Aitken and Harrison (1997), argue that the 
presence of MNEs could decrease productivity of domestic firms, especially in the short-
term. If imperfectly competitive firms have to face fixed costs of production, a 
multinational with lower marginal costs will be more motivated to raise its production 
relative to its local competitors. In this case, MNE produced in the local market can 
attract demand from domestic firms, so the productivity of local firm would decline. If 
the productivity decrease from this demand effect is high enough, net domestic 
productivity can decrease even if the MNE transfer technology, technology or 
knowledge to local firm. 
 
Table 2.2 summarises some empirical evidence on the effects of FDI on growth and 
productivity, examining mainly three types of evidence from both developed and 
developing countries. First, there are country-studies that examine the effects of FDI on 
the average level of productivity in a sector (e.g. Caves, 1974; Globerman. 1979) or on 
productivity in the local industry (e.g. Blomstrom and Persson, 1983). These researches 
test whether there are intra-industry spillovers from FDI. 
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Table 2.2 Some empirical studies on spillovers from FDI 
Study  Country / Level of 
analysis 
Effects of FDI on growth and 
productivity 
Sectoral studies 
Caves (1974) Australia, sectoral 
level, 
manufacturing, 1966 
Positive correlation FDI presence and 
productivity in sector 
Globerman (1979) Canada, sectoral level, 
1972 
Positive correlation FDI presence and 
productivity in sector 
Pain and Hubert 
(2000) 
United Kingdom, 
sectoral 
level. 
Inter and intra-industry spillovers from 
FDI on technical progress of domestic 
firms 
Blomstrom and 
Persson 
(1983) 
Mexico, 
manufacturing, 1970 
Intra-industry spillovers from FDI on 
labour productivity progress of domestic 
firms 
Macro studies 
Balasubramanyam et 
al. (1996) 
46 developing 
countries, cross section 
over 1970-1995 
Beneficial effect of FDI on real GDP is 
greater in export promotion (EP) 
countries than in import substitution (IS) 
countries 
Barrell and Pain 
(1997) 
UK and West 
Germany, 1972-1995 
Positive effect of FDI on overall technical 
progress 
Borensztein et al. 
(1998) 
69 countries, national 
level 
Weak positive correlation between FDI 
and per capita GDP growth 
De Mello (1999) Panel of 16 developed 
and 17 developing 
countries over 
1970-1990 
FDI has positive effect on real GDP 
growth, but on productivity growth only 
in developed countries. 
Xu (2000) 40 countries, national 
level 
Positive technology transfer in developed 
countries, but not in developing countries 
and depends on minimum level of human 
capital 
Firm or plant level studies 
Blomstrom (1986) Mexico, 70s Positive correlation FDI presence and 
productivity in sector, but firms with 
large technology gaps do not learn. 
Aitken, Harrison and 
Lipsey (1996) 
Mexico, Venezuela 
and Unites Sates, 
manufacturing firms 
Positive spillovers on wages in United 
States, but not in Mexico and Venezuela. 
Blomstrom and 
Sjoholm 
(1999) 
Indonesia, 
manufacturing 
firms, 1991 
Positive effect on productivity of 
domestic firms, but only for 
‘nonexporters’. 
Haddad and Harrison 
(1993) 
Morocco, 
manufacturing 
firms, 1985-1989 
Positive spillovers on level of 
productivity in domestic firms in lowtech 
sectors, but negative spillover effects 
on growth of productivity in domestic 
firms. 
Source: adapted from UNCTAD, 2000 
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In light of this literature, I formulate the following hypothesis:  
H2: FDI has contributed positively to the transfer of: technology, knowledge, 
capital and productivity spillovers into the Algerian telecommunication market. 
 
 
II.1.4 Conclusion 
 
The literature on FDI began in 1960s and 1970s with Hymer (1960), Kindleberger 
(1969), and Caves (1971). Hymer (1960) explain that activities of MNEs do not involve 
only capital mobility while Caves (1971) considered that relative production costs, 
technology, trade and barriers as an important motivator for FDI. Other scholars looked 
at the economic factors, such as, market size, its growth rate, labour costs, labour skills 
and per capita income as important factors explaining Foreign Direct Investment. 
Dunning (1981) with the eclectic theory of FDI, suggested that internalization could 
explain the movements of MNEs. The author introduced the eclectic paradigm in 1992. 
The OLI paradigm (ownership, Localisation and internalisation advantages) explains the 
motivations for investing abroad.  
Regarding the FDI effects, it is widely recognised that FDI has a positive impact on the 
host country’s economy by providing capital, foreign exchange, technology, enhancing 
competition and transferring knowledge and managerial skills (World Bank, 2011; 
Crespo and Fontura, 2007; Romer, 1993). Hence, developing countries, where 
investment demand is estimated to be higher compared to their domestic savings rate, 
could be able to invest in their primary sectors and achieve faster economic growth by 
importing capital from abroad in the form of FDI. However, spillovers effects are not 
automatic and the presence of FDI is not sufficient to capture benefits for the local 
economy. Spillovers are also not free and depend on policy, such as the presence of 
policy-created local capabilities. In the next section, I will look at the four main FDI 
determinants /constraints: rent capture; political risk and institutional stability; economic 
determinants; and the cultural distance between the home and host country. 
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Chapter II Section 2: FDI determinants and constraints  
Introduction 
FDI is an entry modality used by foreign companies to maximise their profit by investing 
money, knowledge and technological capital. Firms invest in countries with favourable 
economic and political conditions, which allow them to minimise their transaction and 
production costs, and maximise their profit. 
 
Determinants of FDI are the factors in the host country’s investment environment that 
attract or constrain FDI inflows. Referring to Dunning’s OLI paradigm, in general, the 
factors that determine FDI inflows are the characteristics of the host country that provide the 
investor with ownership, localisation and international advantage. Dunning (1988: 20) 
argues that “MNEs are companies which undertake productive, i.e. value adding, activities 
outside the country in which are incorporated. They are, by definition, also companies 
which are internationally involved. The extent to which they engage in foreign production 
will depend on their comparative advantage vis-à-vis host country firms and the 
comparative endowments of home and foreign countries”. 
 
In the present part of the research, I have identified four main of FDI determinants and 
constraints: rent capture, political risk and institutional stability, economic determinants and 
the cultural distance between the home and host country.  
 
II.2.1. Rent seeking behaviour and effects 
 
Rent capture, also known as rent “seeking”, refers to the process of obtaining and 
maintaining wealth transfers. While the use of this term is quite new, the behaviour 
described by this terminology "has been with us always" (Buchanan, 1980:3). In economics, 
rent capture occurs when an individual, firm or institution seeks to generate income by 
capturing economic rent through taking advantages of the economic environment; in other 
words, using both legal and illegal ways of rent seeking, rather than earning income through 
production activity. Most research on rent capture focuses on the attempt to capture 
particular monopoly privileges (taking advantage of government regulations of market 
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control); it also refers to an increase of added welfare by gaining ownership or control of 
assets without necessarily being productive.  
 
Rent capture has been influenced largely by the business environment changes (especially in 
emerging countries) the role of globalisation, the increase of MNE power and the 
institutional changes, which have created opportunities that did not exist when there was 
general agreement that the state should play a more limited role. Many scholars used the 
term “Monopoly Privilege Rent Seeking” when one firm seeks to capture rent using local 
pressure groups, tariff protection, tax and royalty exemptions, government subsidies, getting 
states loans or credit lines. The terminology of rent capture was associated to the monopoly 
for the first time by Tullock (1967); however, the terms “rent capture/ rent seeking” was 
expressed later by Krueger (1974) as the behaviour of seeking extra value via the 
manipulation of the business environment rather than the usual meaning of “rent” as 
payment of a lease. Robbins (1981), Bhagwati (1982) pointed out that there is some 
misunderstanding between the concept of beneficial profit capture and detrimental rent 
capture.  
Frequently, a further clarification is drawn between “rent” made legally through lobby 
pressure, government privilege, incentive or royalties, and the profits generated common-
law crimes such as bribery, fraud, embezzlement, theft or any other illicit practise. This 
perspective sees "profit" as acquired, through a mutually-agreeable operation between two 
parties (buyer and seller), and the income of common-law crime non-consensually, using 
power, force or fraud imposed on one party by another. “Rent”, by contrast to “Profit”, is 
acquired when a third party expropriates one party’s transaction opportunities, gaining 
absolute control and advantage of a monopolistic market. 
 
Rent capture is assumed to occur often in the form of lobby generated by the Government 
economic regulations, such as tariffs, taxes, quotas or other entry barriers. Regulatory 
capture is a notion linked to collusion between companies and the government regulatory 
bodies. That is perceived as enabling extensive rent capture behaviour, particularly when 
they must rely on the firm’s information about the market. Moreover, many researches 
associate the concept of rent capture with corruption and bribery.  
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Chowdhury (2006) explains that bribery is a form of rent-seeking by the government 
institutions. He defines the concept as a bureaucratic behaviour, which encourages the 
government organisations to use their power to achieve benefit (either legally or illegally). 
 
Likewise, with the increase of globalisation FDI flow, rent capture behaviour has become 
more significant as institutional changes have created opportunities that did not exist when 
government intervention and control over the economy was limited. Olson (1982) argues 
that the pressure group’s involvement in the state economy is a key factor in the 
deteriorating the economic growth. He also states that the increase of MNE activities 
(especially in the emerging market) has led to an increase in the “the rent capture 
phenomenon”. He also observed that this phenomenon was generated by organised groups 
who have local political influence for their own benefit, rather than that of the state 
economy or local consumers.  
 
Posner (1975) and Tullock (1967) analyse and measure the rent capture behaviour, 
discovering that the problem of identification is comparable to that of determining 
monopoly waste and other market inefficiencies. They added that the “rent capture” waste 
can only be recognised by substituting the observer’s own paradigm of value. Similarly, if 
the state executes a legitimate activity, the action exercised by the pressure group to 
maintain this activity it is not necessarily wasteful. Subsequently, the government role in 
regulating economic activities, identifying a particular activity as wasteful, should be based 
on norms that fall outside economic theory. 
 
Theoretically, rent capture could be seen as "buying" a favourable regulatory business 
environment that would probably be less costly than investing in R&D or improving the 
production facilities. In that case, the firm will have two options: firstly, to gather income 
from its own production using its own resources, while spending money on research and 
development, employee training, technology access, additional capital goods. The second 
option is unrelated entirely to any contribution to total wealth or well-being. This method is 
based on money spent on lobbying, to get easy access and some advantage in the market 
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without necessarily improving the firm competitiveness. The term “rent capture” is often 
associated with government corruption, or the excessive influence of special interests. 
 
Chowdhury (2006) suggests that the rent capture could be initiated by government 
representatives (mainly in emerging countries) such as political leaders and lobby 
representatives, seeking bribes or other favours from individuals or firms that stand to gain 
from having special economic privileges. This opens up the possibility of exploitation of the 
consumer. Eisenhans and Hartmut’s (1996) work illustrates that rent capture by bureaucracy 
could increase the production cost of public goods, as well as rent-seeking by tax officials 
which might engender a loss in revenue to the public exchequer. A significant distinction 
can be made between rent-seeking activities aimed at secure favourable legislation to create 
rent, and other activities devoted to allocating a share of such rent once it has been created. 
There are also important differences between rents that emerge from government 
restrictions on market output and government redistributive activity emerging directly from 
the tax-transfer process. 
 
II.2.1.2 Rent capture and the telecommunication sector 
In an open economy associated with deregulation or long transition periods towards free 
market competition (unregulated market competition), rent seeking is generated by firms 
pressure and rewarding politicians and bureaucrats to pursue favourable strategies in order 
to achieve higher market returns; higher than expected without the rent seeking. Therefore, 
the main question to ask is: how do firms develop particular political strategies to success in 
rent capture?  
 
In the case of rent seeking, we can refer to the telecommunication sector as one of the 
fastest growing industries in the world (UNCTAD, 2010). I use the example below to 
explain how rent capture would occur in emerging countries. I therefore, propose the 
following contingencies: (A) all available rents are dissipated through rent seeking; (B) no 
rent dissipation and local government capture the rents; (C) no rent dissipation, MNEs 
would capture the rent. 
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Barzel (1974) suggests the telecommunication sector barriers to entry take the form of 
licenses to operate. Given that the license to operate has value, competition between MNEs 
to bid for the licence will result in real resources being used for lobbying costs, queuing 
costs and inefficiencies in the cost of the delivery that dissipate the eventual rents. When 
MNEs buy the country’s capital and labours in order to acquire the license, the removal of 
the barriers would eliminate them from obtaining the license and remove the wasteful use of 
resources on rent-seeking behaviour. Consequently, there are real resource gains from the 
removal of barriers to MNEs when the country’s labour and capital dedicated to acquisition 
of the license becomes available. No rent dissipation occurs if there is no influence on the 
decision of delivering the license. In this case, we need to look at who could eventually 
capture the rents. The government may capture the rents as payments from MNEs, or from 
eventual taxes imposed on MNEs. In either of these scenarios, the rents are not lost to the 
host economy. On the other hand, when an MNE obtains the license to import, it receives a 
windfall profit equal to the ad valorem equivalent of the quota; this tax is imposed typically 
at the time of a transaction, but it could also be imposed on an annual basis. Or, it could take 
the form of a stamp duty, which is imposed as an ad valorem tax in some countries 
(including Algeria). This discussion led to the following hypothesis:  
H3: there is a strong correlation between rent seeking and FDI inflow. 
 
II.2.2 Political stability:  
The analysis of the rent capture effects drive us to look at the political dimension as one of 
the important determinants of the FDI inflow. 
 
The concept of political stability has extensive indicators ranging from political freedom to 
the probability of revolutions and violent uprisings. The stability of political regimes could 
refer to the longevity of the ruling authority in a country either as a single party in a one-
party governorship, a military regime or a multi-party political system. But the most 
important aspect of political stability is the durability of the regime without any major 
political disruption or turmoil.  In economics, the notion of the “stability of political 
regimes” is perceived differently than in political science. It is defined as the probability of 
disruption of the operations of MNEs by political forces or events in both home and host 
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countries. In host countries, political risk is determined mostly by the risk and uncertainty of 
the actions of political institutions and minority groups, such as separatists for 
fundamentalist movements. In home countries, political risk could stem from political 
actions aimed directly at investment destinations, such as sanctions, or from policies that 
restrict outward investment. From the foreign investors’ perspective, political risk is more 
specifically defined as a breach of contract by governments, restrictions on currency transfer 
and convertibility, expropriation, non-honouring of government guarantees, adverse 
regulatory changes and restrictions on FDI outflows in home countries. Political violence is 
also a significant determinant as civil war; disturbance and terrorism could reduce the 
profitability of investing in the host country, because domestic sales and exports-imports are 
inefficient, production splits and the facility is damaged or destroyed.           
 
Political risk in the host country is also viewed as a key factor for investment locations and 
deciding the investment amount. Political instability is regarded by economists as a serious 
malaise to economic performance, and is likely to reduce policymakers’ horizons, thus 
leading to suboptimal short-term macroeconomic policies. It may also lead to a more 
frequent switch of policies, creating volatility and, therefore, negatively affecting 
macroeconomic performance. 
 
Empirical evidence suggests a strong link between FDI flow and the host country’s political 
stability. For instance, Schneider and Frey (1985) found that political instability had a 
negative effect on FDI flows. Barro (1999) found that political instability negatively affects 
economic growth and investment, and argued that property rights are not enforced in 
politically unstable environments. He established that measures of political instability, such 
as coups, revolutions and assassinations, are inversely correlated with the growth of GDP 
and investment share. He determined that political instability, through its adverse effect on 
property rights, reduces growth and investment in host economies. 
 
Alesina & Perotti (1996) conclude that political instability had a negative effect on 
investment in a sample of 70 countries from 1960 to 1985. Furthermore, Woodward and 
Rolfe’s (1993) cross-sectional analysis of FDI flows to 36 countries for 1977 and 1982 
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found a high correlation between political stability and economic growth in the host 
economies. Younis et al. (2008) found that political stability plays an important role in 
determining economic growth in Asian countries. They conclude that that there is both a 
direct and indirect relationship between political stability and economic growth as political 
stability influences economic growth not only indirectly by sources of capital accumulation, 
but also directly on growth rather than labour, human capital and economic freedom in Asia.  
 
I.2.2.1 The relation between governance institutions and foreign direct investment 
Institutions are the formal and informal rules and values of a country that encourage or 
constrain inward FDI by either increasing or decreasing the costs of doing business for the 
investors. Ali, Fiess and McDonald (2008:6) state that the institutional framework of a 
country “consists of all kinds of humanly devised constraints that shape the human 
interactions, including economic exchange. Institutions can be formal (e.g. constitution, 
laws, etc.), or informal (e.g. conventions and customs)”. Dumludag, Saridogan and Kurt 
(2009) identify the three aspects of the institutional framework of a country: formal rules, 
informal rules and enforcement.  
 
Formal rules are the written rules; for example, the different laws and legislations governing 
society. Informal rules are the unwritten rules that regulate social life; they relate mainly to 
moral, culture and traditional values, codes of conduct and behaviour, etc. The role of the 
institutions is to regulate human interactions and establish norms and rules in order to ease 
the uncertainty associated with these interactions. Therefore, institutions “provide societies 
with predictable framework for interaction” (Ali, Fiess & McDonald 2008: 6).  
The third aspect of the institutional framework is enforcement, which evaluates the 
efficiency of the rules governing society. Quality or good institutions, including efficient 
enforcement, could reduce the costs of doing business and may improve profitability from 
the economic activity (Ali, Fiess & McDonald 2008). Related to the impact of institution in 
economic activities, institutions could affect foreign investors through transaction and 
production costs. Transaction costs are the costs of negotiating and enforcing an economic 
exchange in order to conduct business in the host country. For instance, poor property rights 
protection and unreliable enforcement of contracts could increase transaction and 
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production costs, which may discourage foreign investors. Moreover, a weak business 
environment and inefficient institutions may delay setting up businesses in terms of 
bureaucracy or even bribery.  
 
Rodrik and Subramanian (2002) argue that the quality of the governing and political 
institutions is the factor that could explain the cross country differences in attracting FDI. In 
fact, the quality of institutions and the country investment climate are important criteria for 
MNEs to decide about the localisation for investment. Wernick, Haar and Singh (2009) also 
supported the argument of political stability and good governance institutions reducing 
economic and political uncertainties, improving the country business environment by 
enhancing bureaucratic performances and predictability, and encouraging efficiency as 
governing institutions provide the necessary legal framework for economic growth and 
socio-economic development.  
 
According to the World Bank report (2008), there is strong evidence that efficient ruling 
institutions play an important role in attracting FDI. The quality of government institutions 
would affect the level of economic, political and social stability, shape the degree of 
government intervention on and openness of the economy, effect the rent capture, reduce 
bureaucracy and corruption, allow reliable and transparent regulatory framework  covering 
FDI policies and taxation system, effective property rights protection, enforcement of 
contracts, efficiency of justice and the lack of and the type of privatisation process. “Sound 
regulation corrects market failures that inhibit productive investment and reconciles the 
interests of firms with the interests of society. Strong tax systems are needed to finance 
public services that are needed to invest in a strong investment climate and public welfare 
…Although taxation and regulation are necessary, burdensome regulation and high taxes an 
inhibit growth, encourage informality and corruption, discourage investment and harm 
productivity. Inefficient administrative procedures at the central and municipal levels cost 
businesses time and money, reducing productivity and investment”(World Bank 2008: 119).  
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Therefore, political stability and efficient governing institutions would decrease the political 
risk for investors by providing predictability and transparency which could increase FDI 
flow to the country. 
 
FDI faces variability of basic macroeconomic variables (inflation, budget deficit, balance of 
payments, etc.) across countries. Volatility of macroeconomic policy creates both problems 
and opportunities for international firms, requiring them to manage the risk inherent in 
volatile countries, but also presenting the opportunity of moving production to lower-cost 
facilities. A particular kind of macroeconomic instability is that of exchange-rate volatility. 
If exchange-rate changes merely offset price movements so that real purchasing power 
parity is maintained, the exchange-rate movements would have little real effects. 
Nevertheless, there is empirical evidence to indicate that purchasing power parity does not 
hold for all time periods and, thus, exchange-rate changes can affect the competitiveness of 
plants in different countries. 
Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis:  
H4: political stability is an important determinant to FDI inflow.  
 
II.2.3 The overall country’s economic stability 
 
According to Trevino et al. (2002), the country’s overall economic stability could help 
strengthen the fundamentals of the economy. There exists a vast literature that examines the 
possible effects of economic policies on FDI inflow. Drawing on these researches, I have 
focused on selected factors that could either improve or constrain inward FDI. According to  
UNCTC (1992) and UNCTAD (2010), factors like the quality of human capital, 
macroeconomic stability, financial health and infrastructure availability in the economy are 
expected to have a positive impact, while cost variables (labour cost, energy cost,…) are 
predicted to be related negatively to FDI inflows. 
Table 2.3 summarises the different economic variables and their estimated effect on FDI 
inflow. 
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Table 2.3 different economic variables and their estimated effect on FDI inflow 
Determinant Variable used in the literature  Empirical Studies Impact  
Current Market 
Size and Potential 
Market Size 
Log GDP 
Per Capita  Income 
GDP Growth Rate 
Per Capita Growth rate 
Root and Ahmed 
1979, 
Bhattacharya et al 
1996, Chen and 
Khan 1997 
 
 
Positive  
Cost of Labour Real Wage Rate Woodward and 
Rolfe 1993 
Negative 
Availability of 
Skilled Labour 
Literacy Rates 
Secondary Enrolment rate 
Schneider and 
Frey 1985 
 
 
Positive 
Cost of Capital Local credit ratio 
Log annual average 
lending rates 
Bende Nende, et 
al 2000 
 
Positive 
Availability of 
Infrastructure 
Ratio of Commerce, transport and 
communication to GDP 
Energy production (equivalent tons 
of coal per 1000 population) 
Bende-Nabende, 
et al 2000 
Positive 
Real exchange rate 
 
Real exchange rate Goldberg and Klein 
1998, 
Trevino, et al 2002 
Negative 
Exchange Rate 
Stability 
Percentage Change in Annual 
average. Exchange Rate between 
Local Currency and US $ 
Exchange Rate Volatility using 
Monthly Data 
Froot and Stein 
1991 
Negative 
Rate of Inflation Percentage Change in Consumer 
prices 
Schneider and 
Frey 1985 
Negative 
Financial Health Current Account Deficit 
Ratio of External Debts to Exports 
Schneider and 
Frey 1985 
Negative 
Overall Economic 
Stability that 
includes Political 
Stability 
Credit Ratings 
Budget Deficit/GDP 
Trevino, et al 
2002 
Negative 
Source: adapted from different theoretical and empirical frameworks 
 
In this study, I focus mainly on the influence of market size, cost factors, macroeconomic 
stability, real exchange rates and exchange-rate volatility, and national and international 
FDI policies on either driving or restraining FDI flow. 
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II.2.3.1 Market size 
 
One of the most significant economic factors recognised by the literature is the market-
related variables that could affect market-seeking FDI. These variables are the current 
market size and the potential market size. Bhattacharya et al, (1996), Chen and Khan (1997) 
and Mbekeani (1997) used a log and growth rate of GDP to capture the impact of this 
variable on FDI and found that it had a positive impact on FDI inflow. The scholars argue 
that a large market size could help achieve the economy of scale; a growing market 
improves the prospects of market potential and, thereby, could have a positive impact on 
inward FDI.  
 
II.2.3.2.Cost factors 
In economics, cost factors are defined as the factors that cause investment cost differentials 
and may influence considerably the choice of an investment location for the resource-
seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI. These include labour, capital and infrastructure costs.  
 
Bende-Nabende et al. (2000) found that higher lending rates may have a positive impact on 
FDI inflows. They suggest that the higher the cost of capital in the host economy, the more 
capital is brought in by MNEs firms. In contrast, it can be argued that the host country’s 
cost of capital affects directly domestic consumption. Consequently, the lower the interest 
rates, the higher the domestic consumption, which could attract more FDI to the host 
economy. In relation to infrastructure costs, Bende-Nabende et al. (2000) examined 
different variables, including land and property rents, fuel costs, index of infrastructure, 
transport costs and share of transport and communication to GDP. They found a positive 
correlation between the higher availability of infrastructure and FDI inflow, and suggest that 
high infrastructure availability would generate a low infrastructure, which could enhance the 
country’s attraction to FDI. 
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II.2.3.3 Macroeconomic stability 
FDI inflow could be subject to many macroeconomic variables in host economies (inflation, 
budget deficit, balance of payments, etc.). The volatility of macroeconomic policy could 
create both threats and opportunities for MNEs, requiring them to manage the risk inherent 
in volatile countries, but could also generate some opportunities of shifting production to 
lower-cost facilities.                    
 
II.2.3.3.1 Real exchange rates and exchange-rate volatility 
There is mixed evidence on the possible impact of depreciation of real exchange rate in the 
host country on FDI inflow. Trevino et al. (2002) explain that foreign investors could either 
gain or lose from a devalued exchange rate. MNEs may gain due to larger buying power in 
host countries. Also, they could benefit from the economy of scale so they can produce 
more cheaply and, therefore, export more easily. This could specifically attract resource-
seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI. However, MNEs may not enter if they believe that 
depreciation may continue after they enter a host country (this would suggest costs to be too 
high to justify their investments). Trevino et al. (2002) suggests that, in general, a devalued 
exchange rate would encourage FDI inflow in the host economies, as this would possibly 
reduce the cost of investment to the MNEs. 
 
Conversely, Froot and Stein (1991) studied the impact of exchange-rate volatility and 
suggest that it may affect negatively FDI inflows. They explained that high exchange-rate 
volatility of the host country’s currency might discourage foreign investment as it could 
increase uncertainty regarding the future economic and business prospects of the host 
economy. 
 
II.2.3.3.2 Inflation rate 
 
Schneider and Frey (1985) argue that inflation rate is a key determinant of the country’s 
economic stability. They suggest that a high rate of inflation indicates either the inability or 
capability of the government to balance its budget, and the failure of the central bank to 
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apply the adequate monetary policy. They conclude that the increase of the rate of inflation 
has a negative impact on attracting foreign investment. 
 
II.2.4 National and international FDI policies 
II.2.4.1 National FDI policies 
 
There is an increased interest towards the study of the effect of host countries’ policies to 
attract FDI. However, empirically it is difficult to quantitatively examine the impact of FDI 
specific-policies, such as incentives offered and removal of restrictions on the operations of 
foreign firms, since they are hard to isolate from other factors (Globerman and Shapiro, 
1999). 
 
The literature recognises two main categories of FDI incentives offered by developing 
countries. First are the fiscal incentives, which are defined as the policies designed to reduce 
the tax burden of a firm. They include tax concessions in the form of a reduction of the 
standard corporate income-tax rate; tax holidays; accelerated depreciation allowances on 
capital taxes; exemption or concession from import duties and duty drawbacks on exports 
(Markusen, 1995). The second category of incentives is the financial incentives; they are 
defined as the government’s support of the firm in the form of grants, subsidised loans and 
loan guarantees, and government insurance at discounted rates (Markusen, 1995). 
 
The role of incentives in attracting FDI has been questioned on theoretical as well as 
empirical grounds. Kumar (2002), and Loree and Guisinger (1995) have empirically tested 
the impact particular policies over time and suggest that FDI may flow into a country not 
only because a particular country provides certain investment incentives, but also because 
these incentives, when compared with those provided by other competing host countries, 
seem to be more attractive. They also examined the impact of both individual incentives and 
the overall FDI policies and suggest that, when considered independently, different 
incentives offered by a host country may have a significant influence on FDI. However, 
when considered as a package or under a country general FDI policy these incentives may 
lose their significance. 
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In contrast, with the decline in trade barriers and increase in the importance of networks, 
foreign investors find barriers to entry and less competitive environments less appealing. 
Charkrabarti (2001) found that MNEs are discouraged by trade restrictions, such as high 
tariffs or non-tariff barriers on imported inputs, and are attracted to more open economies. 
In reviewing cross-country regressions on the contributing factors of FDI, the scholar 
suggests that, after market size, economic openness to trade has been the most reliable 
indicator of the attractiveness of a location for FDI.  
 
In addition to the trade barriers, there are other government policies that might effect MNE 
decisions relating to investment. These policies are related to admission and establishment, 
ownership and control, and other operational measures.  
 
Admission and establishment restrictions include the government decision to close certain 
industries to FDI or imposing high entry requirements or requiring authorisation and 
registration of investment and minimum capital. Ownership and control could take form of 
an imposing joint venture as a sole mode of entry by levying a fixed percentage of foreign 
owned assets (the case of Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Mexico), or mandatory transfer of 
ownership to local private firms after a certain period of operation. Restriction on foreign 
labour MNEs could curb the amount of expatriate workers, or even the number of foreign 
senior managers in the company. 
 
Empirical studies corroborate the argument that removal of restrictions has a significant 
positive impact on FDI inflows into developing countries. Djankov, Hart and Nenova 
(2002) study highlights that stricter regulation of entry is associated with more corruption 
and a larger informal economy and, therefore, restrictions on entry could have a negative 
impact on attracting FDI. 
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II.2.4.2 International FDI policies 
 
The international FDI policies take the form of bilateral, multilateral or regional agreements, 
such as the world trade organisation (WTO), EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, the 
Arab free trade zone etc. The role of the agreements is to reduce, and ultimately remove, 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to the free flow of goods, services and factors of production 
between countries. 
 
UNCTAD (1999) suggests that international agreements contain provisions for the 
settlement of disputes between both the treaty partners and between investors and the host 
state. They also cover a number of other areas, specifically in relation to non-discrimination 
in the treatment, and in some cases the entry of foreign-controlled enterprises and other 
related fields. A major aspect of international trade agreements is a considerable uniformity 
in the broad principles underlying the agreements coupled with other variations in the 
specific formulations employed. International agreements recognise the effect of national 
law on FDI and accept the right of governments to regulate the FDI entry. By providing 
protection to both host countries and MNEs, international agreements could improve the 
investment environment to make it more conducive to the free flow of FDI. 
 
Empirical studies conducted by Binh and Haughton (2002) suggest that, although 
international agreements based on non-discriminatory treatment of FDI play an important 
role in attracting FDI inflows into developing countries, the impacts of international 
agreements are stronger and more significant between developed countries than between 
developed and developing countries. 
 
This discussion drives us to the following hypothesis:  
H5: the country’s economic stability and a sound business environment are important 
determinants to FDI inflow. 
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II.2.5 Cultural determinants  
Recently, a plethora of studies has investigated the reasons why certain countries are more 
attractive to foreign investors. They recognise that not only the economic, political, legal 
and cultural environments of the host country are important, but also cultural variables 
could be a significant factor in the location choice of foreign investors.  
 
According to Dunning’s (1977, 1980) eclectic paradigm, MNEs invest where they perceive 
the most advantages in terms of ownership, location, and internalisation. Moreover, cultural 
determinants could be linked strongly to the location advantages.  
 
The cultural difference between two countries is often analysed as a source of increased 
transaction costs; entrepreneurs prefer to invest in countries with cultures similarities to 
their home nations. Scholars suggest that, by doing so, firms could reduce uncertainties and 
transaction costs (Davidson, 1980; Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Benito and Gripsrud, 
1992; Buckley and Casson, 1998; Tihanyi et al., 2005; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Bevan et al., 
2004; Mudambi and Navarra, 2002). Empirically, the notion of cultural distance has been 
found to have a positive, negative or no effect on FDI location (Tihanyi et al., 2005). For 
instance, Grosse and Trevino (1996) used a gravity model to explain the determinants of 
FDI in the United States between 1980 and 1992. They found that the MNEs originating in 
a country that is different culturally from the US are less likely to be involved in foreign 
investment. However, Rauch (2001) analyses social networking between countries, and 
suggests that the presence of the social networks between two countries can reduce the 
barriers of capital exchange between them and encourage trade exchange.  
 
Berlo (1960) recognised five cultural variables affecting FDI inflow: communication skills, 
(language), knowledge, culture, attitude and social system He suggests that these factors 
could enhance information-flow not only between individuals, but also in terms of FDI 
location choice, because good communication may help reduce uncertainties and transaction 
cost. Daniels et al. (2007), Luo and Shenkar (2006), and Tushman, (1978) confirm this 
argument and suggest that communication is more efficient when a shared language exists 
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or when the actors have a strong similar background. Language is key ingredient that can 
shape information exchange, competitive activities and global coordination. 
 
Hofstede (1980), who conducted a large scale research study in IBM subsidiaries across the 
world, argued that culture is collective programming that has a great impact on 
organisational behaviour. He (1980, 1994) identified four dimensions of culture (power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/ collectivism and masculinity/ femininity).  
 
The Hofstede Model of Cultural Dimensions can be of great use when it comes to analysing 
a country’s culture. However, the criticism of this model are quite abundant, the main ones 
are: 
First, the averages of a country do not reflect on all individuals of that country. Even though 
this model has proven to be quite often accurate when applied to the general population, not 
all individuals or even regions with subcultures fit into the pattern. Also, the scholar uses an 
educated and skilful panel: IBM employees. Therefore, their attitude and behaviour could 
differ from the ones far below the hierarchy or the society (McSweeney, 2002). 
 
Second, the data accuracy is another issue. The scholar collected data through 
questionnaires, which have their own limitations. Additionally, in some cultures the context 
of the question asked is as important as its content. Especially in group-oriented cultures, 
individuals might tend to answer questions as if they were addressed to the group he/she 
belongs to. While on the other hand in the United States, which is an individualistic culture, 
the answers will most likely be answered and perceived through the eyes of that individual. 
 
Finally, is this framework up to date? With the world increasingly globalising how much 
does the culture of a country change over time, either by internal or external factors?  
 
So, Hofstede model could be used as a guide to understanding cross cultural differences, not 
as law set in stone. In the present research, I will focus on hierarchical distance, social 
collectivism and uncertainty avoidance as the main determinants or constraints of FDI 
inflow. 
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According to Hofstede (1991, 1994), hierarchical distance or power distance explain the 
perception of the degree of inequality of power between the governor and the governed. 
Shane (1992, 1994) argues that power distance reflects the degree of trust that characterises 
an organisation. He suggests that strong hierarchic distance is associated with weak 
interpersonal trust. Empirically, the effect of interpersonal trust on FDI was examined by 
several researches; for instance, Rousseau and al. (1998). Bottazzi and Hellmann (2008) 
acknowledge that the trust among nations has a significant impact on the likelihood of 
whether entrepreneurs are willing to take risks in investing in another country. Specifically, 
individual partners’ experience and education could affect FDI inflow. Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales’ (2009) work is based on a sample of European countries and confirms that a weak 
level of trust between two nations could lower level of exchange of goods and capitals. 
 
Siegel and Schwartz (2009) argue that high power distance could lead to strong 
informational asymmetry, which maximizes the costs of transaction. They discourage lateral 
investments, particularly the operations of merger and acquisitions (Siegel and Larson, 
2008). Liu et al’s., (2007) empirical study of China during the period 1983-1994 confirms 
this argument. 
 
Moreover, Sagiv and Schwartz (2007) argue that a large power distance affects indirectly 
the FDI in terms of managerial behaviour, as managers can take advantage of their power in 
order to make concessions during negotiations with their partners. 
 
In regards to the potential impact of Hofstede’s (1980) dimension of collectivism 
/individualism on FDI inflow, according to Triandis (1988), the determination of 
individualism and collectivism cultures are based on four general assumptions. First, in 
collectivist cultures, an individual is interdependent on others while in individualistic 
nations, an individual is independent of groups (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Second, in 
collectivist cultures, there is strong emphasis on achieving group goals rather than 
individual goals but in individualistic cultures, personal achievement is more significant 
than group goals (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Wagner and Moch, 1986). Third, in collectivist 
cultures, social behaviour is based on duties and obligations, and depends on sociocultural 
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factors traditions, religions etc. However, in individualistic nations, people value their 
personal values, contracts, and perceived rights (Bontempo and Rivero, 1992; Miller, 1994). 
Fourth, collectivist nations encourage relationships and social interaction, even if they do 
not reap any benefits. In individualistic societies, people seek more rationality in 
networking, which means considering the costs and benefits of relationships (Kim et al., 
1994). 
 
Furthermore, Doney et al. (1998) and Hewett and Bearden (2001) state that, in more 
collectivist nations, trust plays a significant role in motivating supportive behaviours. While 
Knack and Keefer (1997) noticed that countries with ethnically homogeneous populations 
are characterised by a higher income, which could encourage FDI towards collectivist host 
countries, rather than individualist nations.  
 
On the other hand, Bandelj’s (2002) research found that the social relations are key to FDI 
inflow and suggested incrementing the social and behavioural theories. Furthermore, in a 
culture of fairness that values collectivism, the policy of social redistribution favours the 
weak, the unemployed and the elderly. Such a policy allows better social protection for 
workers and improves the standard of living of society. In the economic aspects, 
egalitarianism could limit the scale of corruption, a better transparency in the financial 
market and with more efficient anti-regulation of monopoly and execution (Siegel, Licht, 
and Schwartz 2009). 
 
Analysing the possible impact of Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance dimension on FDI, risk 
perception determines risk preference. In fact, conducting business abroad always entails 
uncertainty and risk, which might rise when the potential partners are from different 
cultures.  
 
Therefore, individuals from high uncertainty avoidance cultures may avoid business 
negotiations and contracts with foreigners. Conversely, people from low uncertainty 
avoidance, due to the positive attitude towards unknown, uncertain and risky situations, 
could be more willing to interact with foreign potential partners (Bhardwaj et al., 2007; 
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Weber and Milliman, 1997). Empirical evidence confirmed the differences among cultures 
in the perception of the risk, resulting in threats to an uncertain future (Kleinhesselink and 
Rosa 1994; Solvic et al., 1991). For instance, Bontempo et al. (1998) found that the Chinese 
are more willing to take risks than Americans and other Westerners. 
 
Along with the findings on the traditional determinants (political, economic and legal), 
cultural variables are a significant determinant for attracting FDI. In particular, high levels 
of individualism, hierarchical distance and uncertainty avoidance represent an unfavourable 
environment for foreign investors. Therefore, developing economies should improve their 
social relationships to foster the FDI. 
 
In light of this analysis, I propose the following hypothesis:  
H6: cultural distance between countries could either encourage or restraints FDI. 
 
 
II.2.6 Conclusion 
 
The last two decades have witnessed an extensive growth in FDI flows to developing 
countries. This has been accompanied by an increase in competition amongst the developing 
countries to attract FDI, resulting in higher investment incentives offered by the host 
governments to foreign investors. 
Along with the traditional findings on the traditional determinants of the FDI (political, 
economic, legal and cultural variables) this study take into consideration the potential effect 
of rent capture as an important determinant in either attracting or restricting FDI flow. Rent 
capture could have a positive effect as it could increase competition, as well as the transfer 
of: technology, know-how and managerial skills. 
 
While the rent capture (via lobbying and pressure group ) could be seen as  potential 
negative  FDI spillovers as MNEs often use their  both rent and economic influence to 
pressure  government policies in directions unfavourable to development. The local 
government (especially in developing countries) often grants economic and political 
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concessions in the form of excessive protection, lower tax, subsidised inputs, cheap 
provision of factory sites. As a result, the private profits of MNEs may exceed social 
benefits and could generates rent waist in forms of encouraging bribery, bureaucracy and 
illicit practises as well as the potential negative impact on natural resources: natural 
resources depletion as well as the deterioration of  environment ( pollution and its impact on 
fauna and flora). 
 
 
 
II.3 Chapter conclusion 
 
FDI has become an important source of private external finance for developing countries as 
it represents investment in production facilities; its significance for developing countries is 
much greater. Not only can FDI add to investible resources and capital formation, it also 
enables the transfer of production technology, skills, innovative capacity, organisational and 
managerial practices between locations, as well as accessing international marketing 
networks. 
 
In this chapter, I began the first section by examining the motivation for FDI: resource 
seeking motivations (targeting natural resources, energy and agricultural goods); market 
seeking motivations (aiming to get access to new markets); asset seeking motivations, in the 
case of acquisitions targeting in the first place technology and knowledge, brands and skills 
incorporated in a foreign company. I have also examined the major literature explaining the 
economic FDI effects, the different modes of entry in emerging markets and the potential 
effects on emerging economies: Technology, knowledge, capital, productivity spillovers and 
competitiveness. In the second section, I analysed the main FDI determinants and 
constraints: rent capture, political risk and institutional stability, economic FDI determinants 
and the cultural distance between the home and host country.  
 
In the next chapter, I will explain my research methodology, clarifying my research 
questions, research design, ethics, research limitations and future scope of my study. 
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Derived from an extensive literature review, I developed my research model starting with 
the classical position that government policy is a key determinant of the extent and nature of 
FDI impact, principally through incentives, specific regulations, benefits and subsidies, or 
general policies such as liberalisation, but also through second-round effects on the 
competitive structure of the market.   
Generally, specific government interventions can enhance specific spillovers (positive 
externalities) from FDI, while liberalisation and increased competitiveness can be expected  
to enhance spillovers. The FDI effects are also influenced classically by the mode of entry 
and management style, which is associated with country risk analysis. 
 
The model differs from classical accounts of FDI in terms of the attention it pays to rents 
and rent capture, which I argue strongly, mediates the effects of FDI, particularly in 
developing economies where markets tend to be inefficient, and in sectors such as 
telecommunications arising from the natural monopolies present. Not only does rent seeking 
and rent capture influence the extent and types of effects and constraints arising from FDI, it 
also adds a secondary dynamic, providing incentives for FDI to be channelled towards 
influencing government policies and the market structure.  
 
Rent capture via lobbying (pressure groups) could have a strong influence on government 
intervention in the market (by the incentive given or specific benefits and regulations). 
Furthermore, the rent captured could generate potential negative or positive spillovers of 
technology, know-how, managerial skills, efficiency and effectiveness, and generate 
negative spillovers, such as resource waste and depletion. Liberalisation also has an indirect 
effect on the competitive reactor pattern by impacting on the competitive structure (changes 
occurred on the competitive rivalry and the market structure), which, on the one hand, 
makes FDI easier but also increases rivalry and reduces the availability of monopoly rents. 
As a consequence, the increased competitive rivalry would reduce the opportunities for 
rents as it is a move away from a monopolistic or oligopolistic situation. Additionally, the 
existence of rents is likely to encourage new entrants and, thus, increase competitive 
rivalries in the market, which could have strong repercussions on the FDI performance in 
the telecommunication sector. 
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Chapter III: Research Methodology  
 
Introduction 
 
Methodology is frequently perceived as the place where epistemology, method and 
theory congregate. For instance, methodology enlightens how and why we decide to 
investigate in a specific area and our choice of methodology is conveyed into method. 
The selection of methodology also helps to shape the research process and enhance the 
knowledge expansion. 
 
The main objective of this chapter is to present the way in which the research was 
conducted, and how it was undertaken and evaluated. It is also considered as the 
framework of my study as it gives a general vision of the work. This is comparable with 
the building of a house, if the frame is inconsistent or defective; the house may not stand 
for long.  
 
The objective of my research is to analyse the potential contributions of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to the performance of the telecommunication sector of the Algerian 
economy, critically examine and analyse the motivations, constraints and effects of FDI 
in the Algerian economy, with reference to the telecommunication sector using both 
literature and experimental approaches.  
 
In order to answer my research question, I use two different reasoning approaches; the 
first is deduction, which is a form of assumption that supposed to be conclusive, as the 
conclusion must necessarily follow from the reasons given. This form of argument calls 
for a stronger link between reasons and conclusions than is found in induction. The 
second approach is the induction argument, which is completely different from the 
deduction type as it does not have the same strength of relationship between reasons and 
conclusion. To induce something is to draw a conclusion from one or more particular 
facts or valid premises. As in the induction, the reasoning approach is the conclusion that 
explains the facts and the facts support the conclusion. 
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III.1 Research design and instrument 
In the present research, I use descriptive research. Descriptive research does not fit 
neatly into the definition of either quantitative or qualitative research methodologies, but 
instead it can utilise elements of both, often within the same study. The term “descriptive 
research” refers to the type of research question, design and data analysis that will be 
applied to a given topic. Descriptive statistics tell what it is, while inferential statistics 
try to determine causes and effects. Descriptive studies intend to find out "what is", so 
observational and survey methods are used frequently to collect descriptive data (Borg & 
Gall, 1989). 
The main purpose of descriptive research is to describe, explain and validate findings. 
Description emerges following creative exploration, and serves to organise the findings 
in order to fit them with explanations, and then test or validate those explanations 
(Krathwohl, 1993).  
Many researches tend to examine specific phenomena by analysing their form, structure, 
activity, changes over time and their relation to other phenomena.  
Descriptive research involves collecting data that describe patterns and then organise, 
tabulate, depict and analyse the data collection (Glass and Hopkins, 1984). It often uses 
visual aids, such as graphs and charts to help the reader understand the data distribution. 
When in-depth, narrative descriptions of multiple cases are involved, the research uses 
description as a tool to organise data into patterns that emerge during analysis. Those 
patterns help to understand the study and its implications. 
In my research, I use a mix between primary and secondary data, analysing all types of 
documents, such as external sources: published government statistics; World Bank and 
IMF reports; published case studies and literature reviews; published text books; 
theoretical work; academic journals, periodicals and archives; and secondary analyses by 
any academic or experts and reports, media: documentaries for example, as a source of 
information (newspapers, online newspapers). Internal sources: firm reports (investor 
reports, financial reports), memos, different surveys and studies conducted by the 
organisations, as well as collecting primary data from the in-depth interviews before 
carrying out my own fieldwork collecting data and comparing them with the secondary 
data already gathered. 
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The advantage of the secondary data is the fact that it represents excellent background 
information. Also, data from secondary sources help to decide what needs to be done 
and can be a rich source of hypotheses, as well as a good basis for a primary data. 
Secondary data avoid unnecessary costs, as the collection of secondary data is faster than 
primary sources, but the disadvantage is that it can be sometimes misleading or 
irrelevant to the study. Moreover, in terms of specificity, it provides a general overview, 
but not in-depth analysis. Furthermore, some internal sources, such as organisational 
surveys, were not valid as the analysis might be biased. 
 
Another common problem with secondary sources is that, often, they do not contain the 
information required, or the information is available but not stored in one source. In my 
research, I found that many multinationals provide information about their activities 
within different countries, but without providing a clear picture about the business 
environment in the country. In the case of Orascom Telecom Holding (OTH), according 
the company reports, the Pakistan telecommunication market is the highest in terms of 
penetration rate, but it does not yield any information about the structure of the market, 
competition within the market or even the external environment.  
 
To overcome this problem I have opted for three major actions: the first one is to merge 
multiple secondary data sources; the second is to adjust the research problem to the 
available data; and the third is to identify which research problem could be investigated 
using the available data. 
 
Another qualitative method used in my research is the case study. The case study stands 
out from the need to understand and explain multifaceted phenomena. It allows scholars 
to retain a more holistic perspective than can be easily achieved through other 
approaches. Case studies were used to “follow up and to put flesh on the bones” (Bell, 
1999, p.11) of the initial survey and to study “participants’ perceptions and judgements” 
(Simons, 1996, p.229).  
 
Yin (1994) argues that the case-study approach could be used to explain complex causal 
links in real-life interventions, describe the real-life context in which the intervention has 
occurred, describe the intervention itself and explore those situations in which the 
intervention being evaluated has no clear set of outcomes.  
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Additionally, case studies provide a meaningful way of exploring different facets of 
research variables. In the present research, I am using multiple case studies in which I 
examine five cases in order to understand the similarities and differences between them 
by applying my research model and hypothesis. Yin (2003:47) describes how multiple 
case studies can be used to either, “(a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) 
predicts contrasting results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication)”. This 
type of a design has its advantages and disadvantages. Overall, the evidence created 
from this type of study is considered robust and reliable.  
 
However, the case study approach has some limitations; the most important being the 
massive data for easy analysis. The case study data could be time-consuming to collect, 
and even more time-consuming to analyse. It could be also very expensive if conducted 
on a large scale.  
 
When case studies are often effective in revealing some of the complexities of the 
pattern studies, there is often a problem of representation. It is often problematic to 
present accessible and realistic pictures of that complexity in writing. Another weakness 
of this approach is that, in a large scale study with multiple variables, this approach fails 
to answer a large number of relevant and appropriate research questions. Besides, some 
aspects of case study work can be fairly easily presented in numerical form, but much 
cannot. Although case study research has had its critics in the past, it is “now widely 
accepted as a form of research” (Simons, 1996, p.225) and fits my research objectives. 
 
Regarding my fieldwork, I am using different types of interview techniques: face-to-face 
interview, mail questionnaire and telephone interviewing. Face to face interview: that 
my prime method for gathering data as it allows a freedom of speech and could generate 
an important flow of information, also, you have the opportunity to explain more in 
depth your study and the role of the interviewee in your research as well as explaining 
ambiguous questions and even debating about the topic which generates more 
information. However, personal interviewing could be time consuming and cost 
intensive adding to that face to face interview may also introduce bias, from either the 
interviewer or the interviewee. Another drawback is that respondents might feel uneasy 
about the anonymity of their responses when they interact face to face. 
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Mail questionnaire:  is the best way to reach busy people or people who would not give 
personal interviews or whose responses might be biased or distorted by the interviewers. 
The inconvenience with mail interview is the insufficient quantity of data gathered; also 
misunderstanding of questions could mislead the interviewee. 
 
Telephone interviewing: It represents the best methods for gathering information 
quickly, the interviewer is also able to clarify any misunderstanding and the good aspect 
of this method is that the response rate is higher than the mail questionnaire but the main 
drawback is that the interviewer has to be short, straightforward and not too personal. 
 
For the sampling method, I use a quota method in which the sampling population for this 
study comprised people with knowledge of the topic as well being available for the 
interview. My selection criteria also involve a mixture of high, middle and low managers 
split equably into two main groups (Locals Vs Expatriates), making a total of 90 
interviewees (20 in each firm except Worktel 10). Also, using my family’s and friends’ 
network (as they work in the telecommunication sector) helped me gain access to 
companies and allow me to effectively organise my interview schedule. 
 
Piloting interviewees is an important step as it allows avoiding any inconsistencies 
resulting from misunderstanding questions. Based on comments and suggestions 
provided by interviewees (during piloting the interviews), some adjustments were made 
in which some questions were rephrased for better understanding. Also, the pilot 
interviews made me aware of potential technical problems that could occur; for instance, 
difficulties in organising my interview schedule.  
 
Regarding the interview procedure, a schedule was drawn up and participants were 
interviewed at their convenient time. The majority of interviews took place at either the 
interviewee’s offices or somewhere else. Beforehand, I sent a summary of my research 
aims and objectives2 as well as a consent form3.A French version of the questionnaire 
was made available to interviewees who are not confident about their English (most of 
the interviews were conducted in English)4. I also asked the participants if they required 
further clarification when necessary. An interview guide was created for the purposes of 
this research; it also helped me to stay within the scope of my questions’ model when 
gathering information5. The interviews progressed from simple or general into more 
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direct descriptive and complex questions. This strategy enabled the interviewees to 
become comfortable before taking the opportunity to be critical, to provide details on 
their own experiences and opinions within scope of the questions. At the end of the 
interviews, I summarised the answers for the participants to ensure that the information 
collected reflected the overall content of the interview before they were thanked and the 
interview brought to a close. Also, all the data collected were transcribed and copies 
were delivered to the interviewees for approval before starting the analysis. The length 
of the interviews varied from 30-45 minutes, with an average of 40 minutes (depending 
on the availability of the interviewee)6. 
 
After gathering the data, the next step is to analyse the data. I am using five major stages 
for the data analysis. The first stage is to become familiar with the data collected. In 
many ways, data collection means having good quality data. Sometimes we tend to 
collect insignificant data, therefore, the best strategy to adopt is to go through the data 
several times and select those that are more significant and appropriate to the research, 
according to the variables of my research model. 
 
The second step is the emphasis on my analysis. In this step, I look back at my research 
questions and hypotheses to find out what I need to answer in my research. The best 
approach would be to write down questions and hypotheses. This is very helpful, as it 
provides a general framework on how to start analysing the data. Moreover, in light of 
the progression on my research, I can either modify some questions, or reject or adjust 
the hypothesis in my findings.  
 
 
 
 
 
2 participation information sheet (appendix 01). 
3
 interview consent form (appendix 02). 
4
 questionnaire in English and French (appendix03 and 04). 
5
 answer sheet (appendix 05). 
6
 summary of the main interview process is represented by the Gantt chart (appendix 06) 
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The next step is to classify the information. Some research opts to categorise information 
by coding or indexing data in numerical form, in which selected variables are labelled 
with specific codes or values (quantitative data). While, in qualitative data (the case of 
my research), I organise information by themes or model, in which we regroup ideas, 
notions, participants behaviour, interaction, and word or phrases used. Then, I put them 
into more logical categories or subcategories. 
 
The fourth step is to identify models within and between categories. This approach 
allows the classification of data by questions, case, theme, time period, and start to find 
the link between these categories. Also, stressing the variation that may occur could be 
very important to the research findings. There are several ways to spot patterns and to 
link them either within or between categories; the first is to summarise the information 
specific to one topic, or find the differences and similarities in participants’ responses 
within a group. 
 
In order to do this, I need to answer the following questions. What are the main ideas 
uttered in one class? What are the similarities and differences in participant answers? 
The second way is to look at the data gathered and see which category appears more 
often, how many times a specific theme is mentioned by the sample interviewed. This 
method is not suitable for statistical analysis, but it could expose common patterns in the 
data gathered.  
 
The final technique is to look at the patterns and see the possibility that two patterns 
occurred constantly together, analysing the relationship between patterns to explain the 
constant connection. 
 
The last step of the analysis is the interpretation of data. At the beginning, I set up a list 
of key elements or significant findings resulting from regrouping and arranging data. At 
this stage, I need to reflect on what I have learned in my research by answering the 
following questions: What are the major lessons learned during the investigation? What 
are main outcomes? What we could improve in our research analysis? Are the 
hypotheses formulated at the beginning of the research suitable? Are there any new 
variables to take into consideration? How could I include graphs and charts to improve 
the communication of findings?  
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Another point is to list all the findings without combining them or investigating their real 
values. Draw an outline for presenting results to the audience, pilot the project, test the 
hypothesis and get the feedback generated from the audience. According to the 
comments received, I can reshape my research model. If I find that some areas are still 
not covered properly or unclear, I could suggest further investigations to emphasise 
these points. 
 
In contrast, to develop my research capacities and test my findings, I have presented my 
research results in different research meetings at the university. As well as participating 
in conferences inside and outside the university, I have also participated in an 
international conference about the potential of investment in Algeria during September 
2010 (in Algiers); I also got in touch with University of Algiers to publish some papers 
related to FDI in the country. 
 
This study is structured sequentially from a deep literature review identifying theories 
and leading to a research model. To corroborate my assumptions, I am analysing and 
applying my research model variables to the main players in the Algerian 
telecommunication sector. Therefore, I have conducted five case studies: Djezzy, 
Algerie Telecom (AT), Nedjma and the two SMEs (Ericsson Algeria and Worktel). 
Regarding to the choice of case studies I have chosen the three main mobile operators in 
the country and the choice of SME’s is mainly due to the availability of information and 
their expertise about the local market. 
 
After carrying out the case studies, I will compare the results obtained in different firms. 
I will draw up a table to identify the main differences between different players in the 
Algerian telecommunication sector. I will also raise any discrepancies observed during 
the interviewees, try to link my hypothesis to my findings and will finish by outlining a 
general conclusion about the impact of FDI on the sector, and make some 
recommendations on how to improve it the telecom sector in the country. 
 
Finally, I link my research model to my findings, recognising major similarities and 
differences, analysing each component in-depth and make partial conclusions and 
recommendations on each factor. Ultimately, I will reach a general conclusion and 
recommendation, where I will highlight my findings, comparing my results with my 
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assumptions (my research model). I will examine FDI in the telecommunication sector 
in Algeria and then generalise it to other sectors, suggesting how it could improve the 
country’s economic conditions and benefit more from foreign investment. 
 
III. 2 Research ethics  
 
The consideration of ethics in my research is very important, as research should exhibit 
ethical behaviour. Ethics should guide researcher to address the question of how to 
conduct research in a moral and responsible way. Thus, ethics not only address the 
question of how to use the methodology in a proper way, but also address the question of 
how the available methodology might be used in a right way. Conducting research, 
either quantitative or qualitative often requires the researcher to compromise on what 
methodology theories recommend and what is feasible from the practical point of view 
(Burges, 1989).  
 
Likewise, there is no single approach to ethics; there are two dominant philosophical 
standpoints: deontology and teleology. In the deontological view, the ends never justify 
the use of the means that are questionable on ethical grounds. For instance, even we 
inform participants about the purpose and procedures of a study, it is likely to affect their 
behaviour in such a way that the information obtained is barely usable to answer the 
research question. Any deception of the respondents would be, in this case, unethical 
(Burges, 1989). 
 
In my research, I will consider first how to protect the participant’s rights. Whether the 
data is gathered in an experiment, interview, observation or survey, the respondent has 
many rights to be safeguarded. In general, I am taking preventive measures in order to 
protect the interviewee from any harm; physical, mental, embarrassment, peer problems, 
generating any conflict within the organisation or a loss of privacy. The main actions I 
am taking are to explain the benefit of the study, the participant’s rights and their 
protection. In order to do so, I will take 11 steps7: 
 
 
7my research was approved by the research degree committee at the University of Greenwich in March 2009. 
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The first step is to clearly explain the research aims and objectives. The overarching 
objective of the present research is to make a fresh enquiry into the contributions of FDI 
to the performance of the telecommunication sector of the Algerian economy, from both 
theoretical and empirical perspectives. 
 
The second step is to identify the main research question; FDI in the Algerian 
telecommunication sector. This will involve an analysis of motivations, limitations and 
effects. 
 
The third step is the data collection procedure; I use structured questionnaires, in which I 
will draw a table with four columns with different research variables in the first column 
and a question related to each variables in the second column. The third and fourth 
columns are dedicated to the possible answers. 
 
The fourth step is related to the choice of the sampling methods; I will choose a quota 
sample in which I interview a prescribed number of people (20)( except Worktel 10), 
from different scales of the hierarchy (from worker to mid-management, senior 
managers and executives). 
 
The fifth step is to get in touch with the participants; mainly using email, telephone, 
networking, family and friends. 
 
The sixth stage is concerned with informing the participants; I sent emails with a brief 
summary of my research outlining my research aim and objectives (Appendix 1) as well 
as the questionnaires (Appendix 3 and 4). I also guarantee the confidentiality of the 
interviews as I am not presenting the participants names and answers8 nor outlining the 
benefits of my research to the person (or firm), as the results could be used by their 
research and development department for multiple purposes (company further 
investments, ameliorating their work conditions and solving any issues or conflict at 
work by understanding the local culture, business environment).  
 
 
8please refer to appendix 02 interview consent form. 
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Similarly, I have clarified my research aims and objectives, as my study concerns the 
foreign direct investment impact on the Algerian economy and the telecommunication 
sector in particular. Therefore, there is no involvement in a firm’s internal politics and, 
under the Data Protection Act; no data will be published without the consent of the 
participants. 
 
The seventh phase is obtaining permission to carry out the study; I contacted companies 
to obtain permission. I also sent letters with a summary of my research to target 
companies. I also made contact with their public relations department to make an 
appointment with executives to explain the purpose and objectives of my research.  
 
The next step is to brief the participants about the topic prior to the interview. I have sent 
emails to participants with a summary of my research aims and objectives, as well as a 
copy of the questionnaire to see if they could answer my questions. Also, before starting 
the interviews, I orally explain to the participant my research model as well as my 
research aims and objectives.     
 
The ninth stage is to share the research results with the participants. I provide the 
participants, as well as their companies, with information about my research findings as 
reward for their collaboration. 
  
The tenth step is to assess the potential harms which may arise as a result of the work. I 
tailored my questions according to the research aims and objectives and made sure not to 
harm any person involved in my project. Moreover, the results of my investigation will 
be given to the companies if they request it, and there is no direct involvement in a 
company’s internal politics or strategies.  
 
Furthermore, we agreed that I will show all notes taken during the interview to the 
participant and take them through all the answers one by one to avoid any 
misunderstanding or incomprehension. Also, I clearly explain from the beginning that no 
names will be shown in my research to avoid any harm to the person. Furthermore, my 
research does not harm the university as it does not relate to any sensitive subject 
(politics, illness etc).  
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Moreover, I have adjusted my questionnaire to avoid any damage or conflict with any 
one (myself as researcher, participants, companies, the Algerian government and the 
University of Greenwich). 
 
The final step focuses on the eventual constraints rising during my interviews, such as 
the language barrier. As I am fluent in English, French and Arabic, I will translate my 
questionnaire and a summary of my project in French to allow the participants a better 
understanding of my research. 
 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
A research methodology could be thought of as providing the overall direction of the 
research illustrating the process by which the research would be conducted. When 
deciding on methodology, research should take into consideration the nature of the study 
(theoretical or empirical). Besides the empirical-theoretical divide, there are many other 
ways of describing research approaches and methods. But within each of these, the 
detailed research strategy will determine the approaches which would be used to collect 
and analyse data.  
 
In this chapter, I present a detailed description of my research design by focusing on the 
theoretical purpose and justification of the methodology chosen. I have presented and 
analysed my case studies’ ethical considerations, informal and formal data gathering 
techniques and provided an explanation of the data analysis strategy used.  
 
In the next chapters, I present my empirical work, starting with questionnaire analysis, 
discussing the data obtained and interpreting the findings in relation to the research 
model, research questions and hypothesis and literature review. 
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Section 1 Case studies analysis  
IV.1.1 Case study: Djezzy Telecom 
IV.1.1.1 Presentation of Orascom Telecom holding 
 
The leading market player is the Djezzy, a branch of the Egyptian giant Orascom Telecom 
Holding S.A.E. (Orascom Telecom or OTH), which is one of the most important 
international telecommunication companies operating in more than ten emerging markets in 
the Middle East, Africa and South Asia headquartered in Cairo, Egypt. Established in 1998 
and employs about 17,213 employees. OTH started off with 200,000 subscribers by 31 
December 2010 the holding accounted more than 78 million subscribers and a total 
population under license of approximately 517 million with an average mobile telephony 
penetration of approximately 48% (according to OTH website figures). Orascom Telecom 
operates GSM networks in Algeria (Djezzy), Pakistan (Mobilink), Egypt (MobiNil), Tunisia 
(Tunisiana), Iraq (Iraqna) and Bangladesh (Banglalink). OTH has an indirect equity 
ownership in Globalive Wireless, which has been granted a license in Canada. Orascom 
Telecom Holding has been awarded the management contract of one of the two Lebanese 
mobile telecommunication operators (Alfa) from the government of the Republic of 
Lebanon through its branch, Telecel Globe (Orascom, 2011). 
 
According to the company mission statement, OTH’s vision is to always look for new 
opportunities to expand its activities not regionally, but around the globe become one of the 
world’s leading telecommunication operators; therefore the company mission statement is to 
satisfy all communication needs in different markets. In April 2011, Wind Telecom, OTH’s 
parents company and VimpelCom Ltd. Announced the venture between the two groups, 
thereby creating the world’s sixth largest telecommunications company. 
 
Table 4.1 presents Orascom holding at glance, Figure 4.1 highlight the financial health of 
the group while table 4.2 summarises the key concepts of Orascom strategy and table 4.3 
highlights the company’s key indicators.  
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Table 4.1 Orascom Telecom Holding at Glance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  Source: Orascom, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Future 
market 
growth 
opportunity 
 
Population covered approximately 517 million with an 
average penetration of 47% (31 December 2010) 
 
Leading 
position in 
global 
markets 
 
Leaders all over the world (number one in Algeria, Egypt, 
Iraq, Pakistan, Tunisia) and strengthening position in 
Bangladesh (number 2). 
 
High 
Historical 
Organic 
Growth 
 
Overwhelmingly organic growth in revenue, EBITDA and 
total subscribers. 
 
Industry 
leading 
profitability 
 
EBITDA margin of 41.4% and net income of US$ 345mm for 
Q3 2010 
 
Investing in 
Leadership 
 
In December of 2005, OTH had succeeded to takover19.3% 
market share of leading global provider of telecommunication 
services (Hutchison Telecommunications International 
Limited) that operates in nine emerging markets.  In April 
2011, VimpelCom Ltd. closed the transaction with Wind 
Telecom S.p.A. to combine the two groups. As a result of the 
Transaction, VimpelCom owns, through Wind Telecom, 
51.7% of Orascom Telecom Holding S.A.E. (“Orascom 
Telecom”) and 100% of WIND Telecomunicazioni S.p.A. 
(“Wind Italy”).  
 
 
Management 
 
Prudent and experienced management team with a successful 
track record of acquiring and operating GSM licenses. 
 
Low 
Leverage 
 
On December 2011 Orascom had a Net Debt/EBITDA ratio 
(LTM) of 1.8   
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                                                                                              Source: Orascom, 2012 
Figure 4.1 Orascom Holding financial highlights (December 2011) 
 
Table 4.2: The key concepts of the Orascom Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              Source: Orascom, 2011 
 
 
 
 
Exercise 
management 
x Sole or joint control of GSM operation. 
x Focussed portfolio of assets over which day to day control 
is exercised. 
 
Deliver value 
through Holding 
Company 
x Centralised network infrastructure procurement through 
frame agreements. 
x Financial discipline and reporting at our subsidiaries. 
x Group-wide strategic initiatives, best practices and 
management expertise 
x Enhance  the subsidiaries’ access to various forms of 
capital  
 
Maintain market 
Leadership  
x Capitalise on superior network coverage, brand awareness 
and on net traffic to create substantial barriers to entry. 
x Invest in Network capacity to manage market growth in 
order to optimise competitive positioning. 
 
Localised Branding 
and tariff strategies 
x Strive to be a local brand in the markets in which we 
operate. 
x Localised marketing strategies. 
 
 
Selectively explore 
investments 
Acquisitions 
x Consolidate ownership through minority acquisitions in 
existing GSM operations at sensible valuations. 
x Opportunistically explore acquisitions of existing or 
Greenfield investment. 
x Reputation for successful development of GSM business 
opens opportunities.  
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Table 4.3: Orascom Key indicators 
Country Key indicators Type of 
investment 
Algeria Population: 33 Million  
GDP growth: 3.4% 
GDP/Capita ($): 3,861 
Population under 15 years: 26% 
Sovereign Risk: NR 
Mobile Penetration: 83% 
Network subscribers: 15 million (march, 31st, 2012) 
Market share: 56% Number of subscribers: 30 million 
(march, 31st, 2012) 
 
 
Complete 
ownership             
( Djezzy) 
Tunisia Population: 10 Million 
GDP growth: 4.7% 
GDP/Capita ($): 3,798 
Population under 15 years: 23% 
Sovereign Risk: BBB 
Mobile Penetration: 82% 
Number of subscribers: 5 million (march, 31st, 2009) 
Market share: 51.6% (march, 31st, 2009) 
Present with 
joint venture      
(Tunisiana) 
Bangladesh  Population: 140 Million 
GDP growth: 6.2% 
GDP/Capita ($): 427 
Population under 15 years: 23% 
Sovereign Risk: NR 
Mobile Penetration: 23% 
Number of subscribers: 11million (march, 31st, 2009) 
Market share: 23.9% (march, 31st, 2009) 
Complete 
ownership 
Pakistan Population: 160 Millions 
GDP growth:  6.0 
GDP/Capita ($):890 
Population under 15 years: 40% 
Sovereign Risk: CCC 
Mobile Penetration: 56% 
Number of subscribers: 28 million (march, 31st, 2009) 
Market share: 31% (march, 31st, 2009) 
Complete 
ownership 
 
North Korea 
Population: 23 Million 
GDP growth: 1% 
GDP/Capita ($):1,800 
Population under 15 years: 23% 
Sovereign Risk: NR 
Mobile Penetration: >1% 
3G licence  
Joint venture  
OTH 75% 
North Korea 
post (KPTC) 
25% 
Zimbabwe Population: 13,3 Million 
GDP growth:  6.0% 
GDP/Capita ($): 340 
Population under 15 years: N/A 
Sovereign Risk: NR 
Mobile Penetration: 2% 
Complete 
ownership 
 
 
 
Egypt Population: 74 Million 
GDP growth:  6.0% 
GDP/Capita ($):1.719 
Present with 
joint venture  
(Mobinil) 
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Population under 15 years: 32% 
Sovereign Risk: BB+ 
Mobile Penetration: 54% 
Number of subscribers: 21 million (march, 31st, 2009) 
Market share: 45.6% (march, 31st, 2009) 
Central 
African 
Republic 
Population: 4.5Million 
GDP growth:  4.2 
GDP/Capita ($):N/A 
Population under 15 years: 41% 
Sovereign Risk: NR 
Mobile Penetration: 6% 
Operation 
acquired/own
ed by Telecel 
Globe 
Burundi Population: 9Million 
GDP growth:  3.6% 
GDP/Capita ($):N/A 
Population under 15 years: 46% 
Sovereign Risk: NR 
Mobile Penetration: 4% 
Operation 
acquired/own
ed by Telecel 
Globe 
                                                                               Source: Orascom , 2011 
 
IV.1.1.2 Presentation of Orascom Telecom Algerie 
On 11 July 2001, Orascom Telecom Algeria acquired the country’s second GSM bid for 
nearly $737 million and launched its service in February 2002 under the brand name 
“Djezzy”. It managed to command 70% of the market after less than 10 months of operation 
(Orascom, 2011).  
 
In August 2010, the company accounted for more than 15 million customers, representing 
more than 44% of the market share in the country, while the state-owned company, Mobilis 
had 30% and Nedjma 27% (Figure 4.2) (ONS,2011). Accounting in 2009 for nearly 50% of 
the company’s earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, the firm ranked 
the third largest operator in North Africa and Middle East, and is regarded as the most 
profitable subsidiary among the Orascom holding. The Cairo-based investment bank, 
Beltone Financial, values the unit at $6.7bn, representing 51% of its total operator valuation 
(Oxford Business Group, 2011).  
 
Due to the success of the services, the company has launched new services aiming to 
provide a set of products and services to suit all segments; for instance, in February 25, 
2006 the company collaborated with Egypt telecom to create the “Consortium Algerian de 
Telecommunications”, which has been awarded the second fixed-line licensing. 
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Another new investment is the launch, in 2006, of phone-box service Djezzy in eight of the 
biggest cities (OTH website). According to Orascom Holding, investor presentation, 
September 2009, the company investment exceeded $2.8 billion from 2001 to the last 
quarter of 2008, employing more than 3,000 employees and 14 million subscribers in March 
2009, and reached 15.087 million in December 2010, as well as working as a support and 
solution provider for GSM and internet operations.  
 
Djezzy Algeria is highly perceived as the favourite operator in the country, despite the 
arrival of a new competitor (Nedjma) and the restructure of the state company, Algerie 
Telecom. This is according to Djezzy data, based on an independent survey on customer 
satisfaction conducted in 2008 (Orascom Holding, September (2009)).  
 
Furthermore, Djezzy’s declining per-head revenue and market share, which fell from 
roughly 80% in late 2004 to 60% in March 2007, shows how competitive the Algerian 
telecommunication market is (Figure 4.3). Djezzy can no longer rely on its hegemony over 
the market, especially with the price-cutting strategy adopted by the two other competitors, 
as Algerie Telecom dropped charges twice in two years from $0.16 in June 2003 to $ 0.14 
in April 2004 and $0.12 in 2006. This has pushed all operators to engage in an aggressive 
marketing war by offering extra credit with any top-up (up to double credit for the third 
operator Nedjma, free calls from 7h00pm to 7h00am in the same network or landlines for 
the Algerie telecom, or freeze the clock talk 60 minutes and pay for just 3 minutes). For 
Djezzy, additional promotions are currently running, particularly during special occasions 
(Eid, summer holidays, Ramadan) in order to attract more subscribers9 (Orascom Holding, 
September 2009).                                                                                                      
 
 
 
 
            
 
9
 The secret of Djezzy success (appendix 07).          
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Source: ARPT, 2011 
Figure 4.2 and 4.3 the Algerian telecom market share August 2006 and 2010. 
 
IV.1.1.3 The Firm’s motivation to invest in the Algerian Telecom market 
The first motivation for the firm to enter the lucrative Algerian market was the guarantee 
given by the Algerian government: a four-year free taxation offer, as well as access to credit 
lines by the state banks, access to land, helping the MNE multinational importing 
technological equipment and facilitating the work permit for its expatriates. 
 
Furthermore, according to an emerging Algeria report (2007), the firm negotiated its entry 
more than a year and half before deciding to bid for the second GSM licence in 2001. The 
firm put certain pressure on the Algerian government to allow Djezzy to impose a monopoly 
Algerian telecom market share August 2010 
Djezzy 43% 
Nedjma 
27% 
Mobilis 
30% 
Algerian telecom market share December 2006 
Djezzy 
70% Nedjma 
10% 
Mobilis 
20% 
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on the Algerian market, by first postponing the third GSM bid which was originally 
scheduled for 2003. Another important point is that Djezzy has sealed deals with big firms 
and local institutions to provide a business network, thereby obstructing the doors to the 
national firm, Algerie Telecom (Oxford Business, 2007). 
 
According to Najeeb Swariss(ex-chief executive of Djazzy) and the interviews conducted 
on the firm’s mode of entry, the firm had no option other than greenfield, as the Egyptian 
firm was the first multinational to invest in the country after the deregulation of the 
telecommunication market and the government intention to modernise the obsolete 
infrastructure. In addition to weak economic stability and state security ravaged by more 
than twelve years of terrorism, the country’s credit rating was relatively low during the 
beginning of the last decade (according to the Cofface credit rating). The government has 
encouraged the firm to invest by granting some privileges such as: access to land, tax 
royalties and access to credit and loans from state banks (Oxford Business, 2007). 
 
In relation to the location of investment, according to Najeeb Swariss, the MNE has always 
opted to invest in relative high risk countries, like Algeria Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sudan, 
North Korea and Zimbabwe, knowing that risk could generate high profit due to the lack of 
competition and taking advantage of market inefficiency, rent and monopoly seeking. As a 
result, the three most profitable subsidiaries among the holding are high risk countries. He 
also described the MNE rent-seeking strategy as “normal”, especially in emerging markets 
characterised by high market imperfection as, rent capture would likely encourage new 
entrants, decrease bureaucracy, speed up the company setup, and increase competitive 
rivalry in the market, which could have strong repercussions on the FDI performance. This 
could benefit consumers, as the increase of market competition would lower prices and 
improve technology, R & D and market innovation. It could also create jobs and might help 
develop employees’ skills via the different training programmes offered to be more 
competitive in a fast growing market, and ease the transfer of knowledge, management, 
know-how and absorptive capabilities to the local market. Therefore, Djezzy contributed in 
funding different government projects, including education and training, sports and 
community support (Oxford Business, 2007). 
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One of the reasons that encouraged Djezzy in Algeria is the bilateral agreement between 
Algeria and Egypt, giving Egyptian investors a premium position and the cultural proximity 
as both countries share the same language and religion which would facilitate 
communication and interaction between the home and host country. This was beneficial at 
the beginning, but since the deterioration of relations between Algeria and Egypt and the 
football match incident, the image of the company was heavily affected. It raised anti-
Egyptian interest and Egyptians were no longer welcomed in Algeria.10 
 
According the Oxford Business Group (2007), Djezzy has used lobbies to put pressure the 
Algerian government to privilege the Egyptian firm in detriment of the national one, as 
many of government institutions switched from Mobilis to Djezzy. In late December 2003, 
a newspaper (El Khaber) published an article about Djezzy’s rent seeking, or how the 
company managed to win the GSM second bid beforehand or how Orascom made a deal 
with the government before the bid. It described the bid as a theatre play as the winner was 
awarded more than a year before. The newspaper continued explaining how the $780 
million (the bid) was given to OTH by Algerian banks under government consent 
(Mahmoud, 2003). 
 
This revelation generated a big debate about how open is the Algerian economy and how 
lobbying groups are acting against the state firm interest. Many journalists denounce this 
fiasco and excuse the government of illicit practises. El Khaber asked a pertinent question 
on its editorial: what the government is gaining from giving up the telecom market to the 
Egyptians?? What is beyond the Egyptians entry to the Algerian market (Mahmoud, 2003). 
 
Reviewing the article, the questions addressed are: why do we call the Djezzy’s success a 
miracle?! How did Djezzy reach about a million in less than a year of activity? How would 
it be possible?? How did the Algerian authorities contribute to this success? 
 
 
10Analysis on the conflict between Djezzy and The Algerian Government (appendix 08). 
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In his article Mahmoud (2003)  argues that Djezzy took advantage of the bilateral agreement 
signed by the Algerian and Egyptian governments to promote investment between the two 
countries, giving the Egyptian firm a premium status in the Algeria (confirmed by the 
interviews). Another fact is that the privatisation of the Algerian Post and 
Telecommunication Company was postponed as it was meant to be completed by the end of 
1999 (delayed till 2003). This created tension and anarchy within the firm, opening the 
doors to Djezzy to have a virgin market without solid competition. Also, it condemned the 
government and the regulatory body’s (ARPT) position towards Djezzy hegemony.  
According to the Oxford Business group report (2007), Djezzy breached the ARPT rules in 
terms of competition more than 25 times between 2002-2005, but no action has ever been 
taken, despite complaints being received from Mobilis and later Nedjma. Indeed, only 
verbal warnings were issued to Djezzy to ask the firm to stick to the policies. 
 
After the successful set up of Orascom Telecom Algerie, the multinational began to expand 
its services and develop its business in Algeria by bringing its subsidiaries not only in 
telecommunication, but also in other high potential sectors, such as building technology and 
equipment: Ring mobile retailer, Orascom Building, Orascom technology, Orascom 
equipment and Orascom cement (Oxford Business group, 2008). 
  
The Algerian government welcomes this initiative as it will lower the increasing export bill, 
and promised Orascom to provide all necessary resources to allow a quick set up such as 
free tax royalties for five years and financial loans. However, on 11 December 2007, 
Orascom sealed a deal with the French firm Lafarge, one of the biggest construction groups 
in the world, for more than €8.8 million ($9.5 million) for a takeover, which was highly 
criticised by the Algerian government. It is clearly mentioned in the agreement that any 
change in the ownership should be subject to the government consent (Oxford Business, 
2008). 
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IV.1.1.4 Conclusion of the Djezzy case study 
According to Hassan Kabbani (Djezzy chief executive) in an interview with the Algerian 
newspaper (Echrouk), the secret of Orascom Telecom’s successful performance in Algeria 
is the trust factor (customer loyalty) with its 14 million customers. The company has 
contributed largely to the transfer of technology, knowledge and capital to the 
telecommunication market. “Djezzy is now a trademark in every Algerian home on the basis 
on constant commitment to keep all promises in transparency and seriousness, which makes 
Orascom Telecom Algerie, considers itself as the pride of telecommunication in Algeria. 
Djezzy is the first in terms of importance compared to the rest of the group’s branches in 
Asia, Africa and Europe. He added “In the current year, the investment reached 2 billion 
and 900 dollars….this amount reflects the reality of the branch extension which records 
around 14 million subscribers” (Yahia, 2009: 5-6). 
 
On 4 October 2010, after secret negotiations, VimpelCom, the giant Russian 
Telecommunication firm, took control of Orascom Telecom as part of a $6.6 billion 
international acquisition. The Algerian government displayed firm opposition to the deal 
and declared its intentions to buy the company11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11
 The VimpelCom potential Takeover of Djezzy (appendix 09). 
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IV.1.2 Case study of Nedjma Telecom 
IV.1.2.1 Presentation of Nedjma 
 
Wataniya Telecom was launched in 1999 as the first privately-owned operator in Kuwait. Its 
entry led to a sharp increase in the mobile market penetration in Kuwait (over 80%). The 
company had enjoyed a rapid growth over the last ten years, especially through it 
acquisition and expansion strategy in MENA & ASIA (including Kuwait, Maldives, Saudi 
Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria and from 2007 in Palestine). In March 2007, Qatar Telecom (Qtel) 
acquired 51% of Wataniya Telecom shares. Qtel is now active in more than 16 countries, 
including Qatar, Oman, Iraq, Singapore and Indonesia. In November 2006, Qtel acquired a 
strategic 38% equity stake with AT&T in NavLink, a leading provider of Managed Data 
Services to businesses in the Middle East (Wataniya telecom, 2011). 
 
The takeover of Wataniya by Qtel represents a major step for Qatar Telecom over the 
hegemony of the Middle-Eastern telecommunication market. Furthermore, Wataniya 
Telecom launched the first multimedia operator in Algeria via it local subsidiary, Wataniya 
Telecom Algerie (Nedjma), on 2 December 2003 after the second GSM licence bid by the 
ARPT, for a total value of  $421 million (Wataniya Telecom, 2011). 
 
The firm launched commercially its services on the 25 August 2004. The aim of the new 
operator is to provide new way of communication, new products adapted to all segments of 
the market using new and innovating technology (GPRS) and very high standards of 
services. According to the company mission statement, Nedjma is a customer-driven 
company that aims to provide product and service excellence. This is leading to a real 
customer value in order to compete against the two other well-established operators; Djezzy 
that held a market share in 2004 of over 85%, while the historic operator Algerie Telecom 
had 15% (Wataniya Telecom, 2011). 
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IV.1.2.2 Nedjma market analysis 
 
 
 
 
                                             Source: ARPT,2010 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Nedjma market analysis 
 
 
Before 2008, the telecommunication actors were trying to attract customer attention by 
focusing on a marketing and media campaign offering more services and tailored packages. 
Since the increase of the competition in the market, the main players turned to a new price 
war targeting the mass market segment, low and middle income (representing more than 
95% of the Algerian population). Table 4.4 below provides a sample of the price and 
packages introduced from 2008 (Nedjma marketing report, 2009). 
 
 
 
1st private operator: 
High coverage, 
innovation and 
performance  
1st historic operator: 
Lowest 
communication rates 
 
1st Multimedia 
operator,  
Cutting edge 
technology 
High quality services 
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Table 4.4: different promotions /providers 
 
Operator Period Offers 
Mobilis  
 
 
 
From 2008 
Mobilis card: get up to 
DZA500 every time you top up 
+ free calls to Mobilis 
Djezzy Gratissimo: free calls to Djezzy 
from 00h to 18h00 
Nedjma Nedjma plus: top up DZA1000 
and you will get free calls to 
Nedjma. 
Top up DZA 500 and get extra 
DZA 500 
Top up DZA 2000 and you get 
an extra DZA 4000 worth of 
credit to all networks 
                                                           Source: Wataniya Telecom Algerie, Marketing report 2009. 
 
The two foreign operators, Djezzy and Nedjma, are adopting a very aggressive positioning 
strategy. When analysing Figures 4.5 and 4.6, we can notice that, from 2006, the number of 
Nedjma subscribers almost doubled every year to reach 8.245 million subscribers by the end 
of 2010. This net evolution is due to the introduction of the multimedia service by Nedjma, 
an aggressive marketing campaign targeting mainly youngsters and students. It is also due 
to a new phenomenon in the Algerian market, the rise of a new segment or what we call the 
“multi SIM cards possessors” (Nedjma marketing report, 2009). 
 
According to the Nedjma marketing report (2009), this new group spends around DZA1000 
each trimester on the function of the validity of the SIM card. According to our interviews, 
the interviewees define this new segment as a low spender group (mainly students and 
youngsters) that do not care about keeping the same number and swap between operators 
whenever there is a promotion. 
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                                Source: ARPT, 2011 
 
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 comparison between the evolutions and growth of the number of 
subscribers for Djezzy/Nedjma  
 
We can observe from the graph above that the growth of Djezzy’s customers has declined 
steadily from 2006 to 2007, then fell sharply from 2008 to 2010 (reached -30%). In terms of 
revenue, Orascom Telecom Algerie has seen its profit fall from $2000 million in 2008 to 
$1867million in 2009. On the other hand, Nedjma’s growth declined dramatically from 
2006-2008 and has been recovering ever since. Analysts justify this by the appointment of 
Joseph Jade as the new CEO in September 2007. His arrival has changed the strategic 
orientation of the company, being more competitive with the development of the network  
Nedjma reached 99% of territory in December 2008, upgrading it systems, introducing new 
services and tailored it offers to fit all the segments (ARPT annual report, 2009).  
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The involvement of Nedjma in sponsoring events and sports (mainly football clubs) has also 
helped the firm reinforce its brand image, and the recent conflict between Djezzy and the 
Algerian government12 played in important role in driving Djezzy’s customers towards 
Nedjma and Mobilis.  
 
In fact, according to the ARPT annual report (2011), Nedjma benefited from more than 1.2 
million extra subscribers from November 2009 to the end of 2010. While, in terms of 
revenue the Kuwaiti-based firm has seen its profit growth declining, that was explained by 
the Nedjma analyst as the low customer expenditure. According to the interviewees, the 
average customer expenditure fell from DZA1500/month in October 2009 to 
DZA1000/month in March 2010. Some of them described this as Nedjma taking over 
ineffective Djezzy customers (Wataniya Telecom Algerie, 2011). In terms of profitability, 
Djezzy’s profit was above $15000 million for the last four years, while Nedjma barely 
reached the cap of $500 million. Figure 4.7 shows the evolution of the revenue between 
Nedjma and Djezzy.   
 
 
Source: Wataniya Telecom Algerie, 2010 
Figure 4.7 evolution of the revenue of Nedjma/Djezzy 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Analysis on the conflict between Djezzy and The Algerian Government (appendix07and 08). 
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IV.1.2.3 Nedjma internal and external diagnostics 
The internal and external analyses are based on different sources: the firm annual reports, 
articles, news stories, announcements, conference proceedings, corporate web pages, 
consultants and expert’s reports and empirical data collected. 
 
IV.1.2.3.1 Internal analyses 
Strengths: 
x Continuous upgrade of its network. 
 
x Constant launch of offers tailored to all segments. 
 
x Low call rates, including free minutes and texts. 
 
x Adopting an aggressive marketing strategy in order to be very competitive. 
 
x Quick reaction to the competitors’ offers (by keeping updated and acting in 
response). 
 
x Investing internally by opening four training centres nationwide, providing staff 
with the essential training to cope with the latest technology in the market. 
 
x Investing in developing human resources by setting up its proper training centres 
and collaborating with diverse universities and schools to train their staff. 
According to interviewees, Nedjma offers short courses and different training 
adapted to all scale of hierarchy as well as offering MBA courses through its 
schools partners. 
 
x Very participative way of management involving all the stockholders in the 
decision making according to interviewees the company intercultural aspect allows 
the interaction between different styles of management and know-how which 
contribute to its development. 
x Strong communication and marketing team, to enhance the brand image of the 
company. 
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x Selective and rational recruitment politic (recruiting when needed to avoid being 
over staffed). 
 
Weaknesses:   
 
x Profit in slow progression. 
 
x Over-spending on sponsoring (without necessarily being effective). 
 
x The complication of the offers and promotions. According to Nedjma internal 
reports, call centre receive massive amount of calls from people who can’t 
understand the nature of the offers and how it works. According to marketing 
manager, the company has identified the problem (the language used, as well as too 
many information in a short message) and they are working hard to simplify the 
offers as much as they could (this problem was also pointed out by the ARPT, as 
they received many complaints from unhappy customers (Nedjma marketing report, 
2009). 
 
x Lobbying that caused internal conflicts, ARPT report (2009) claims that all the 
senior positions are occupied by Lebanese and states that more than 95% of the 
senior managers are Lebanese and also the CEO is Lebanese. All the senior 
managers are recruited from Lebanon, which does not give chance to locals to get 
promoted; ARPT has reported this issue to the mother company Qtel and to the 
Algerian government but nothing has been done so far. 
 
x The degradation of the network, since the Djezzy conflict with the Algerian 
government. The migration of Djezzy’s customers towards Nedjma, the later did not 
expend its network which generates a network saturation this problem was not 
resolved since December 2009.  
When asking senior managers, about this problem they states that since the takeover 
by Qtel in 2008, the mother firm, allocate a yearly budget to Nedjma. Since the 
qualification of Algeria to the World Cup, the company has spent much more than 
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expected specially in sponsoring which led to a shortage of funds (that shows why 
Nedjma could not address this problem) but they assured that they are working with 
Algerie Telecom to use their network to absorb the increased number of new 
subscribers (adapted from the interviews). 
 
IV.1.2.3.2 External Analysis:  
 
x The continual conflict with the regulatory body regarding the promotions launched. 
x The gain from the conflict between Djezzy and the Algerian government with the 
migration of customers from Djezzy to the other operators (some Djezzy’s senior 
managers criticised Nedjma for poisoning the situation by using media supports such 
as blogs, newspapers article and TV and audio ads to show their total support to the 
Algerian government and Algerian people emphasising that Nedjma is an Algerian 
Entity unlike Djezzy (adapted from the interviews). 
 
x Qtel’s ambitious expansion plan in Algeria was reviewed due to the new investment 
law (according to the interviewees, the government gave Nedjma some warranties 
related to tax exemptions). Adding to that, the Djezzy conflict is making any further 
expansion hard to concretise. 
 
x The new orientation of the company being more involved on the political scene, via 
sponsoring government projects, sponsoring lobbies for rent-seeking purposes and 
also to avoid any eventual conflict with the Algerian government. 
 
x Corporate social responsibility awareness, Nedjma is working on multiple projects 
like organising youth camps (for children in need), donating books and computers to 
schools. According to the interviews, the company is intending to take over Djezzy’s 
position by being more involved in social and cultural scenes. 
 
x In terms of improving the brand image, the firm is sponsoring the Algerian football 
team and the Football League Association. Nedjma has not skimped on expenses, 
signing with $19.4m; “an unheard of sum” in Algerian football, according to 
Mourad Aït Aoudia, chief of the McCann Algérie agency which produces Nedjma’s 
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publicity campaigns. To that can be added the 80m dinars for the national league and 
about 20m dinars for each of the six clubs it sponsors. Adding to that, transporting 
hundreds of fans for the match against Egypt (held in Khartoum), providing free 
Peugeot 307 cars specially customised to football team members after they qualified 
for the 2010 South African World Cup. Moreover, the interviewees described the 
Djezzy’s conflict as a big turn in Nedjma’s positioning in the Algerian market. 
  
x In terms of competition, the new strategic orientation of the company based on 
marketing and media has led to a net increase of the market share. If we compare 
Nedjma’s market share from 2006 to August 2010 (as described in the graphs 
below) we can see the net development is due to the strategic reorientation of the 
company. While Nedjma and Mobilis were focusing more on marketing, Djezzy was 
just looking at its rivals without acting. In fact, since the mutation of its CEO Hassan 
Kabbani to Egyptian subsidy Mobinil, the politic change drastically, cutting on the 
marketing, media and sponsor budget and focusing more on retaining existing 
customers even with the controversial Egyptian Algerian football match. The firm 
did not address it properly, while Mobilis and Nedjma took advantage of the 
situation and doubled the effort to support the Algerian football fans. According to 
Mourad Aït Aoudia, things would have been done differently with Hassan Kabbani, 
who placed much more emphasis on marketing and was more knowledgeable of 
football issues in Algeria than the new CEO Tamer Al Mahdi. Nedjma knew how to 
seize the opportunities which led it to win the marketing battle so far (Faiza Ghozali, 
2010). 
 
x Strong corporation with local firms, particularly for maintenance, and upgrading the 
network and call-centres. According to Nedjma’s interviewees, the company is 
working closely with many local SMEs in different parts of the country, allowing 
better performance and prompt intervention in the case of problems. Also, the firm is 
committed to support its partners by providing financial and technical support. 
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IV.1.2.4 The impact of rent capture on Nedjma’s strategy 
When analysing the company’s strategy in Algeria, we can notice two different strategies:  
From 2005-2008, it is characterised by focusing on developing its network and brand image 
- developing its marketing as a market follower, while Djezzy was the market leader. From 
2008-2010, the arrival of the new CEO Joseph Ged changed the orientation of the firm 
being more involved in the country politics via sponsoring major events, football clubs, 
lobbying, and other government projects, such as water desalination, social projects 
(funding schools) (Nedjma marketing report, 2009). 
 
By being involved in the political life of the country, Nedjma has benefited from some tax 
exemptions, access to land, bank loans (with discounted interest) and, most importantly, a 
good relationship with the Algerian government (avoiding Djezzy’s fortune). In fact, 
Nedjma seized the opportunity of the deterioration of relations between the Egyptian firm 
and the Algerian government (previously explained in the Djezzy section), to change its 
politic from market follower to market leader, trying to attract both public and state 
contentment by aggressive market campaign and sponsoring (Oxford Business group, 
2008). 
According to Nedjma senior managers, the importance of the rent capture in increasing 
company capabilities and competitiveness has pushed the MNE to reconsider its strategy in 
the country by considering the influence and the degree of the government involvement on 
the Algerian business environment.  
The firm is now focusing on maintaining a close relationship to develop its market share in 
the market. Djezzy’s case had made the Qatar-based firm think about reshaping its strategy 
to get more involved in both the political and social life of the country.  
  
The interviews with the company’s executives explained the choice of the Algerian market 
as strategic, as the liberalisation, and the Algerian government’s efforts to develop the 
sectors have helped attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to the country. Moreover, the 
MNE justified the choice of investment by the rise of anti-Arab and Muslim feeling in the 
world following the 9/11 attacks. Many Arab investors decided to transfer their capital from 
western to Arab countries, thinking it would safer as they share the same language and 
culture. After trying an eventual takeover of the state owned firm, the company has opted to 
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bid for the third GSM licence, the company used greenfield mode of investment as it had no 
other choices available an eventual merger with Djezzy (strategic alliances between the two 
firms in Tunisia) was not discarded by Orascom, as Djezzy was the cash cow of the 
Egyptian telecommunication group.  
 
According to the Nedjma investment report (2009), the firm has switched from market 
follower to market leader strategy. The firm was observing the market and on one occasion 
it seized the opportunities offered. The firm has invested heavily in media and sponsoring to 
create a strong brand image and improve its competitiveness. The company is also investing 
continuously in its own human capital by developing skills and knowledge of its employees. 
 
According to Nedjma CEO, Joseph Ged, after a period of adaptation to the local market, 
Nedjma has learned a lot from both its competitors and the host country. The increase in 
competition has led the company to increase its technological capacities as well as 
efficiency. He added “the liberalisation of Algerian telecoms has been one of the most 
successful openings of a sector in the region. As an international company, we are very 
happy with our investment and motivated about the future, which we see as being rather 
bullish. On the technology side, we have tried to focus on becoming a multimedia operator. 
Web media is becoming a major means of communication and is a key area to capitalise on. 
As for the network, a big part of our investment is being put toward increasing capacity, as 
well as upgrading and enhancing the existing infrastructure. The network is now 3G ready 
and we are looking forward to the issuing of the 3G licences as we believe there is a big 
market for mobile broadband in the country” (Oxford Business group, 2011: 157). 
 
Also, regarding the new investment law and the tax on profit applied to all MNEs, Nedjma 
has been granted free tax on profit (until further notice). According to our case study, the 
company has negotiated five years tax-free with the Algerian government, after being 
refused the tax royalties as the government aims to stimulate this industry with fiscal 
incentives in the hope of gaining expertise and creating employment (Oxford Business 
group, 2011). 
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Furthermore, the favouritism of the Algerian government and the ARPT towards Djezzy 
seems to disappear. The recent complaints made by Nedjma to the regulatory body ARPT 
concerning illegal competition practises were reassessed and accepted, while Djezzy’s 
complaint regarding the inappropriate exploitation of its parent (Egypt) by Nedjma in order 
to improve its brand image and deteriorate Djezzy’s one, was rejected by the ARPT with a 
non-fundamental notion.  
 
In relation to the role of the ARPT regulating the market, Joseph Ged declared, “I hope that 
we will see moves by the Post and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (Autorité de 
Régulation de la Poste et des Télécommunications, ARPT) towards balancing the market, as 
the revenue shares are still very skewed. The ARPT could introduce measures that would 
make it easier for smaller players to be aggressive and gain a better position. We believe the 
strategic objectives of all operators should be aligned towards the Algerian objectives where 
everyone can work within an environment of constructive, fair competition” (Oxford 
Business group, 2011: 157). Despite being considered the youngest operator in the sector, 
Nedjma has rapidly built up a strong market share. The firm was quick to adopt an 
innovative positioning when it launched in August 2004, prioritising Internet and 
multimedia services and using aggressive marketing campaigns to help win customers. The 
firm has helped brought a new dimension to the sector by focusing on Internet and data 
connection and building strong customer service. 
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IV.3 Presentation of Algerie Telecom 
Algerie Telecom group is the historic state-owned company. It consists of three main 
subsidiaries: Algerie Telecom (landline service); Mobilis (the mobile service); and Algerie 
Telecom satellite ATS (satellite operator).The mission statement of the company is to be 
very competitive in a constantly evolving market, with the necessity to implement 
mechanisms of adaptations to technological, competitive and knowledge mutations. 
 
In fact, from 2004-2008 Algerie Telecom embarked on a very ambitious programme 
investing more than $2.5 billion dollars in upgrading and expanding its network by June 
2010. The company accounted for more than 5 million landline subscribers, 9.46 million 
mobile subscribers and 1.5 million broadband internet subscribers (Algerie Telecom Annual 
report, 2009).   
 
Algerie Telecom’s main objectives are to invest relentlessly to reach more than 10 million 
mobile subscribers and 2 million internet users by the end of 2011 (Algerie Telecom Annual 
report, 2009). The second development programme taking place between2008-2011 
earmarked a total of $1.5 billion. This will be divided between all subsidiaries of the group 
(Satellite telecommunication, Internet, Telecommunication logistics, Information Systems 
and Management). 
 
Looking at the company’s positioning in the Algerian market, interviewees state that 
Djezzy’s take over of the hegemony of Algerie Telecom since its entry in the market is due 
to several factors, such as: outdated network, bad coverage, narrow range of services, low 
standard of customers service, high prices and the absence of clear marketing strategy, 
pressure group and lobbying role. In contrast, they admit that the presence of rent capture in 
the market has increased competition despite some illegal practises and bribery exerted by 
some competitors. The fast development of the telecommunication sector in Algeria has 
driven the company to undertake deep reforms internally and externally, investing in 
upgrading its facilities, collaborating with local and foreign partners to develop the firm’s 
technology skills and know-how. According to the chief executive, the new investment 
programme is expected to produce convincing results thanks to the new technology 
implemented based on the wireless system. This could allow an increase on the landline 
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teledensity, especially in rural areas within the first year of the programme. The teledensity 
has increased from 5.80% in 2000 to 10.2% at the end of 2008 and expects to reach 12% by 
the end 2011 (Algerie Telecom report, 2010). 
 
Regarding the upgrade of the existing network, Algerie Telecom has increased its capacities 
by upgrading its communication backbone from 2.5 and 10 Gbps to 80 Gbps in addition to 
10 Gbps toward Spain and 60 Gbps toward Marseille since November 2005. In addition, the 
ground cables link Algeria to Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and soon Nigeria (Algerie Telecom 
Annual report, 2009). 
 
According to the ex-chief executive, Moussa Benhamadi, the deep transformation that the 
firm encountered allowed Algerie Telecom to efficiently transform itself from an 
administrative unit to a group of joint entities. He also highlighted that in order to expend it 
capabilities to integrate into the dynamics of the market economy, the firm has opted for the 
introduction of new technologies such as WIFI, WIMAX, VSAT, WAP, GPRS and UMTS 
(Algerie Telecom Annual report, 2009).  
 
Moreover, through its Mobilis branch, AT launched additional projects, such as the 
multiservice (IP/MPLS) allowing the increase of the data and voice packet transfer, network 
resources designed for individual costumers or small businesses. Another step forward by 
the state-owned firm is the setup of two more subsides: Djaweb for Internet and ATS for 
satellite telecommunication through high performance VSAT and GMPCS services, the 
broadcasting of service and sound.  
 
Yet, the real challenge for Algerie Telecom is how to cope with growth of the economy by 
contributing effectively to the other sectors; namely by electronic telecommunication; e-
business, e-banking, e-learning, e-healthcare, e-tourism. The group aims to use the 
information, communication technology and knowledge to promote the local culture and 
family values. AT has launched a new service targeting families “Ousratic” allowing middle 
or low-income families to acquire computers and get access to the Internet at a low cost 
partly subsidised by AT and the Algerian government (Algerie Telecom Annual report, 
2009). 
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The main objective of this ambitious project is to provide all Algerian households with one 
computer by 2012. This project was a wide success and, in the forum of the development of 
Africa (Nepad, 2009), Algerian President Bouteflika gave a talk about the importance of the 
project and its positive repercussion in the Algerian society and also offered to export the 
Algerian experience to other developing economies in Africa (Algerie Telecom Annual 
report, 2009).Seeking to be ahead in the development of the information technology sector, 
telecommunication in the country has generated interest from private and international firms 
to propose its service to the historical operator. The opening of the firm capital and the bond 
issue by the public offer has beaten all forecasts; in the second operation the money raised 
exceeded the $350 million dollars more than the $100 million dollars raised from the first 
operation (Algerie Telecom Annual report, 2009).  
 
The opening of AT on the financial market shows the strong desire to raise significant cash-
flow to support its various expansion plans making the group in a strong position in a very 
competitive local market. The partnership and alliances agreed with foreign investors 
(Ericsson, Huawei, ZTE, Alcatel). 
 
The mobile unit, Mobilis, has finished its fibre optic expansion covering more than 
25,000km and 1,900 km submarine. Adding to another $30 Million cable from Algeria to 
Marseille contracted to the French operator, Telecom. The 1,300 Km cable that connects 
Marseilles to both Algiers and the eastern cost city Annaba (near the Tunisian border); this 
project was designed for the Egyptian operator Orascom Telecom. Another ambitious 
investment is the new 20,000km undersea cable from Marseille to Singapore, with stops in 
14 countries including Middle Eastern countries, India, Pakistan, Thailand and Malaysia 
(Algerie Telecom Annual report, 2009). 
 
The current investment projects are partly financed by the group the rest comes from loans 
and revenue from operations. China’s export credit agency Sinosure lent Algerie telecom 
$40m to pay for optical network equipment from the chine’s manufacturer, ZTE, including 
transition gear, power supply and software. Huawei, the technology leader in the Chinese 
market, is currently building the country’s first 3G network.  
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The Chinese companies remain the preferred partners of AT. The interest of the Chinese 
firms to the lucrative North-African market has rapidly grown. This interest had seen the 
domination of the Swedish firm Ericsson and the German Siemens diluted. Huawei employs 
more than 2,000 people in North Africa, in which half of them are locals. Meanwhile, ZTE 
is working on the wireless expansion projects, and opened the first North-African training 
institute; a French language school to provide telecommunication training for the Maghreb 
countries. 
 
Believing in the power of good human resource management, AT has established a very 
motivated strategy to upgrade the knowledge of its employees. The group has already 
established four regional schools in Algiers, Constantine, Tlemcen and Ouargla covering the 
countries. In addition to the training, its partners aim to become more effective and efficient 
in the development of information and communication technology with the ability of the 
group to improve is know-how and managerial performance (Algerie Telecom report, 
2010). 
 
IV.3.1 The effect of the entry of new players on Algerie Telecom 
The increase in competition has led the national operator to engage in drastic restructuration 
reforms adding to the investment of $2.5 billion dollars in upgrading and expending it 
network from 2004 to 2008. Mobilis hopes to achieve 20% growth in 2011. In 2009, AT 
reportedly recorded turnover of AD47bn (€461.4m), an increase of 2% of 2008 (Oxford 
Business group, 2011). 
Mobilis’ chief executive, Azouaou Mehmel, declared, “This is a market that is characterised 
by extremely fierce competition, with a level of technological evolution that makes our 
sector very complex. We must integrate these elements into our strategy in order to 
guarantee a favourable economic performance. This is particularly important for Mobilis, 
since we are a public entity, and therefore subject to the obligations of public service, which 
can make our quest for profitability an even greater challenge. This is why we are investing 
in developing the quality of the network, as well as the knowhow of people in the sector. 
Looking forward, the key factor for success in this sector will be to ensure responsiveness 
and proximity to customers. In Algeria there is a blank slate, which gives us a special 
opportunity to move in whatever direction we decide, using the examples of other 
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companies in foreign countries to decide what the best solutions will be for Algeria” 
(Oxford Business group, 2011: 157). 
 
He also explained that the penetration rate reaches saturation rate. There is a need to look at 
potential other services outside voice calls. Looking at Value-added services, like the 
mobile data services, could provide Algerian consumers with fast and reliable access. The 
3G network could give the telecommunication market a new breath by releasing the full 
potential of the Algerian market and creating a mobile telephony environment that goes far 
beyond voice services. 
 
In conclusion, the liberalisation of the telecommunication market has influenced new 
entrants in the Algerian market, pushing the state firm to reshape its strategy, upgrade its 
facilities, collaborate with leading MNEs, as well as local SMEs. The company aims to 
return to its leading position (especially after the Djezzy conflict) by implementing an  
 
ambitious positioning strategy, using the image of the national network and transforming its 
weaknesses into strengths. According to Algerie Telecom, the firm budget for marketing, 
sponsoring and communication has more than doubled in 2009 to cope with the increased 
expenditure by its competitors (Algerie Telecom report, 2010). 
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IV.4. Presentation of Ericsson 
Ericsson was established as a representative office in 1974, and shortly after this date the 
first switching equipment and installation services contract was signed (crossbar 
technology) with PTT. Ericsson worked with an extensive transfer of competence also in 
co-operation with the Institute for Telecommunication in Algiers and Oran. 
 
Ericsson took part in the transition to the new digital switching technology. The first AXE 
contract was signed with PTT 1987.1988 Ericsson signed a Joint Venture (JV) agreement 
with Algerian partners with 35 % ownership for Ericsson. This was the first JV of its kind in 
Algeria. AXE equipment was manufactured during more than 12 years. This allowed 
Ericsson to be present in the market also during the troublesome years 1993-2000 (Ericsson 
Algeria, Annual report, 2007). 
 
The first GSM contract (100K) was delivered to PTT and installed by Ericsson 1999. As the 
political situation in Algeria improved, Ericsson strengthened its presence in the 
representative office from 2000 and worked in co-operation with the JV to serve the 
Algerian market. A company, Ericsson Algerie SARL, was established in 2004 for all 
Ericsson activities in the country with today more than 200 employees with high 
competence. The good knowledge of the market and our ambition to serve the Algerian 
telecom market in the best possible way has built the confidence between Ericsson and our 
business partners (Ericsson Algeria, Annual report, 2007). 
 
In September 2002, Algerie Telecom selected Ericsson to install its second GSM network. 
The $162.3 million contract aimed to establish 700,000 lines, providing services to 12 of 
Algeria's 48 departments. The deal has a target date of completion set for August 2003. 
Ericsson has encountered a high competition from Siemens, Huawei Technologies, 
Zhongxing Technologies, Alcatel and Motorola (Ericsson Algeria, Annual report, 2007).  
 
The Algerie Telecom’s fixed network has currently 2,900 AXE subscribers. Today, 
Ericsson has a close co-operation with AT for the evolution and modernisation of the fixed 
network. A major extension contract for the GSM network was awarded to Ericsson Dec 
2003 by Algerie Telecom Mobile (ATM). That included core and radio network, services 
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for implementation and support as well as the operation & maintenance. Ericsson has 
supplied GPRS/MMS and other applications and services. The extension of the network has 
continued 2005 and 2006 in partnership with ATM. 
 
Furthermore, Ericsson was awarded a contract for radio network included services for the 
third mobile operator, Wataniya Algerie, in April 2004, and extensions were made during 
2005 and 2006 including applications for the service layer, and since 2008, extending 
Nedjma’s network (Ericsson Algeria, Annual report,2009). Finally, Ericsson is supplying 
other governmental entities since many years. The firm is also engaged in different project 
through distributors and re-sellers, active within an enterprise market (SMEs) 
 
IV.4.1 Analysing Ericsson strategy in the Algerian market 
 
Ericsson is considered as the pioneer in the Algerian telecommunication market, well 
established since 1974, but the main client was the Algerian state-owned company, PTT 
(newly Algerie Telecom). Since the openness of the Algerian market, the firm has expended 
it list to cover the three major telecom players (Djezzy, Nedjma , Algerie Telecom) adding 
to other small and medium companies and subcontracting with other multinationals; 
Siemens, Motorola, Alactel (Ericsson Algeria, Annual report, 2009). 
 
But, according to Ericsson Algeria’s annual report (2009), the company is facing fierce 
competition from the Chinese constructors Huawei, ZTE. The new government 
collaboration with the Chinese firms has stopped the expansion of the Swedish firm; it has 
also pushed the company to focus on the realisation of project in the neighbourhood 
countries: Morocco and Tunisia. 
 
The lack of clarity on the government decision adding to the degree of involvement of the 
state in the market create an instable investment climate in the country, also, the 
transparency of call for tender is a big issue in Algeria as in many occasion is not best bid 
that wins but the company who has more power, or that exert more pressure via influent 
lobbies that has the final word. Ericsson has been in the Algerian market over 35 years and 
was very close collaborating with the state project but the sudden shift in the government 
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policy and strategic orientations has badly affected the firm’s position in the Algerian 
market (Ericsson Algeria, Annual report, 2009). 
 
According to the interviews, Ericsson is suffering from Chinese rent seeking, denouncing 
the illicit competition by the Chinese MNEs, giving examples of many projects that were 
agreed between Algerie Telecom or the government and Ericsson and were finally given 
without prior notice to Chinese constructors. Also, according to the interviews, both 
expatriates and local Ericsson employees agree that the boom of the sector did not 
significantly improve Ericsson’s turnover as the company is mainly working now in smaller 
projects or with other multinationals losing its position as the government preferred partner. 
 
In conclusion, according to Ericsson interviewees, the Algerian market has benefited 
strongly from FDI, by increasing competitiveness, better services, developing employee’s 
expertise and increasing innovation. As the company has been present over the last thirty 
years, they confirm that the company business has flourished since the deregulation of the 
market, allowing the company to focus on the Algerian market by investing more in both 
infrastructures and human resources. in relation to rent capture, the participants believe that 
it would help improve the market but it could also generate illegal practises, and could harm 
the business environment in the country, urging the government to play a role of market 
regulator rather than interfering in the market by offering special benefits to some 
competitors. Also, the lack of coordination between Multinationals and local firms and 
strategy adopted by the major players (preferring to collaborate with companies from the 
same country) which could affect the improvement of local SMEs. 
 
The company aims to introduce 3G and the government’s “e-government” plan will offer 
more opportunities for MNEs and could help strengthen their role in developing the 
Algerian economy. 
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IV.5 Presentation of Worktel 
Worktel is small local company with around 200 permanent staff and 100 fixed contracted 
staff; the SME was created in March 2003, to supply the growing demand on the booming 
telecom and energy sectors. The company has benefited from the credit lines designed from 
the Algerian government to help local entrepreneurs “ENSEJ”. After more than seven years 
of activities, the telecommunication operations represents more than 80% of the company 
turn over and only 20% on the oil sector (due to high competitively of this sector specially 
from overseas MNEs). The main objective of the company is to extend it services on the 
hydrocarbon sector to reach around 40% of its total turnover (Worktel annual report, 2009). 
 
The company provides different services in booth sectors: in the sector: call-centre 
operations, maintenance of the telecommunication equipment, the set up and the integration 
of BTS equipment, civil engineering studies related to the telecom operations, 
subcontracting services from the major players: Djezzy, Nedjma, Algerie Telecom, Huawei, 
Ericsson, Alcatel and Siemens, consulting and advising foreign or local investors about the 
opportunity of investment in the telecom sector. 
 
In the oil sector: the company offers a comprehensive range of services like: the study and 
setup of electric connection medium and high, realisation of the underground or over ground 
electric supply network distribution MT or BT, design and installation of rescue feeding 
system, analysing the reactive composition system, study of energy saving management 
(Worktel annual report, 2009). 
 
Examples of different realisations: 
x Ericsson account: radio, survey and transmissions, the preparation of installation 
documents, BTS mini-link installation (with alignment) for BTS sites, Antenna 
feeders and installation measurement, contracting for the account of Algerie telecom 
an installation and integration of BTS and HUB sites.                                                                                
x Huawei account: a month contract including an installation of 06 BTS, GSM radio 
channels, feeders and Antenna, Radio measurement and start-up. Contract for 
INSYS for the account of Huawei including the setup of 30 BTS, 06 BSC WLL 
CDA in the east of the country. 
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x Djezzy Account: including the civil engineering study for GSM sites (10 
sites/month), also the setup for BTS and HUB for more than 300 sites, as well as, the 
contract of connection in electric power of GSM sites more than 400 sites acquired. 
x Nedjma account: subcontracting diver BTS and Hub installation in diverse sites in 
the east part of the country, contracting call centres services. 
 
IV.5.1Worktel turnover evolution 
 
                                                                               Source: Worktel, 2009 
                              Figure 4.8 evolution of Worktel in the Algerian Market 
 
When analysing the graph above (4.8), we can notice the steady growth of the company 
turnover is mainly due to the expansion of the company, as its activities were mainly located 
on the east part of the country. Since 2006, Worktel has extended its activities to the centre 
of the country, including the capital and it suburbs, to be closer to the major telecom 
players, allowing the company to be more present in a high competitive market (Worktel 
annual report, 2009). 
 
During this period, the firm has invested heavily on upgrading its technology and benefited 
from training from it contactors: training and certification of Worktel engineer by Huawei 
technology, training with Cisco system, Ericsson offered full staff training on project 
management as well as, interest free loans to help the firm improve its financial situation. 
According to the interviews (both senior managers and engineers questioned), the firm has 
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largely benefited from the flow of foreign direct investment in the country in term of the 
transfer of technology and knowledge as well as the potential financial support offered.  
 
Conversely, the increase of MNEs has led to an increase in the flow of SMEs from home to 
host countries; for instance, from 2002 to 2008 there is more than 1000 Egyptian SMEs 
operating in the telecom sector entered the Algerian market (ARPT, 2010). In most cases, 
MNEs prefer to deal with their home countries partners due either to a long-term 
relationship, the lack of expertise of the local companies or strategic alliances. So, there is a 
threat coming from foreign SMEs as they increasingly improve their market share in 
detriment of the local ones.  
 
Another point is the lack of subvention and protection of the government that does not act 
necessarily to help local firms (according to Worktel interviews). They added that the new 
state strategy in favour of national companies seems inefficient, due to the pressure exerted 
by foreign firm that privilege rent seeking in order to get easy access to the market, avoiding 
government protection policies and taking advantage of the government monopoly 
privilege. This does not necessarily help local firms that have less resources and less 
competition than the foreign ones. 
 
In summary, according to Worktel senior managers, the company was created to satisfy 
growing need of the Algerian telecommunication sector. They pointed out that the increase 
of multinationals has regenerated the market boosting competition and developing 
absorptive capacities, the existence of rent would help the market to some extent but it also 
generates waist like the raise of bureaucracy, bribery and other illicit practise. The lack of 
government protection and support for local small and medium firms would have damaging 
consequences, as local SMEs could not survive with the increasing entry of foreign SMEs.   
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Chapter IV: The Empirical Framework 
Section 2: Questionnaire Analysis 
 
Introduction: 
 
In order to corroborate my literature findings, I have drawn a questionnaire in relation to my 
research model and hypothesis. The first set analyses the business environment of Algeria, 
particularly the impact of liberalisation of the telecommunication and government 
investment policies on the foreign direct investment (FDI) flow. The second set focuses on 
the analysis of the rent capture influence on the FDI impact. The third set explores the 
relationship between FDI, mode entry, technology, capital spillovers and competitiveness, 
and the fourth set looks at the cultural distance and FDI inflow. 
 
IV.2.1 key statistics 
 
Table 4.5: The breakdown of interviewees by category 
 
 Locals Expatriates 
Nedjma 9 11 
Djezzy 10 10 
Ericsson 8 12 
Worktel 10 00 
   
Source: adapted from my case studies 
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Source: adapted from my case studies 
 
Figure 4.9 the repartition of interviewees by category 
 
 
Table 4.6: The repartition of interviewees by managerial position 
 
  Low Management Middle Management High Management 
  Locals Expatriates Locals Expatriates Locals Expatriates 
Nedjma  4 0 5 1 0 10 
Djezzy 2 0 7 3 1 7 
Ericsson 0 0 8 5 0 7 
Worktel 2 0 6 0 2 0 
Source: adapted from my case studies 
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Source: adapted from my case studies 
Figure 4.10 the repartition of interviewees by managerial position 
 
IV.2.2 Analysing the first set of questions 
 
The first set of questions looks at the business environment in Algeria’s effect on FDI 
inflow by analysing the country risk analysis (mainly the political and economic risks), the 
degree of openness of the market and the liberalisation of the telecommunication sector. 
 
Broadly, the interviewees agreed that the liberalisation of the economy in general and the 
telecom sector in particular has a positive effect on the flow of FDI in the country. They 
point out that due to the black decade of violence and political instability, the Algerian 
economy has suffered a lot in terms of assets, the flow of capitals and foreign investors 
outside the country and technology. 
 
For small and medium firms (SMEs), all interviewees agreed that since the liberalisation of 
the telecom, this segment has flourished as new opportunities emerged, in the other hand 
this segment used to be monopolised by handful hands. According to Worktel’s managing 
director, the number of SMEs operating in the sector acceded the 1000, with more than 60% 
being foreign (mainly Egyptian and Lebanese). While the local ones operate generally in 
call-centres and network installation.      
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From the expatriates’ point of view, the nature of political regime before the 1990s 
(socialist) has largely contributed to the reticence of the Algerian market toward foreign 
investors. Also, the switch on the economy from Agricultural based on the begging of the 
1960s to a mono product (hydrocarbon based) played an important role isolating the country 
from the stream of capitals. Some expatriates managers declare that “After the black decade 
and even with the effort to restructure the economy, many MNE’s still see Algeria as 
dangerous destination, also many country warn its investors to go to Algeria due to the bad 
image due mainly to the security situation” (adapted from the interviews). 
 
Besides the rigidity of the market, the hegemony of the state-owned firms on the market as 
well as the lack of competition in the economy in general and telecom in particular did not 
push the state own company into innovation or promoting their products and services. As an 
example given by one of the interviewees, before the entry of Djezzy, the hegemony of 
Mobilis (previously PTT) in the Algerian market, has led to a low penetration in the market, 
bad services, high charges, lack of promotion, discounts or any promotional deals, stating 
that before the entrance of the Djezzy in the Algerian market, Mobilis accounted for less 
than 40,000 subscribers in 2001, but even with the entry of Djezzy Mobilis Reached 1 
million subscribers in 2003 which means competition had an encouraging outcome on the 
state owned firm, as Mobilis was obliged to cope with the new competitive environment, 
restructuring it facilities and adopting a more aggressive strategy to battle against the new 
entrants. Djezzy senior marketing manager stated “the entry of Djezzy has improved the 
Algerian telecom market in terms of quality as the network coverage has improved reaching 
the entire country by December 2004 while competition has significantly dropped prices in 
favour of customers” (adapted from the interviews). 
 
In relation to the decision for investment in the country, the interviewees generally agreed 
that, the country has unexploited resources and as the proof of the good decision for 
investment is the rank of Djezzy in Algeria with more than 15 million subscribers and an 
EBITDA exceeding 65%, or Nedjma with an EBITDA exceeding 60% (Djezzy’s figure). 
Also, the entry of new players has driven other foreign firms, mainly SMS, to operate in 
different areas of the sector offering complimentary services.  
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In addition, the interviewees confirmed the decision for investment was not taken like that 
but it was after years of studying and carefully observation and analysing the evolution the 
Algerian market and forecasting the potential return that could be gained from the 
investment some executives from Nedjma stated “we have looked at the evolution of the 
Algerian telecom market, business and political environment before deciding to invest, also 
the success of Djezzy’s investment has motivated the Kuwaiti firm to invest” (adapted from 
the interviews).  
 
For the potential impact of barriers of entry in attracting foreign capitals, the majority of 
answers collected suggests that despite all the effort to deregulate the market, investors still 
suffer from many difficulties that push many of them to exit the market including, 
bureaucracy, the difficulty to buy a suitable land; specially that the Algerian law does not 
allow ownership of for foreigners. It is an obsolete banking system, as it takes more than 40 
days to transfer money. Also, the banking system is not linked to the global market, which 
means lack of loans or small credits or even financial guidance as well as the rigidity of the 
investment regulations; rather than having one stop shop for all administration paperwork 
you have to go through several stages top open your business.  
 
Some expatriate executives from Nedjma, Djezzy and Ericsson state that, “doing business in 
Algeria is much harder than the other north African neighbours as it takes more than two 
months to be a registered as company comparing to two hours in neighbour Tunisia and half 
day in Morocco”. One of the interviewees added that, “even the high potential of the 
Algerian market MNEs still prefer to flee the country to setup in Tunisia or Morocco for 
instance, Renault the car manufacturer after  encountering problems to establish a plant in 
the country decided to opt for Tangier in Morocco” (adapted from the interviews).   
 
The new investment law could harm investors and could create an instable business climate 
in the country, according to the interviewees. Furthermore, the entry of the new investment 
law does not allow full ownership of MNEs in the Algerian market as well as the new 15% 
tax transfers on capital abroad from foreign capitals operating in the country was 
controversial and could slow down the flow of investment into the country.  
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Some senior managers questioned affirmed that, “the Algerian government gave guarantees 
to Djezzy, Nedjma and Ericsson that they will not be concerned with the new legislation as 
they invested in the country before the new law” adding that, “the changes in governments 
and the relative fragility of the Algerian political system as every new government bring its 
own rules which could negatively affect FDI flow to Algeria” (adapted from the interviews). 
 
Most interviewees did not denigrate the government efforts to improve the business 
environment in the country. Still, the country low macroeconomic stability and the lack of 
business infrastructure would alter its attractiveness to FDI. Both locals and expatriates 
interviewees declared, “the country dependence on the energy sector is a bad strategy as the 
economy relies on the hydrocarbon revenue, as the oil price is very volatile this would harm 
the economy, the government needs to diversify the revenue by deregulating other sectors 
and make them more attractive for investment” (adapted from the interviews).    
 
In relation to the government bias towards any competitor, some of the interviewees suggest 
that the Algerian government or the regulation body (ARPT) act sometimes in favor of the 
historic provider, Mobilis, as it is still in control of many structures of the telecom, like the 
international connection, interchange and VoIP and impose the charge an arbitrary charge. 
The interviewees also urged the authority to take off the tights imposed by the ARPT, 
providing a better market conditions to allow a fair play between competitors. One of the 
interviews state that, “in order to have a liberalized telecommunications sector the 
government should privatize the state company so all the players would have equal 
opportunities this would allow high technology, knowledge and capital spillovers and would 
benefit the telecom but the Algerian economy a whole” (adapted from interviews). 
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Table 4.7 Summary of the first set of questions 
Set 01: analysis the business environment of Algeria; the impact of liberalisation on the FDI 
inflow. 
Djezzy AT Nedjma Ericsson Worktel 
The liberalisation of 
the economy in 
general and the 
telecom sector in 
particular has a 
positive effect on the 
FDI inflow.  
 
The proof of 
successful 
investment is the 
company’s rank in 
Algeria with more 
than 15 million 
subscribers and an 
EBITDA exceeding 
60%, also the 
operations of the 
company has 
extended to other 
emerging sectors like 
the construction with 
Orascom 
construction Algerie 
and in future 
Tourism industry. 
 
For the barriers of 
entry, the majority of 
the people 
questioned states that 
despite all the efforts 
to deregulate the 
market investors still 
suffers from oodles 
difficulties that could 
push many of them 
to exit the market 
including, 
bureaucracy and the 
land accessibility. 
 
The liberalisation 
of the economy 
has pushed the 
company to 
upgrade its 
network and 
improve its 
services.  
 
AT is the historic 
operator               
(this question 
does not apply) 
 
 
According to 
Algerie Telecom 
some barriers of 
entry are justified 
by the 
government 
intention to 
protect the 
national firm 
against MNEs. 
But most of them 
recognised that 
bureaucracy, 
obsolete banking 
system and law 
rigidity could 
represent a real 
problem for 
investors. 
The deregulation 
of the telecom 
sector has 
positively effect 
the Algerian 
economy. 
 
Interviewees 
totally agree that, 
Algeria is a large 
country with 
diverse 
unexploited 
resources.  
And the decision 
for investment 
came after deep 
analysis of the 
telecom sector 
fluctuations 
 
The new 
investment law 
could be 
refraining for 
foreign investors 
although the 
government gave 
some guarantees 
to Nedjma. 
Adding to that 
the bureaucracy, 
rent capture, 
outdated banking 
system and the 
inefficiency legal 
system.  
The 
deregulation of 
the telecom 
market has led 
to an increase 
of foreign 
investment and 
therefore, 
increased 
competition. 
 
 
When the 
company 
decided to 
invest the 
market was still 
virgin. 
 
 
most of the 
interviewees 
think that the 
Algerian 
government is 
tightening  up 
the investment 
procedures 
without 
necessarily 
helping the 
local economy, 
adding to that 
the juridical 
system is 
viewed as 
obsolete and 
need to cope 
with the new 
changes. 
The 
liberalisation of 
the market has 
benefited not 
only foreign 
investors but 
also SMEs. 
 
 
For the SME 
point of view 
the telecom 
market offers 
many 
opportunities  
for investment 
 
 
The new 
investment law 
aims to give the 
government 
more control 
over the market 
making MNEs 
contributing to 
the 
development of 
the local 
economy  as 
well as allowing 
fairer 
competition in 
favour of the 
home 
companies 
 
 
Source: Adapted from my interview answers 
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IV.2.3 Analysing the second set of questions 
The second set of questions analysed to what extent the rent capture influences the effects 
arising from FDI. How could rent capture via lobbying (pressure groups) have a strong 
influence on government intervention on the market (by the incentive given or specific 
benefits and regulations) Does the rent capture generates potential negative or positive 
effects of technology, know-how, managerial skills and efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
When asked about the rent capture influence, many of the interviewees were hesitant due to 
the sensitivity of the topic. The local panel suggested that the rent capture is vital for any 
investment as it is a very common practise in Africa in general and Algeria in particular, 
although, the panel associated the rent capture to the increase of bribery, non-respect of 
market competition, it also seen as a way of maximising profit by getting “exclusive tax 
royalties” and, in some cases, not even paying back credits and loans which could engender 
waste resources which means less capital invested in production, less innovation, raising 
transaction costs and uncertainty. Adding to that, it could lead to inefficient economic 
outcomes, barrier to a long-term foreign and domestic investment and misallocating talent 
to unproductive activities. 
 
On the other hand, some expatriates argue that the rent capture could be more positive than 
negative. Suggesting that “bribery associated to rent seeking might have positive effects 
through enhancing efficiency by avoiding all bureaucratic paperwork, reducing processing 
time, allowing the acquisition of assets, credit loans; as bribery might be the original cause 
of slowing down processing time in the first place” (adapted from the Ericsson interviews).   
 
Related to how rent capture via lobbying (pressure groups) could have a strong influence on 
government intervention in the market by the incentive given or specific benefits and 
regulations, some of the Algerie Telecom (AT) interviewees stated that the case of Djezzy is 
a good example suggesting that, “unlike the other players, Djezzy has largely benefited 
from incentives like tax royalties for five years, access to land and credit lines from the 
Algerian banks in fact according to the panel more than 50% of Djezzy investment comes 
from Algerian banks credits, adding to that Egyptian firm has negotiated it entry on the 
market before hand as the firm via lobbying pressure and network to exert a pressure on the 
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Algerian government not postpone the bid for tender for the 3rd GSM licence by another two 
years allowing the company to impose its hegemony over the Algerian Market”(adapted 
from the interviews).  
 
The link to pressure groups has led the firm to get access to the Algerian institutions as 
government administrations switch their mobile contract from the national provider, 
Mobilis, to Djezzy, which was described by AT executives as “pure conspiracy”. In 
addition, the interviewees described how AT has experienced some internal conflicts that 
led to a migration of its skilled worker to Djezzy, as well as the decline of the network 
efficiency and the loss of subscribers. 
 
Vis-à-vis the rent captures effect on technology, know-how, managerial skills and efficiency 
and effectiveness, all interviewees agreed that the existence of rents is likely to encourage 
new entrants and thus increase competitive rivalry in the market which could have a strong 
repercussion on the FDI performance. That would be positive when it benefits the 
consumer; under perfect competition suggesting that, “the increase of market competition 
would possibly boost technological innovation as an example, firms tend to provide extra 
services like internet navigation, social network service (facebook, twitter, link to news 
around the world as well as downloading games and apps for mobiles). So the increase of 
market competition could create job opportunities and might help developing employees 
skills via the different training programs offered to be more competitive in a fast growing 
market” (adapted from the interviews). Moreover, many expatriates view the rent capture 
influence as more positive than negative so, through rent capture, the investment process 
could be easier, making the business environment of the country more favourable for 
investment adding to that the rent could increase the participation of the firm in local 
economy. “Djezzy for instance has helped building desalination station in five cities where 
Nedjma developed helping school kids developing their sports talents and AT sponsored 
major events in the country” (adapted from the interviews). 
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To sum up, the interviewees suggest that rent capture is an important factor mediating FDI 
impact as it has the potential for positive impact on the transfer and knowledge and 
technology. However, in contrast, it generates a waste of resources for the government; tax 
waste, waste of resources, the actual cost of the rent could be relatively high adding to the 
extent of the involvement in the political life which could jeopardise the state legitimacy. 
 
Table 4.8 Summary of the analysis of the second set of questions 
Set 02: Analysis of the rent capture influence on the FDI effect 
Djezzy AT Nedjma Ericsson WorkTel 
Through rent 
capture the 
investment process 
could be easier 
making business 
environment of the 
country more 
favourable for 
investment. 
 
The existence of 
rents might 
increase the 
transfer of 
technology, 
innovation and 
skills.  
 
AT did not 
benefit from rent 
capture as much 
as the other 
competitors 
especially 
Djezzy.  
 
The link with 
pressure groups 
has allowed 
certain 
competitors to 
get access to the 
Algerian 
institutions, 
which led to a 
serious loss for 
Mobilis 
 
Rent seeking 
could be positive 
in the case of the 
shift of 
technology and 
knowledge and 
negative in terms 
of profit loss 
generated by an 
unfair 
competition. 
The existence of 
rents is likely to 
encourage new 
entrants and thus 
increase 
competitive 
rivalry in the 
market. 
 
The rent capture 
through the profit 
generated could 
be beneficial for 
all players, 
company, 
government, the 
market and even 
consumers. 
The rent capture 
could be more 
positive than 
negative in some 
cases. 
 
 
 
The rent capture 
is an important 
mediating factor 
in the FDI 
spillovers as it 
has potential 
positive impact 
on the transfer of 
capital, 
knowledge and 
technology. 
The presence of 
rent could 
stimulate the 
competitive 
rivalry which 
could have a 
strong 
repercussion on 
the FDI 
performance. 
 
The rent capture 
could generate 
more positive 
than negative 
slipovers 
especially 
through the 
transfer of 
technology, 
knowledge, 
know-how and 
efficiency.  In 
the other hand 
the waste 
generated by 
rent seeking 
could have a 
negative impact 
on the economy.  
Source: Adapted from my interview answers  
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IV.2.5 Analysing the third set of questions 
This section examines the relation between mode of entry and FDI spillovers, the potential 
effect of FDI on technology, capital, knowledge and competitiveness spillovers and the 
potential impact of culture in constraining FDI. 
 
When questioned about the choice of mode of entry, most participants declared that they 
“had no choice rather than proper setup as the telecom sector in Algeria was very 
underdeveloped (archaic infrastructures), and monopolised by the state owned company 
which did not open its capital for investors” (adapted from interviews). So, Djezzy, Nedjma 
and Ericsson were in a way forced to go for the most expensive mode of entry “greenfield”, 
the most risky but could generates higher return. Some participants stated “that because of 
the hegemony of the historic provider as well as the high potential of the market as mobile 
penetration before 2001 was less than 3% in the country, so Djezzy knew that Algerie 
Telecom (Mobilis) could not compete against them, while Nedjma was first interested to 
take over the national operator AT before the government decision to retract their intention 
to sell the operator constraining the MNEs to bid for the third GSM licence” (adapted from 
interviews). 
 
Another point is that MNEs conducted some market research prior to their investments; they 
observed that the Algerian customers is eager for change and like trying something new, 
adding to the bad perception of the state-owned company (describing it as old, bad 
reception, bad service quality, very expensive and unsatisfactory customers services). These 
reasons pushed Djezzy and Nedjma to opt for a greenfield mode of entry, unlike in Tunisia 
where they opt for a joint venture with the competitor, Wataniya (Nedjma), in Algeria. 
 
All interviewees agreed that the type of investment has a strong link with the FDI effects.  
They asserted that, “the greenfield mode has the highest return and could benefit more the 
host country by creating more jobs, technology knowledge  transfer while strategic alliances 
does not necessarily work” (adapted from interviews). 
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In terms of the transfer of technology and capitals, the interviewees from different firms, 
were unanimous that “the telecom sector has seen a substantial revolution in all aspects 
(qualitatively and quantitatively), the new players have helped to upgrade the telecom sector 
via the transfer of capitals, technology spillovers as a proof the quality of service has deeply 
improved, the prices have seen a plummet in favour of the Algerian consumer who now 
enjoy high quality product at a reasonable price”(adapted from interviews). 
 
In relation to knowledge and skills, the five firms have a very ambitious training and 
formation strategy, offering continual training in all aspects technical, managerial or 
marketing. Also, all firms are investing in human resources by providing English lessons to 
their employees, as Algerians are mainly Francophone. On the other hand, in order to 
measure the efficiency and effectiveness of the employee, AT, Nedjma, Ericsson, Worktel, 
OTA work with objectives, set the objective beforehand to every department before the start 
of the year and there is a continual review of the objectives every three to six months during 
meeting where objective and performance indicators are analysed in function of external 
and internal factors. 
 
Analysing the competitiveness in the telecommunication market, all the interviewees 
declared that since the openness of the market and the entry of new players, the market in 
Algeria has seen a renaissance, and since 2004 (the entry of Nedjma Telecom) “the market 
is getting very competitive, as all the players implement aggressive strategies to increase 
their shares of the market, even for the promotion there is some similarities for instance 
when Djezzy launched its new promotion 100DA/day and you get free calls from 12am-
6am Nedjma replied by introducing Nedjma free when you top up with 1000da/month you 
still get your 1000DA plus you get free calls between 6am to 18h00pm and Mobilis launch 
4h of free credit to two of your favourite number just to show how competitive is the 
market”(adapted from the interviews). 
 
One of the executives added that, “for most of the cases, we get to know the offer just 30 
minutes before the launch as we get a quick briefing to avoid any sort of leakage” (adapted 
from the interviews). As a reaction to the decrease of Djezzy’s market share, the panel 
stated that the decrease is a “normal consequence” as Djezzy still has a large hegemony 
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with more than 60% of the total market share, stating that this increase could be associated 
with the increase of Nedjma share; as the firm is getting more experienced and also, the 
efforts of the historic provider Mobilis to reduce the gap (Djezzy and Nedjma interviews).  
For the SMEs’ perspective, Worktel and Ericsson suggest that since the deregulation of the 
sector the telecommunication market has seen a huge flow of SMEs around the world. This 
has come mainly from the market, profit and efficiency seeking Chinese, Egyptian and 
Lebanese firms as well as the local ones who try to be more competitive and gain 
technology, knowledge spillovers and absorptive capacities. 
 
For the stimulation of the local market employment, some interviewees explained how 
Djezzy played an important role in regenerating the local market. One senior manager 
added, “Djezzy is the biggest employer in Algeria, as the firm employ directly more than 
3,000 workers and 5.000 indirectly, while Nedjma employs more than 5.000 with 3.000 
indirectly through third parties, Algerian Telecom employs around 21400 with more than 
7.000 for its Mobilis subsidiary. Erickson has around 120 employees and Worktel around 70 
employees” (adapted from interviews). 
 
One of the executives added that, “the President Mr Bouteflika praised during the Algerian 
international Fair FIA in 2007  Nedjma and  Djezzy for being among the MNEs that recruit 
locally criticising some MNEs (especially the ones operating in the south) to import foreign 
work force. Adding that Algerian government has changed the labours right to work policy, 
obliging foreign investors to use local human resource to fill the positions, which would be 
more beneficial to Algeria as it allow to reduce the unemployment rate and improve 
standard of living of the Algerian citizen” (adapted from Nedjma and Djezzy interviews). 
 
When questioned about the company policy in terms of the workforce, all Nedjma 
interviewees declared “that the company privilege the Algerian competence as more than 
90% of the employees are Algerian and the company aim to reach 100% by the end of 2011, 
while Djezzy accounts more than 80% of Algerian and aim to reach 90% by the end of 2010 
and Ericsson report more than 70% of Algerian” (adapted from interviews). 
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Some local interviewees criticised the fact that, even though the number of expatriates is in 
decline, the Egyptian and Lebanese hold the most interesting and highest position in 
detriments of local and accused the company to practise favouritism in advantage of the 
Egyptian lobby. 
 
When asked about the link between cultural distance and investment decision, most of the 
expatriate interviewees agreed that cultural proximity was an important factor for Djezzy 
and Nedjma investment. One of the expatriates suggested that, “geographic and cultural 
rapprochement sharing the same cultural and religious values was an important factor for 
the FDI investment” (adapted from interviews). Interviewees also suggested that, since the 
president Bouteflika reached power, in 1999 he favoured Arab investors. While others 
linked the decision of investment to the 09/11 World Trade Centre terrorist attack, the raise 
of anti-Muslim sentiment and the fear for the Arab investors to lose their capitals due to the 
increase of global insecurity. Some added “that the adhesion of Algeria to the Arab free 
trade region taking effect from the 1st January 2009, would have a good repercussion in term 
of generating more capitals to the country, driving more Arab investment and reducing the 
entry barriers to the Algerian market” (adapted from interviews).  
 
Nedjma interviewees added that another important investment determinant was to gain 
some international experience, as the firm has little international experience by setting up 
linkages with foreign firms and institutions to explore evaluate and utilise resources. 
Ericsson expatriates suggest that the only motivation for the company to invest in Algeria 
was the opportunities resulting from the liberalisation of the sector. 
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Table 4.9 Summary of the third set of questions 
Set 03:   This section looks at the relation between mode of entry and FDI spillovers, the 
potential effect of FDI on technology, capital, knowledge and competitiveness spillovers and 
the potential impact of culture in constraining FDI. 
Djezzy AT Nedjma Ericsson Worktel 
 The choice of 
greenfield mode 
of entry is 
assumed to have 
higher return 
comparing to 
other mode in 
terms of 
technology 
knowledge 
transfers as well 
as enhance 
managerial skills. 
 The market is 
getting very 
competitive, as 
all players use 
belligerent 
strategies to 
increase their 
shares of the 
market. 
 
Djezzy 
recognised the 
importance of 
Foreign 
investment in 
transforming the 
telecom sector by 
boosting capital, 
Technology, 
knowhow 
transfer. 
 
 More than 80% 
of the employees 
are Algerians 
suggest that they 
are the biggest 
employer in the 
Algerian Market. 
 The state owned 
company recently 
opened its capital 
to public.  
 
Since the entry of 
foreign firms there 
is a stiff 
competition within 
the telecom 
market, this 
competition is 
regulated by the 
ARPT who acts in 
favour of fair 
competition. 
 
 
AT claims that the 
foreign players 
helped improving 
the sector by 
transferring 
technology, 
management style, 
knowledge and 
capitals also the 
increase of 
competition in 
favour of the local 
customers.` 
 
 
AT group has 
already 
established four 
regional schools in 
Algiers, 
Constantine, 
Tlemcen and 
Ouargla covering 
the countries. 
Adding to the ones 
offered by it 
 The choice of 
greenfield mode of 
entry is the most 
convenient and 
most profitable for 
the host country. 
 The increase of 
competition has led 
to some unethical 
practises, also, 
some concern 
raised about the 
ARPT 
interventions in the 
market which do 
not necessarily 
serve the telecom 
sector.  
  
 
Interviewees gave 
some evidence to 
show the 
contribution of FDI 
in the telecom 
sector for instance 
the  sector growth 
of 500% on 
average  between 
2002-2009. 
 
More than 90% of 
the employees are 
Algerians and the 
firm is continuing 
to improve the 
employment 
market. 
 
Knowing the 
importance of 
human capitals, the 
firm opened its first 
 The choice of 
greenfield mode 
of entry, 
interviewees 
assumed that 
they had no 
other choices. 
 
The increase of 
foreign 
investment has 
increased 
competition and 
enhances 
research and 
development in 
the sector as 
firms tend to 
innovate to be 
more 
competitive. 
 
 
Ericsson does 
believe that 
MNEs 
contribute to the 
transfer of 
technology, 
knowhow and 
efficiency to the 
local market. 
 
 
 
More than 90% 
of the 
employees are 
Algerians. 
 
 
 
 
 
Worktel is a 
local firm. 
 
 
 
In the point of 
view of SMEs 
the increase of 
competition 
could generate 
more projects 
which could 
develop the 
SMEs 
activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
Worktel 
recognised the 
positive FDI 
spillovers in 
term of 
transfer of 
knowledge and 
technology. 
 
 
The SME has 
signed 
partnership 
with schools to 
provide a 
comprehensive 
training to its 
employees. 
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Source: Adapted from my interview answers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
all interviewees 
suggest that there 
is no cultural 
clash or the 
management  
 
 
The firm strategy 
is to focus on the 
human resources 
as a valuable 
asset therefore 
the firm has 
opened a training 
centre in Algiers 
adding to the 
ones in Egypt 
and Dubai so 
employees could 
benefit from 
different 
trainings and 
short courses 
offered. 
 
Djezzy 
executives 
declare that since 
the president 
Bouteflika came 
to power he 
privileged Arab 
investors by 
providing 
incentive and 
guaranties.   
 
international 
partners. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
training centre after 
just one year of 
establishment, the 
centre know deliver 
short course as well 
management 
classes, English 
while other courses 
are available with a 
partnership 
colleges. 
 
 
The cultural cluster 
was an important 
determinant in the 
firm investment 
decision. 
Expatriates 
interviewed state 
that the 
government new 
strategy is in 
favour of Arab 
investment as they 
share the same 
culture, principals 
and interests. So 
they could benefit 
more the Algerian 
economy. 
 
Ericsson has its 
own training 
centre (located 
in Tunisia for 
north Africa), 
adding to the 
central one 
located in the 
home country 
Finland. 
 
 
 
The firm has 
been a local 
Algerian partner 
for many years 
and could not 
face any cross 
cultural issues. 
Also the 
investment 
decision was not 
linked to 
cultural 
distance. In the 
other side, the 
panel states that 
minor 
management 
style issues 
emerged at the 
beginning but 
both training 
and briefing 
were given to 
avoid any major 
clashes. 
 
 
The choice to 
turn to Arab 
investors is 
justified and 
could be bring 
a good asset to 
the local 
economy, as 
being a part of 
the Arab union 
zone this could 
help the 
Algerian 
economy to 
perform as 
well    as the 
leading Arab 
countries. 
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IV.2.4 Analysing the fourth set of questions 
The fourth set of questions examines the impact of FDI on local SMEs and other sectors of 
the economy, and explores how Algeria could benefit further from FDI.  
For the relation between the new investors and local companies, the interviewees pointed 
out that “Nedjma and Djezzy are working hard to build a strong relationship with the local 
companies with more than 90% of the distributers are locals as well as more than 50.000 
other retailers accredited” (adapted from Djezzy and Nedjma interviews).  
 
AT and Worktel interviewees stated that, “multinationals prefer to work with SMEs from 
their home countries or neighbourhood countries, declaring that since the arrival of Djezzy 
in the Algerian market channelled more than 500 small foreign firm have entered the 
Algerian market (with most of them Egyptian and Lebanese) which is discriminatory 
against local ones (adapted from Worktel interviews). However, other interviewees (from 
Nedjma and Djezzy) justified their choice to work in home countries SMEs due to “the lack 
of expertise of the local ones in one hand, in the other is the long term relationship with the 
home ones which facilitate operations” (adapted from Nedjma and Djezzy interviews). 
 
Another factor is the repercussion of the growth of telecommunications on the other sectors 
of the economy; for instance, the marketing and communication sector is experiencing a big 
boom, the development in the media sector is mainly due to the amount of investment 
allocated by MNEs to elaborate their marketing campaigns. 
 
In fact, according to one of the Worktel’s executive “the improvement of the telecom has 
helped developing other sectors such as the marketing and communication and media” also 
the increasing role of internet and data access could help lowering transaction costs and 
leading to more efficient communication and ease business”. One of the Djezzy’s 
interviewees gave the example of fishermen in south of India, stating that, “communicating 
through mobiles, sardines fishermen were able to sell their fish on the market where the 
demand was high, as a result, less fish wastage, high benefits and lower prices for  
consumers” (adapted from Djezzy interviews).  
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When asked about how Algeria could benefit more from FDI, the interviewees suggested 
that foreign capital is essential for Algerian development prospects, but the FDI rules may 
have a deterrent effect on foreign investors who prefer to hold majority stakes in their 
Algerian subsidiaries. According to MNEs, the government should ease the policies to 
attract more FDI the new investment rules could demotivate FDI especially during the 
global turmoil where the FDI trends are decreasing and developing countries are competing 
to attract foreign capitals. One of the Nedjma executives stated, “We do understand that the 
government may be wary of the loss of control implied by a minority shareholding by local 
companies, but this can be mitigated by the creation of institutions charged with supervising 
FDI and improving the country’s business climate” (adapted from the interviews). 
Moreover, AT interviewees explained that although FDI is important, engaging MNEs with 
local partners would be more beneficial to the Algerian economy. 
 
All interviewees urged the government to liberalise other sectors of the economy to benefit 
fully from FDI and enhance the country’s welfare. One of the interviews explained, “After 
the success of the liberalization of the telecom other sector needs to follow this would help 
the country gaining a world class economy” (adapted from the interviews). 
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Table: 4.10 Summary of the fourth set of questions 
Set 04: The fourth set of questions examines the impact of FDI on local SMEs and other 
sectors of the economy and explores how Algeria could benefit more from Foreign Direct 
Investment. 
Djezzy AT Nedjma Ericsson WorkTel 
 
The company 
strategy privilege 
working with 
local firms as 
more than 90% of 
distributers are 
locals and tend to 
work with foreign 
firms when 
expertise is not 
available. 
 
 
For the barrier of 
entry, the 
majority of the 
people questioned 
states that despite 
all the effort to 
deregulate the 
market, investors 
still suffers from a 
oodles difficulties 
that push many of 
them to exit the 
market including: 
bureaucracy, the 
obsolete banking 
system and land 
accessibility 
 
 
 
 
 
AT via Mobilis 
has strong tight 
with home 
companies and 
its politic is in 
favour of local 
firms. In the 
other hand AT 
denounce the 
other 
competitors 
practise to bring 
their home 
collaborating 
firms to work in 
Algeria in 
detriment of the 
local ones. 
 
 
 
 
The Algerian 
government 
needs to review 
its FDI policies 
to attract more 
FDI.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nedjma 
Interviewees insist 
that the firm is 
proud to be 
considered as local 
and it strategy is 
focused on the 
development of 
local SMEs and 
upgrade them to 
internationals 
standards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FDI is vital to 
upgrade the 
Algerian economy 
but the government 
need to protect the 
country interest as 
MNEs are profit 
based they usually 
take more than 
they give. 
 
 
  
 
Most of 
Ericsson 
partners are 
locals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sound 
economic 
reforms are 
needed to 
foster more 
FDI. 
 
 
 
 
 
As a local SME 
Worktel 
interviewees claim 
that they are 
underprivileged as 
foreign firms tend 
to work with their 
home based 
associates.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The success of 
FDI in the telecom 
sector should be 
generalised to 
other sectors of the 
economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from my interview answers  
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IV.2.5 Interviewees’ comments about my research model 
When commenting on my model, the first general observations made by all interviewees 
(locales and expatriates) is that government policy is an important determinant of the extent 
and nature of FDI inflows; principally through incentives, specific regulations, specific 
benefits and subsidies, or general policies such as liberalisation, the latest play a major role 
increasing competitiveness that could enhance spillovers generally. The spillovers from FDI 
are also associated with the mode of entry. In the cases of Nedjma and Djezzy, the MNEs 
were pushed to choose a greenfield investment. The latter is no longer available as the new 
government policy requires MNEs to find local partners. In contrast, the choice of the type 
of entry could be related to country risk analysis; if we take the example of Djezzy, the firm 
choose greenfield investment in high risk country like (Pakistan, Iraq, Bangladesh, Algeria) 
due mainly to the political instability, the degree of government intervention on the market, 
market inefficiency. In the case of Algeria, the telecommunication market was outdated and 
underdeveloped, due mainly to the hegemony of the state-owned company, AT. The final 
factor related to the FDI spillovers is the type of management. 
 
In relation to the effect of rent capture on FDI inflow, I noticed two distinct opinions. On 
one hand, the expatriates believe that rent capture via lobbying (pressure groups) could have 
a strong influence on government intervention on the market (by the incentive given or 
specific benefits and regulations).  They also argued that, “in some emerging country were 
market tend to be inefficient, the presence of rent could play an important role lowering the 
barriers of entry avoiding bureaucracy problems allowing better access to the market, 
increasing rivalry and reduces the availability of monopoly rents, as a consequence, the 
increased competitive rivalry would probably reduce the opportunities for rents as it is a 
move away from a monopolistic or oligopolistic situation. Additionally, the existence of 
rents is likely to encourage new entrants and thus increase competitive rivalry in the market 
that could boost the FDI performance in the telecom sectors by raising the spillovers of 
technology, know-how, managerial skills and efficiency and effectiveness”(adapted from 
interviews). 
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IV.2.6 Interviews summary and conclusion 
According to the interviews conducted and the information gathered from my case studies, I 
reach the following findings: 
x Regarding the impact of the government subsidising local companies to the 
detriment of the foreign investors, most of the information gathered confirmed that 
foreign firms were plenty of times penalised by the ARPT for illicit practises and 
non-respect of the competition rule. Also, Djezzy and Nedjma claim that Mobilis 
(previously PTT) is still controlling foreign calls, and imposing its own charges on 
other networks. Therefore, according to some interviewees, “Djezzy has raised this 
problem to the local authorities and they are still waiting for the government to show 
a sign of good will. In the other hand, Djezzy executives assured that the relation 
with the government are excellent (despite the deterioration of the relations between 
Algeria and Egypt) as both parties meet regularly  to discuss any issues raised as 
well as, talking about the future investment planned by the company” (adapted from 
interviews). 
 
x For the business environment, some interviewees expressed concern about the non-
stability of the political and economic environments, despite government efforts to 
restructure the economy; the banking sector and the land accessibility remain huge 
barriers for foreign investors. 
 
x Related to how the rent capture via lobbying (pressure groups) could have a strong 
influence on government intervention on the market (by the incentive given or 
specific benefits and regulations, interviewees agreed that the existence of rents is 
likely to encourage new entrants and, thus, increase competitive rivalry in the 
market, which could have a strong repercussion on the FDI performance. This could 
be positive in a way as it would benefit the consumer (under perfect market 
competition pattern), increase of market competition would possibly boost 
technologic innovation as an example now firms tend to provide extra service 
internet navigation, social network service (Facebook, Twitter, link to news around  
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the world as well as downloading games and apps for mobiles) it also generates job 
opportunities, and might help developing employees skills via the different training 
programs offered to be more competitive in a fast growing market. 
 
x The rent capture influence might have more positive than negative aspects                 
as, through rent capture, the investment process could be easier, making business 
environment of the country more favourable for investment adding to that the rent 
could increase the participation of the firm in local economy. Djezzy, for instance, 
has helped building desalination station in five cities, while Nedjma helped school 
children develop their sporting talents and AT sponsored major events in the 
country. 
 
x According to the interviewees, the rent capture is an important mediating factor 
affecting the FDI impact as it has potential positive impact on the transfer and 
knowledge and technology. But, on the other hand, it generates a waste of resources 
for the government (tax waste, resources waste, the actual cost of the rent could be 
relatively high), adding to the extent of the involvement in the political life, which 
could jeopardise the state legitimacy. 
 
x For the FDI effect on increasing competitiveness in the telecom, when Djezzy 
entered the Algerian market competition, it was dominated by the Algerian firm 
(Mobilis). After less than a year, Djezzy achieved amazing results, taking over more 
than 70% of the market share. However, with the arrival of a new player, Nedjma, 
and the restructure of the Algerian Telecom Company (Mobilis), the shares falls 
under 60 % August 2010 (according to the ARPT figure). Respondents stated that 
the fall in Djezzy market share shows how competitive the Algerian market is, 
insisting that all players have to battle to get additional shares, using aggressive 
marketing and media campaigns, promotions, special discounts, giving away 
freebies, service quality and customer service. They suggested that “the Algerian 
GSM market will reach saturation between 2012 and 2015, which the necessity to 
introduce the 3G that meant to be launched more than a year ago but the regulatory 
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body ( ARPT) did not call for tenders, aiming that the 3G operation will give the 
Algerian market a new breath” (adapted from interviews). 
 
x According to the new investment law calling for foreign investors to look for a local 
partnership in order to invest in the country, Djezzy, Nedjma and Ericsson 
respondents confirmed that this law is effective as of 01 January 2009. Moreover, 
the MNEs entered before 2009; for instance, Djezzy joined the Algerian market in 
late 2001. Also, for the future investment, OTA has obtained guarantees from the 
Algerian government to continue its ambitious plan without any constraint, while 
Nedjma and Ericsson agreed to boost their investment in the country to avoid any 
conflict with the Algerian government.   
 
x According to the choice of investment implemented by the selected panel, the 
participants stated that greenfield was the only option available in Algeria at that 
time, as the market was deregulated just before the first MNE decision to invest. At 
that point, the Algerian market was risky, as it was monopolised by the state 
company (PTT). Also, the capital of the PTT was not opened, which did not leave 
many options to OTH. But after one year of exercise the Algerian subsidiary Djezzy 
was ranked the most profitable among the other OTH branches, while Nedjma an 
eventual takeover of AT, taking advantage of the booming of the sector the firm 
opted for Greenfield as the most profitable and suitable to its expansion strategy. 
Worktel and Ericsson believe that Greenfield investment is the most appropriate to 
the actual business environment of the country, as it could generates more capitals, 
jobs and easy transfer of technology and know-how. 
 
x Regarding the transfer of technology, know-how and managerial skills, the 
interviewees were unanimous that the sector has seen a substantial revolution in all 
aspects (qualitatively and quantitatively), as the service quality has deeply improved, 
and the prices have seen a plummet in favour of the Algerian consumer who now 
enjoy height quality product at a reasonable price. While customer satisfaction is in 
constant progress (according to companies marketing surveys and interviews), the 
improvement of telecommunication is having a positive effect on other sectors, such 
as marketing, communication and media. While talking about the relation between 
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MNEs and SMEs, the panel interviewees confirmed that the increase of competition 
has led to an increase of the number of SMEs operating in different area of the 
telecom sector such as setup, logistic, call centres, consulting. Worktel and Ericsson 
interviewees suggested that the number of local SMEs is in constant progression 
which shows the good health of the sector also the collaboration between MNEs and 
SMEs is very important according to all players MNEs offer training and support to 
SMEs to ensure the good collaboration and long run relationship, some Ericsson 
expatriates explained the new relation between SMEs stating the examples of 
Ericsson that tend to subcontract some project with local SMEs (this collaboration 
was made possible thanks to the MNEs effort to improve local SMEs providing 
them technical and managerial training). 
 
x Regarding the cultural distance effect on investment decision, the Ericsson panel 
suggested it was not related as they believe that the deregulation of the 
telecommunication sector is the most important determinant, while other MNEs 
suggest that the government new strategy to promote Arab investment also the 
cultural proximity between home and host countries are key determinants. They 
argued that Arab MNEs prefer to invest in Arab country, mainly due to the 
international climate of uncertainty with the rise of terrorism and anti-Muslim 
campaigns. 
 
Finally, both expatriates and locals consider “the liberalisation of the telecom as a 
success story and urge the government to spread out this success to other sectors that 
show high potential but still suffer from the lack of productivity” (adapted from 
interviews).  
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IV2.7 Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter presents my empirical work. I began by analysing the case five case studies, 
looking at the companies in depth.   
 
In the second section, I analysed the interviews. I designed a questionnaire in relation to my 
research model variables and categorised my questions into four main sets. The first set of 
questions looked at the impact of liberalisation on the FDI inflow. The second set examined 
to what extent the rent capture influences the types of effects arising from FDI. The third 
section looked at the effect of mode of entry on the FDI spillovers, the potential effect of 
FDI on technology and capital, knowledge and competitiveness spillovers and the impact of 
culture in constraining FDI. Finally, the fourth set of questions examined the impact of FDI 
on local SMEs and other sectors of the economy and explores how Algeria could benefit 
more from FDI. 
 
In the next chapter I will discuss how my case-study results corroborate my research model, 
hypotheses and literature review, suggesting future direction and development of my 
research as well as my research limitations. 
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Chapter V: Discussion and Reflection 
 
V.1 Research objectives and research model 
 
The objective of this research is to investigate and analyse the contributions of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) to the performance of the telecommunication sector of the 
Algerian economy by examining the literature on FDI impact and reviewing evidence 
from the Algerian telecommunications sector. In light of this, I formulate six main 
hypotheses:  
 
1.  Entry mode has an important impact on FDI spillovers in the Algerian 
telecommunication sector. 
2. FDI has contributed positively to the transfer of: technology, knowledge, capital 
and productivity spillovers into the Algerian telecom market. 
3. There is a strong correlation between rent-seeking and FDI inflow. 
4. Political stability is an important determinant to FDI inflow.  
5. The country’s economic stability and a sound business environment are 
important determinants to FDI inflow. 
6. Cultural distance between countries could either encourage or restrain FDI. 
 
My research model starts with the classical position that government policy is an 
important factor influencing the FDI inflows, mainly through incentives, specific 
regulations, specific benefits and subsidies, or general policies such as liberalisation, but 
also through second-round effects on the competitive structure of the market. Generally, 
government interventions could increase specific “positive externalities” from FDI, 
while liberalisation and increased competitiveness might improve spillovers. The 
spillovers from FDI are also influenced naturally by other factors, such as: the mode of 
entry and management style, which is associated with country risk analysis. 
 
The model differs from classical accounts of FDI in terms of the attention it pays to rents 
and rent capture. I argue that this strongly mediates the effects of FDI, particularly in 
developing economies where markets tend to be inefficient, and in sectors such as 
telecommunications arising from the presence of natural monopolies. Not only does rent 
seeking and rent capture influence the extent and types of effects arising from FDI, it 
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also adds a secondary dynamic, providing incentives for FDI to be channelled towards 
influencing government policies and the market structure.  
 
Rent capture via lobbying or pressure groups could have a strong influence on 
government intervention in the market by the incentive given or specific benefits and 
regulations. Furthermore, the rent captured could generate potential negative or positive 
impact of technology, know-how, managerial skills and efficiency and effectiveness and 
generate some constraints such as bribery, illicit practise and resource depletion.  
 
Liberalisation also has an indirect effect on the competitive pattern by having an impact 
on the competitive structure changes occurred on the competitive rivalry and the market 
structure. On the one hand, this makes FDI easier, but it also increases rivalry and 
reduces the availability of monopoly rents. Consequently, the increased competitive 
rivalry would reduce the opportunities for rents as it is a move away from a monopolistic 
or oligopolistic situation.  
 
Additionally, the existence of rents is likely to encourage new entrants and thus increase 
competitive rivalry in the market which could have a strong repercussion on the FDI 
performance in the telecommunication sector. 
 
V.2 Presentation of the case-studies results 
 
In terms of the business environment of the country, some interviewees expressed their 
concern about the non-stability of the economic environment. Despite government 
efforts to restructure the economy, the change in government strategy towards 
investment and the high government intervention in the market adding to the obsolete 
banking sector and the land unavailability remain huge barriers to foreign investors. 
 
In relation to the potential effect of political and economic risk analysis in Algeria in 
driving investment, both multinationals questioned assume that Djezzy and Nedjma have 
negotiated their entry into the Algerian market. Djezzy’s executives explained that one 
of the company strategies is investing in “high risk countries” giving the example of 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, where the company has done very well in a quite short term. 
They stated that countries with high risk, have high potential too and could generate high 
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profit due to market virginity, unlike countries with “low risk” where the market is 
highly saturated and the penetration rate is relatively slow. To the question why 
choosing Algeria, executives from both multinationals explained that the bilateral 
agreement between home and host countries was a significant factor in the investment 
decision. 
 
In terms of the influence of rent capture via lobbying “pressure groups” on government 
intervention in the market by the incentive given or specific benefits and regulations, 
Interviewees agreed that existence of rents is likely to encourage new entrants and thus 
increase competitive rivalry in the market which could have a strong repercussion on the 
FDI performance. 
 
That could be positive in a way as it would benefit consumer under perfect market 
competition pattern, while the increase of market competition effect the market structure 
and would improve technologic innovation. Moreover, the rent capture could influence 
the investment process (by accelerating the investment procedures, making business 
environment of the country more favourable for investment and, therefore, encouraging 
new entrants). Adding to that, the rent would increase the participation of the firm in the 
social and cultural life through charity or sponsorship. 
 
Moreover, the rent capture is an important mediating factor in the FDI impact as it has 
potential positive impact on the transfer and knowledge and technology but in the other 
hand it also generates waste of resources for the government; tax waste, resources waste, 
the actual cost of the rent could be relatively high adding to the extent of the MNEs 
involvement in the political life, which could jeopardise the state legitimacy. 
 
Analysing the possible effect of FDI in transferring technology, know-how and 
managerial skills, the interviewees argued that the sector has seen a significant 
revolution in all aspects qualitatively and quantitatively. As the quality of services has 
deeply improved, the prices have plummeted in favour of the Algerian consumers, who 
now enjoy high-quality products at a reasonable price while customer satisfaction is in 
constant progress (according to companies marketing surveys and the interviews 
conducted). Also, the development of the telecommunication sector is having a positive 
effect on other sectors, such as marketing, communication and media. 
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Looking at the potential link between the mode of entry and FDI effect, interviewees 
concluded that the greenfield mode was the most suitable option available at the time of 
investment. As the sector was underdeveloped and needed capital, technology and 
knowledge, recognising that greenfield mode would be profitable for both sides for the 
country as it generates, technology, R&D, absorptive capacities, job opportunities while 
it is assumed to generate high return for the firm. Executives explained that risk-taking 
was justified as the greenfield could be “very risky” when the market is saturated. 
However, in the case of Algeria, the market was unexploited before 2001, with less 
10,000 mobile subscribers for 33 million people (adapted from the interviews).  
 
Regarding the impact of the government protectionism policy on FDI, my case-study 
results demonstrate that foreign firms urge the government to consider a comprehensive 
review of FDI policies to attract more foreign capital by creating a more FDI-friendly 
regime.  
 
On the other hand, interviewees argued that they were discriminated against and 
penalised by the regulation body (ARPT) for illicit practices and non-respect of the 
competition rules. Djezzy and Nedjma also claim that Mobilis (previously PTT) “is still 
controlling foreign calls and imposes excessive charges to other networks, while 
Algerian Telecom accuse lobbying groups to work against the national company by 
helping multinationals to acquire big telecom projects and denunciates the excessive use 
of rent to “sabotaging” the state firm” (adapted from the interviews). SMEs like Worktel 
and Ericsson denounce the government policy to allow MNEs to bring their home 
countries partners and penalising the local ones.   
 
Looking at the influence of management style and cultures on FDI impact, my findings 
indicate that, in general, MNEs did not face major cultural or managerial clashes. 
According to the interviewees, expatriates stated that they receive a full training before 
coming to Algeria about culture, traditions, habits and the Algerian personality to 
facilitate adaptation to local culture. 
 
Analysing the relation between MNEs and SMEs, the case-study results suggest that the 
increase of competition has led to an increase of the number of SMEs operating in 
different area of the telecom sector such as: setup, logistic, call-centres and consulting.  
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Finally, according to the interviews conducted, the major challenge facing the Algerian 
authorities is to diversify away from the energy sector and ensure sustained private 
investment led growth. Whether economic diversification strategies depend more on the 
public or the private sector, key policies must be adopted. Among these is a friendly and 
open FDI regime. Foreign capital is essential for Algerian development prospects as FDI 
provides private investment-scarce countries with the capital, know-how and technology 
transfer required for creating and developing strong private domestic investment. This is 
particularly true in today’s global economy where the service industry and technology 
transfer plays a significant role in the international competitiveness of firms and 
countries. 
 
V.3 Discussion: 
 
My research findings suggest a strong link between government policies and the FDI 
inflow through incentives, specific regulations, benefits and subsidies or by general 
policies such as liberalisation could increase competitive rivalry in the market. Also, a 
robust political system added to a transparent economic environment would attract more 
foreign investment. This supports hypotheses four and five 
 
Furthermore, the literature argues that FDI is also influenced by the mode of entry as it 
would facilitate the flow of technology, capitals and knowledge and management style. 
My empirical results suggest that greenfield investment generates more benefit for the 
host country which corroborates hypothesis one, However, because all MNEs operating 
in the sector have chosen greenfield as mode of entry, I could not compare the impact of 
greenfield against strategic alliances in terms of FDI spillovers. 
 
Also according to my research findings, rent capture via lobbying has a strong influence 
on government intervention on the market by the incentive given or specific benefits and 
regulations. Additionally, my results show that the rent capture generates positive impact 
of technology, know-how, managerial skills and efficiency and effectiveness in the case 
of the telecommunication sector in Algeria and could produce negative spillovers in the 
form of waste, such as resource depletion, bribery and illicit practices.  
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Conversely, the increased competitive rivalry reduces the opportunities for rents as it 
moves away from a monopolistic situation. Furthermore, the existence of rents is likely 
to encourage new entrants and therefore, increase competitive rivalry in the market 
which generates a positive impact in the telecom sector by increasing R&D and 
innovation. This would confirm hypothesis two. 
 
Finally, my findings corroborate well my model and hypothesis when explaining the link 
between the importance of cultural approaches between home and host countries. 
According to my interviewees, increasingly Arab capitals are moving from western 
countries to the Ar ab world as a safe place due to the cultural similarities and the 
increase of Islamophobia in the rest of world. This finding confirms hypothesis six. 
 
V.4 Reflection of the empirical findings using the literature review 
 
Both my literature and empirical work suggest that FDI plays a significant developing 
the Algerian telecommunication sector due to benefits related to: the transfer of 
innovation, technology, capitals, increasing competitiveness, developing managerial 
skills, creation of job opportunities, helping improving the overall economic conditions 
by affecting other sectors and promote the growth of the private sector and SMEs. This 
supports the literature (Caves, 1974; Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Perez, 1997; and 
Markusen and Venables, 1999). 
 
In relation to the ownership advantage (Dunning, 1977, 1980), the case of Djezzy 
illustrates that the firm has a monopoly over its specific advantages and can utilise them 
abroad, resulting in a higher marginal return or lower marginal cost than its competitors, 
which would result in high profit. As the company was the first multinational to enter the 
Algerian telecommunication market, the company used its core competencies - mainly 
technology and knowledge - to create a monopolistic advantage in the form of privileged 
access to output and input markets through ownership of scarce natural resources (the 
right to access the land, use the state-owned company network), as well as patent rights, 
and credit and loans from stated-owned banks.  
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This has helped the Egyptian firm to achieve the economy of large size (advantages of 
common governance), such as economies of learning, economy of scale and scope, 
broader access to financial capital throughout the multinational enterprise organisation 
and advantages acquired from international diversification of assets and risks. 
 
As in the case of Nedjma, the dominance of Djezzy has pushed the company to be more 
innovative and focus on its core competencies, mainly technology and human know-
how, in order to be more competitive in the market. However, according to the case 
studies, there is little evidence of the existence of costs generated by failure of 
knowledge about local market conditions, legal, institutional, cultural and language 
diversities. However, there is significant evidence of the presence of high costs of 
communicating and operating in Algeria, especially from 2008 as companies annual 
reports figures show that marketing and media expenditure are increasing. This is due to 
the intensification of competition in the market and represents one of highest budget 
allocation in both Djezzy and Nedjma, compared with the stated-own company which is 
investing more in R&D and upgrading its network (Algerie Telecom case study).  
 
From my case studies, rent capture has a strong link with both ownership advantage and 
the location advantage as the firm must use some foreign factors in connexion with its 
native firm specific advantages in order to earn full rents on these firm specific 
advantages. Consequently, there is evidence that the locational advantages of different 
countries are key elements in determining which country will become a host country for 
multinational enterprises for instance Orascom Telecom chooses Algeria for few 
reasons, market size, low competition (as the sector rose from monopoly), bilateral trade 
agreements between the Algerian and Egyptian governments, the potential rent capture  
that could be earned through lobbying or specific benefit and privileges according to 
Egyptian investors, geographical and cultural approaches. However, according to my 
fieldwork, because of the poor structure of the Algerian sector and the lack of skilled 
labour, Djezzy had to import skilled labour mainly from Egypt, France and Lebanon. In 
this case, the investment was affected positively by the market size but negatively by the 
labour cost, which corroborates my literature review (Dunning, 1977.1980; Markusen 
and Helpman, 1984; Helpman and Krugman, 1985). 
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When assessing the decision of investment of Wataniya Telecom (Nedjma), the MNE 
has chosen Algeria for multiple reasons. The main ones are to gain some international 
experience by setting up linkages with foreign firms and institutions, to explore, evaluate 
and utilise resources, skills and expertise available on a global scale, combined with 
their own assets (adapted from the interviews). Also, to benefit from the increase of 
competition in the market, the growth of the economy and potential knowledge and 
absorptive capacities that could be gained from the market as result Wataniya teamed up 
with its rival Orascom to invest in the neighbourhood country Tunisia in 2008 by 
creating a Joint venture (Tunisiana). Those confirm the literature as it suggests that 
MNEs with relatively weak technology, human capital, suppliers and distributors will be 
willing to cluster “agglomeration effect” to gain technological and pecuniary 
externalities in order to be more competitive in the market (Shaver and Flyer, 2000). 
 
Therefore, the market-entry decision and MNE investment decision is quite distinct to 
the two MNEs. Orascom was motivated only by market size, political recovery, market 
potential, rent capture (which could be raised from the market imperfection), 
geographical and culture proximity, specific benefits and government incentives and was 
driven by the company experience in other countries with the same business 
environment conditions. Wataniya, meanwhile, entered the Algerian market for other 
reasons; first the company had little international experience so according to the 
interviews the company aimed to gain technology, skills and knowledge benefiting from 
the “agglomeration effect” as well as experiencing different business environment and 
this has helped the company to invest in other countries like Tunisia and in some south 
Asian countries. 
 
Furthermore, in relation to the potential impact of political and economic stability in 
attracting foreign capitals to the Algerian economy and telecom sector in particular, the 
majority of answers collected suggest that, despite all the government efforts to improve 
the business environment in the country, the country’s low macroeconomic stability and 
the lack of business infrastructure would alter its attractiveness to FDI. Moreover, the 
new investment law in restricting full ownership control for MNEs could reduce the 
flow of investment to the country. This corroborates both the hypotheses and literatures 
review (Schneider and Frey, 1985; Barro, 1995), and confirms Globerman and Shapiro 
(1999) in relation to the significance of host countries policies in attracting FDI. 
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Analysing the key factors influencing the choice of mode of entry, the literature focuses 
on explaining the choice between sole and joint ventures and the ownership and control 
issues involved in the different mode of entries (Dunning 1977,1980,1988,1995;Caves 
(1982); Davidson and Mc Fetridge,1984,1985; Henart ,1982,1991; Kogut and singh, 
1988; Anderson and Gatigon,1986 ;Cho and Radmanabhan, 1995). 
 
My empirical findings could not confirm the literature, particularly in the case of a 
developing market where markets tend to be imperfect. Due to the lack of adequate 
infrastructure or government legislation, MNEs would have no choice of mode of entry. 
In the case of the Algerian telecommunication market, MNEs were in away “forced” to 
opt for greenfield mode of investment due to the poor state of the market, and the high 
return that could be achieved through greenfield compared with other modes. 
Meanwhile, Nedjma tried first to take over the national state firm, Algerie Telecom, 
before deciding to choose full ownership mode, justifying this by the high potential of 
the Algerian market and driven by the success of multinationals.  
 
However, my case studies confirm the first hypothesis regarding the potential impact of 
mode of entry on FDI spillovers as they state that greenfield investment plays an 
important in developing and upgrading the country’s telecoms sector as well as 
improving the economy by creates more jobs and allowing better technology and 
knowledge transfer. This corroborates the literature and hypothesis one. 
 
In relation to the impact of the rent capture on the FDI effect, the case-study results 
show that the rent capture via lobbying (pressure groups) could have a strong influence 
on government intervention on the market by specific incentive or specific benefits and 
regulations. Interviewees agreed that the existence of rents is likely to encourage new 
entrants and thus increase competitive rivalry in the market which could have a strong 
repercussion on the FDI performance. This could be positive in a way as it would benefit 
the consumer, increase market competition, increase the transfer of knowledge and 
know-how, as well as increasing technological innovation. It also improves employment 
opportunities and might help develop employee skills via the different training 
programmes offered, to be more competitive in a fast growing market. This corroborates 
the theories of Posner (1975), Tullock (1967) and Olson (1982) and confirms my third 
hypothesis.                                      
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Conversely, my interviewee panel suggested that the rent capture via pressure groups 
could generate some waste in form of the raise of bureaucracy, bribery, illicit practises, 
loss of government taxes and the natural resources depletion.  
 
Finally, when studying the linkage between the choice of investment and cultural 
distances, the literature argues that larger national cultural differences on average would 
result in larger differences in terms of organisational and management practices, making 
post-acquisition integration more difficult and less attractive in culturally distant 
countries (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Larimo, 2002). 
 
My case studies support the literature, as both Djezzy’s and Nedjma’s interviewees 
explain that that the cultural proximity is an important factor as there is no cultural 
differences between the home and host countries. While the Ericsson panel stated that 
the choice of mode of entry “greenfield” has helped reduce cultural and managerial 
clashes, most of the employees were locals accounting for more than 80% of the MNEs 
total employees, adding that expatriates have received appropriate managerial and 
cultural training. Furthermore, the interviewees argued that this “melting pot” has 
achieved good results in terms of marketing, R&D and innovation (adapted from the 
interviews). In addition, the company adopted a hybrid model of participative 
management, integrating both firms and local management styles. 
 
To summarise, my model developed well and my empirical findings results corroborate 
the literature and my hypothesis formulated on the literature review section. In order to 
improve my research there is a need to investigate other important factors, such as: 
potential rent waste generated, the possible impact of global investment climate in 
attracting or constraining FDI, and the impact of “economic agglomeration” on the 
investment decision. 
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Chapter VI: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
VI.1 Conclusion  
Many researches have dealt with the issue of FDI and their potential benefits for 
developing countries in terms of technology, knowledge and capital transfers, job 
creation opportunities, and growth and development. There have also been several 
studies on the determinants of FDI in both developed and developing countries. 
However, there are very few studies that concentrate on foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in North Africa, and Algeria in particular. 
 
To close this gap in existing literature, my aim was to analyse critically the contribution 
to FDI to the Algerian economy with reference to the telecommunication sector. My 
research question is: FDI in the Algerian telecommunication sector: An analysis of 
motivations, constraints and effects. In order to answer this question, I have presented a 
model based on the following sub questions: What are the potential FDI effects on 
emerging economies? Why are developing countries lagging behind in attracting foreign 
capital? What is the possible relation between the mode of entry and effects by industry 
and market? What is the potential contribution of FDI in the transfer of technology, 
knowledge, capital and productivity spillovers in the Algerian telecom market? How 
could rent capture, political risk and institutional stability, economic determinants and 
the cultural distance effect or constraints FDI inflow to the Algeria in general, and the 
telecommunication sector in particular? 
 
My research model starts with the classical position that government policy is a key 
determinant of the extent and nature of FDI impact, principally through incentives, 
specific regulations, specific benefits and subsidies, or general policies such as 
liberalisation, but also through second-round effects on the competitive structure of the 
market.  
 
Generally, specific government interventions can enhance specific spillovers (positive 
externalities) from FDI, while liberalisation and increased competitiveness can be 
expected to enhance spillovers. The FDI effects are also influenced classically by the 
mode of entry and management style, which is associated with country risk analysis. 
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The model differs from classical accounts of FDI in the attention it pays to rents and rent 
capture, which I argue strongly mediates the effects of FDI, particularly in developing 
economies where markets tend to be inefficient, and in sectors such as 
telecommunications arising from the natural monopolies present. Not only does rent 
seeking and rent capture influence the extent and types of effects and constraints arising 
from FDI, but it also adds a secondary dynamic, providing incentives for FDI to be 
channelled towards influencing government policies and the market structure.  
 
Rent capture via lobbying (pressure groups) could have a strong influence on 
government intervention on the market (by the incentive given or specific benefits and 
regulations). Furthermore, the rent captured could generate potential negative or positive 
spillovers of technology, know-how, managerial skills and efficiency and effectiveness 
and generate negative spillovers, such as resource wastes.  
 
After conducting an in-depth literature review, I have formulated the following 
hypotheses:  
1. Entry mode has an important impact on FDI spillovers in the Algerian 
telecommunication sector. 
2. FDI has contributed positively to the transfer of: technology, knowledge, capital 
and productivity spillovers into the Algerian telecommunication market. 
3. There is a strong correlation between rent seeking and FDI inflow. 
4. Political stability is an important determinant to FDI inflow.  
5. The country’s economic stability and a sound business environment are 
important determinants to FDI inflow. 
6. Cultural distance between countries could either encourage or restrain FDI. 
 
To test my research model and my hypotheses, I analysed five case studies and reached 
the following conclusions: 
 
Analysing the potential contribution FDI to the performance of the telecommunications 
sector of the Algerian economy, my empirical findings confirm the literature regarding 
the transfer of technology (absorptive capacity), knowledge (know-how) and capitals. 
According to my findings, the telecommunication sector in Algeria has benefited largely 
from the entry of foreign players in upgrading, extending the services, developing new 
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services and creating a competitive market to the benefit of customers who can enjoy 
wide range of services at lower prices. The creation of local job opportunities (direct or 
non-direct) also helped support local SMEs (with the case of Worktel).  
As a repercussion of the increase of foreign direct investment into the 
telecommunication sector, Algeria's mobile market is experiencing a big boom. It has 
achieved more than 33 million subscribers in December 2010, compared with fewer than 
10,000 subscribers in 2002 (according to the regulatory body (ARPT) figures). With a 
penetration rate close to 90 % compared with 0.26% in 2000, and the market is expected 
to maintain the pace with the introduction of the 3G service (expected by mid-2012) 
(ARPT, 2011).                       
 
Also, unlike the non-equity mode of investment, adopting a greenfield investment 
appear to help the growth of the telecommunication sector (as the sector was outdated 
with a poor infrastructure), as it increases competition. This enables a better service at a 
lower price; however, in many emerging markets (specifically Algeria), the profits 
generated from the investment do not feedback into the host economy. Instead, MNEs 
tend to transfer the profit to their home country which the necessity of the government to 
protect the local market.  
 
Regarding the impact of rent seeking, my research findings suggest that rent capture is a 
significant determinant on the effects of FDI, particularly in developing economies 
where markets tend to be inefficient, and in sectors such as telecommunications arising 
from the natural monopolies present. Not only does rent seeking and rent capture 
influence the extent and types of spillovers arising from FDI, it also adds a secondary 
dynamic, providing incentives for FDI to be channelled towards influencing government 
policies and the market structure. Rent capture via lobbying (pressure groups) might 
have a strong influence on government intervention on the market (by the incentive 
given or specific benefits and regulations). Furthermore, the rent captured could generate 
potential negative or positive spillovers of technology, know-how, managerial skills and 
efficiency and effectiveness and generate negative spillovers, such as resource depletion.  
 
Liberalisation also has an indirect effect on the competitive reactor pattern by having an 
impact on the competitive structure (changes occurred on the competitive rivalry and the 
market structure). On the one hand, this makes FDI easier, but it also increases rivalry 
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and reduces the availability of monopoly rents. Consequently, the increased competitive 
rivalry would reduce the opportunities for rents as it is a move away from a monopolistic 
or oligopolistic situation. Additionally, the existence of rents is likely to encourage new 
entrants and thus increase competitive rivalry in the market which could have a strong 
repercussion on the FDI performance in the telecommunication sector. In addition, FDI 
effects could be constrained by the economic, political, legal and cultural environments 
of the host country. 
 
Finally, my research findings confirm that the deregulation of the telecommunication 
market, associated with the increase of foreign investment and privatisation, allows 
technology transfer, more abundant capital, and increased market competition, which 
should benefit national telecommunication development. Of equal importance, 
telecommunications also have an important influence on national security, social 
stability, economic development and many industrial sectors. The new challenge facing 
the government is the “e-Algerie” plan by 2013, which aims to boost investment in the 
sector, taking the country to a new dimension of world-class digital communication.  
 
VI.2 Recommendations 
 
Another major challenge facing the government is to diversify the economy, more 
specifically to stimulate exports that involve improving the business climate, making it 
more attractive to foreign and local investors while dipping the government’s 
involvement in the provision of goods and services. With a tradition of high savings, 
abundance of skilled workers, diversity of natural resources and an advantageous 
geographic location, the country has huge potential for swift and sustainable growth in 
the all economy sectors. Moreover, a more favourable business environment is needed to 
support the development of the emerging private sector, as a vital pillar of a sustainable 
growth and employment generation strategy, as well as reducing the country’s high 
dependence on the oil sector. 
 
After reviewing the literature and conducting my fieldwork, and in order to improve the 
Algerian economy, I would suggest reforming both the judicial and economic systems 
by implementing a more flexible judicial system in order to regain market confidence. 
This is a key factor in any investment by respecting international, bilateral agreements 
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clauses and conventions that encourage an economic democracy, the application of 
international norms to guarantee the rights of the investors as well as the country.  
 
In contrast, the government needs to review FDI ownership limits on foreign subsidies 
as this could constrain foreign capitals flow to the country. The literature and my 
empirical results suggest that fully-owned subsidiaries are essential for carrying out the 
majority of overseas projects to safeguard the internal knowledge of the MNE. Another 
major problem identified by case studies is facing the bureaucracy facing foreign and 
local investors. Therefore, I highly recommend the suppression of all administrative 
constraints and a replacement by a more flexible and adapted system to motivate 
investment.  
 
Furthermore, it is essential for the country to develop more transparent contractual 
relations and adhere to all the international structures in favour of free trade such as: 
World Trade Organisation, the Maghreb Union, Arab Trade Free Zone and the Euro-
Mediterranean, whose objective is the free circulation of people, goods, capitals and 
services. 
 
Another important point is the liberation of domestic and foreign trade, according to the 
international or bilateral trade conventions and agreements, by removing all judicial 
barriers and ending of all forms of monopoly. This would reduce the degree of 
government intervention in the market, allowing the government to act as a regulatory 
body by controlling the respect of the rules and procedures. 
 
Finally, this would enable local and foreign partners to have a direct contact without any 
intermediaries, facilitate the investment procedures by encouraging private investment 
and encourage the small and medium companies to build a long-term partnership with 
foreign firms. This would be achieved by the creation of joint entrepreneurship to benefit 
from the efficient transfer of technology, knowledge, managerial skills and “absorptive 
capacities” required to regenerate sectors, such as industry, banking, tourism, agriculture 
and transport. 
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VI.3 Research Limitations and shortcomings  
 
For the limitation of my study, the reliability of the data gathered is a key factor as the 
value of any research findings depend critically on the accuracy of the data 
collected.  Data quality can be compromised via a number of potential routes, e.g., 
leading questions, unrepresentative samples, biased interviewers etc.  Efforts to ensure 
that data is accurate, samples are representative and interviewers are objective. 
 
Due to the complexity of the topic and its political implications it was hard to find 
collaboration from the government institutions and regulatory body as a result, I relied 
more on secondary data to fill this gap. Consequently the main limitations of my study 
comes from the design and the scope of my survey as the study tend to examine MNEs, 
state firm and SMEs perceptions of the effect of FDI on telecom sector but omit to look 
at the government, the regulatory body and consumers positions and view of the 
contribution of FDI to the Algerian telecom sector. 
 
Hence, the government and the regulatory body positions as well as consumers 
perceptions are important variables that were not taking into consideration in my 
empirical. Another limitation is  
The questionnaire design, the questions tend to be more general and descriptive with a 
little of critical analysis and do not reflect the research objectives which are the 
investigation and the critical analysis of the participation of FDI within the Algerian 
economy, with reference to the telecommunication sector.  
 
Adding to that, due to the small sample size, the conducted analysis could not use 
statistical techniques. For that reason, the research results do not provide grounds for full 
generalisation of conclusions. 
 
Another important limitation is that the study is about perceptions as there are not real 
attempts to estimate the spillovers: the degree of technological and knowledge transfer 
and the level of competition both quantitatively and qualitatively. As a result, my 
research recommendations are constrained by these limitations.  
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Besides, the effect of rent capture is vaguely determined as most and the empirical work 
is based on perceptions and most of the analyses come from secondary data. The 
government and pressure groups roles are not clearly defined as a result there are little 
evidences that rent capture has an effect on either motivating or constraining FDI inflow 
to the Algerian telecom sector. 
 
Other factors like the lack of resources availability in English, as my work take place in 
Algeria, most of the documents available are in French in some cases in Arabic, 
therefore, translating information is a time consuming task, also, as the economic 
environment is in constant change (as the government is embarking a deep economic 
restructuring), it is very hard to find accurate or valid information. Budgetary and time 
constraints could affect my research scope as gathering and processing data can be time 
consuming and very expensive. 
 
Additionally, analysing the rent capture as a key variable of my research was hard due to 
the lack of academic publications as little researches were conducted about the impact of 
the rent capture in the telecom sector in general and the Algerian telecom sector in 
particular. 
 
To overcome all these limitations and add more credibility to my research, I propose to 
redesign the survey questionnaires to cover all the research variables. To extend the 
scope of the survey to cover a larger panel of all the telecom stockholders: government, 
the regulatory body, MNEs, SMEs and consumers. 
 
I will also look at other benchmarking tools to estimate the FDI performance for 
instance: FDI performance index which measures performance by standardising a 
country’s inflows to the size of its economy, and measures potential by using a set of 
economic and policy variables of importance to foreign investors. Taken together, these 
indices show how countries are performing relative to their potential. Furthermore, I will 
use an econometric estimation using the performance of factor inputs distance approach 
proposed by Farel (1957) using a Cobb–Douglas function form involving one output and 
three inputs. The inputs are labour (L), domestic (K) and foreign (FDI) capital stocks. 
Assuming that there is one-way causality from FDI to output, the implied relationship is 
that GDP is a function of labour, and domestic and foreign capital stocks. 
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VI.4 Area of Further Research  
For the future scope of the research, I will draw a comparative study between the 
telecommunication and oil sectors (as the backbone of the Algerian economy), 
illustrating how the country could benefit more from FDI and suggest how the 
government should act in order to improve the local economy.  
 
I plan to follow the same steps for the oil industry as the telecommunication sector. I 
will add the natural depletion theory as a key determinant on driving or restraining FDI 
using the Patrick Bond (2006) concept of natural resource depletion theory, which 
suggests that any assessment of FDI, especially in oil and resource rich countries, must 
henceforth take into account its contribution to the net negative impact on national 
wealth, including the depletion and degradation of the resource base. I will also look at 
the effect of the surplus and resource extraction through FDI and the possible rent waste 
generated, some of which include tax fraud, corruption and lobbying, as suggested by 
Patrick Bond in his article “looting Africa”, as well as the World Bank reports (2007, 
2008). 
 
In addition, future research must demonstrate how the contribution of FDI in the oil 
sector differs from telecommunications in terms of the impact of the rent capture on 
government intervention on the market, the impact of rent capture on: resources 
depletion, mode of entry, competition, technology, managerial and absorptive capacities; 
knowledge acquisition, assimilation, transformation and exploitation capabilities.  
 
Another important point is the evaluation of the influence of the government policy and 
incentives on the FDI inflow by looking at the impact of the economic deregulation on 
the oil market structure. Additionally, it looks at the impact of the new investment law 
regarding the restriction on full ownership for foreign investors on constraining FDI 
flow to the both oil and telecommunication sectors. I will therefore extend the scope of 
my survey to include all the major stockholders such as: MNEs; local firms; SMEs; 
government; workforce and managers in related industries.  
 
Finally, after conducting an empirical study, I would advise comparing the two sectors, 
in terms of the extended model variables, and draw a conclusion on the contribution of 
FDI in both sectors of the Algerian economy. 
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Appendix 01 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
You are being invited to take part in a student research study.  Before you decide it is 
imperative for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  
Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you 
wish.  Please ask if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.  
Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
The aim of this research is to identify the impact of Foreign Direct Investment on the Oil 
and Telecom sectors of the Algerian economy. I am examining the evolution of the Algerian 
economy from the 1980’s up to now, focusing on the major economic reforms and 
investment incentives offered to foreign corporations and identifying the changing structure 
of competition in oil and telecom sectors as foreign investment has grown in these sectors. 
Through a comparison of six contrasting case studies, I will examine in detail the effects of 
foreign investment on businesses in these sectors, particularly the effects on firm strategies, 
technology and know-how, differentiation and cost structure, management efficiency and 
effectiveness. By locating the micro-level case research within the more broadly established 
macro-level trends, I aim to gain new insights into the specific dynamics of FDI in a 
developing country context that will have implications for managers negotiating such 
investments in the future and for policy makers. 
 
Your involvement in the study would be to complete a questionnaire examining the impact 
of foreign direct investment in the Oil and Telecom Sectors in Algeria. You are welcome to 
express freely your opinion on the topic, without any pressure, and should take no more than 
30 minutes to complete.  
 
If you are willing, it would also be greatly valuable to have your participation in an 
interview, at a time and location that suits you.  This would take up to 1½ hours, depending 
on how much time you have available, and what you are willing to discuss.  
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I would record the interviews, with your permission. The recordings would be written up 
and you will be offered a copy of the transcript, encrypted and sent via email, to keep.  
All data collected will be recorded and reported confidentially. All data collection, storage 
and processing will comply with the principles of the Data Protection Act 1998 and the EU 
Directive 95/46 on Data Protection. Under no circumstances will identifiable responses be 
provided to any other third party outside these provisions.  
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part in this research. If you decide to take 
part, you will be asked to sign the attached consent form but you are still free to withdraw 
from the study at any time and without a given reason.  
 
Your participation is very important for this research, as it will provide detailed insight into 
the impact of foreign direct investment in Algeria that is not currently available by any other 
means. It will allow me to assess the contribution of Foreign Direct Investment to 
technology and know-how transfer, market competition and change in the Oil and Telecom 
sectors and the impact on related local small and medium sized enterprises. The study will 
help improve managerial efficiency and effectiveness in working with foreign investors and 
will have implications for government policy towards foreign investment to the benefit of 
the country as a whole. 
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Appendix02: INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM 
 
 
University of Greenwich Business School 
 
 
Project Title: What are the contributions of Foreign Direct Investment to the 
performance of the oil and telecommunications sectors in the Algerian economy? 
 
INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM 
 
Agree to take part in the above research; I have had the details project explained to me at 
my satisfaction. I have read the Explanatory Statement, and I understand that this 
research is undertaken solely as an Honours research project and that any data and 
information gathered by whatever means will not be used for any purpose other than this 
research project and associated research publications.  
 I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to allow: 
 
x be interviewed by the researcher  
x allow the interviewer to use recording materials such as: videotape/audiotape 
x participate in a sole or group interview  
x to complete questionnaires  
x make myself available for a further interview should that be required 
  
I understand I have the right to:  
 
x decline to participate; 
x refuse to answer any particular questions;  
x participate in this research anonymously; 
x provide information on the understanding that my name or the name of my 
organisation will not be publicised without my express approval;  
x I will be given access to a summary of the findings of the study when it is 
concluded but have no editorial control over any aspect of the study. 
x I understand that I will be given a copy of data concerning my interview for my 
approval prior the publication  the research  
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x I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to contribute in 
part or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any step of the project without 
being penalised or disadvantaged in any way. 
 
 Agreements 
I agree to participate in this study on the understandings outlined above. 
I agree/do not agree to the interview being audio taped. In the event of my agreeing to 
the interview being audio taped I understand that I have the right to ask for the audio 
tape to be turned off at any time during the interview. 
I agree/do not agree to my name or the name of my organisation being identifiable to the 
researcher in association with the information I provide. 
I agree/do not agree to my name or the name of my organisation being publicly 
identifiable in association with the information I provide. 
 
 
Signed: 
 
Name: 
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Appendix03 
Questionnaire: 
1. In which way do you think the liberalisation of the telecom sector in 2000 has 
helped you to invest in the Algerian market? 
2. What do you think about the degree of openness of the market?  
3. What are the advantage and disadvantage of this liberation on your investment? 
4. Do you think that telecom sector needs further restructuration?  
5. How could you contribute to this restructuration? 
6. Did you look at the Algeria country risk analysis prior your investment?   
7. Have you seek any professional service for financial and risk advisories? What 
was the impact of these in your investment decision? Does the analysis converge 
or diverge with the reality? Are you continually monitoring the investment risk in 
Algeria? 
8. Have you studied the business environment in Algeria?  
9. What do you think about the clearness of legal and economic policies?  
10. What do you think about the macro-economic stability in the country?  How does 
it affect your company?  
11. In your opinion, what is needed to be done to ameliorate the macro-economic 
stability in the country? 
12. What influence had market regulations and benefits on your investment? 
13. In your opinion were the market regulations a motivating or restraining forces to 
your investment? 
14. Have you ever had a problem with the market regulations? If yes, how did dealt 
with that?  
15. According to you, what could the government do to improve the business 
environment in the country? 
16. How do you think could rent capture influence the extent and types of spillovers 
arising from FDI? 
17. How could the Rent capture via lobbying (pressure groups) have a strong 
influence on government intervention on the market (by the incentive given or 
specific benefits and regulations? 
18. In your opinion does the rent capture generate potential negative or positive 
spillovers of technology, know-how, managerial skills and efficiency and 
effectiveness? 
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19. Knowing that corruption and bribes are common money in emerging markets 
Have you ever faced any corruption or bribes problems when deciding to invest 
in the Algerian market? If yes, could you describe it? How did it affect your 
company? How could you describe the degree of corruption in Algeria?  
20. In your opinion how could the authorities combat this harmful phenomenon? 
21. Did you get any grant, royalties or any kind of incentive to invest in Algeria? If 
yes, was it the main reason for your company to set up in the country?  
22. Do you think that more incentives could bring more investment flow in the 
country? 
23. Is the government subsidising any local firms in telecom market? If yes, how 
could it affect your business and any future investment?  In your opinion is 
government subsidy driver or restrainers of the FDI flow? 
24. What do you think about the degree of competition in your market? 
25. Did you analyse the market structure and competitive rivalry before entering the 
market?  
26. In your opinion, what do you need to do to be more competitive? Are you 
planning to expend your investment in the country? 
27. What’s you type of investment?  
28. Do you think that the type of investment is strongly related to the FDI spillovers?  
29. In which way your investment could benefit the Algerian economy in terms of 
technology, capital and competitiveness? 
30. In your opinion, which mode of entry could be the most profitable to the 
Algerian economy and why? 
31. Which kind of management is your firm operating? Is it compatible with the 
Algerian style of management?  
32. Have you ever faced any cultural clash or managerial issues? If yes how did you 
cope with that? 
33. Have you trained your managers before they come to Algeria?  
34. Did you train the Algerian staff to cope with your way of management? If no, 
how do they cope with the company style of management? 
35. In your opinion what you firm has brought to Algerian market in term of know-
how and Managerial skills and efficiency & effectiveness? 
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36. Do you collaborate with local SMEs? if yes, how could you describe this relation 
? What do you think about the role of SMEs in the Algerian market?  
37. How could you see, the impact of your market entry on SMEs?  
38. In your opinion, does the increase of FDI flow have a positive or negative effect 
on SMEs? 
39. Do you employ more local or foreign work force? How could you describe your 
politic towards employment? 
40. How is your company contributing in stimulating the local market employment? 
41. Is your company’s home country an agreed partner with Algeria? If yes, could 
you describe the advantages that you could benefit from the agreement?  
42. In your opinion, is your investment due to the partnership between your home 
country and Algeria? 
43. Do you think that the adhesion of Algeria to regional and global cartels could 
help attracting FDI? 
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Appendix 05 
Answer sheet:  
Impact of 
liberalisation 
On FDI flow 
In which way do you think the 
liberalisation of the telecom 
sector has helped you to invest in 
the Algerian market? What do 
you think about the degree of 
openness of the market? What are 
the advantages and disadvantages 
of this liberation on your 
investment? Do you think that 
telecom sector needs further 
restructuration? How could you 
contribute to this restructuration? 
After the 
liberalisation of the 
market we decided 
to enter the 
lucrative telecom 
market from 2001 
because of all 
benefit we could 
get from a virgin 
market.  
 
 
 
We are present 
in the country 
before 2001. 
Impact of 
Country Risk 
Analysis on 
the 
investment 
decision  
 
Did you look at the Algeria 
country risk analysis prior your 
investment?  Have you seek any 
professional service for financial 
and risk advisories? What was the 
impact of these in your 
investment decision? Does the 
analysis converge or diverge with 
the reality? Are you continually 
monitorings investment risk in 
Algeria? 
 
 
 
We planned our 
investment strategy 
in alignment with 
the country risk 
analysis. 
 
 
 
We did not take 
into 
consideration 
this factor. 
The relation 
between FDI 
and macro-
economic 
stability  
Have you studied the business 
environment in Algeria?  
What do you think about the 
clearness of legal and economic 
policies? What do you think about 
the macro-economic stability in 
the country?  How Does it affect 
your company? In your opinion, 
what is needed to be done in order 
to improve the macro-economic 
stability in the country? 
 
 
 
We looked at the 
transparency of 
legal and economic 
policies before 
entering the market. 
 
 
did not take into 
consideration 
this factor. 
Impact of the 
Algerian 
business 
environment 
on FDI 
What influence had market 
regulations and benefits on your 
investment decision? In your 
opinion were the market 
regulations a motivating or 
restraining forces to your 
investment? Have you ever had a 
problem with the market 
The regulations and 
benefits had great 
influence on the 
investment 
decision.  
These factors 
were 
insignificant 
towards the 
investment 
decision.  
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regulations? if yes, how did you 
deal with that? According to you, 
what could the government do to 
ameliorate the business 
environment in the country? 
The impact of 
corruption in 
the FDI 
spillovers  
Knowing that corruption and 
bribes are common money in 
emerging markets Have you ever 
faced any corruption or bribes 
problems when deciding to invest 
in the Algerian market? If yes, 
could you describe it? How did it 
affect your company? Could you 
describe the degree of corruption 
in Algeria? In your opinion how 
could the authorities combat this 
harmful phenomenon?  
 
 
As bribery is 
common money to 
get access to 
emerging market. 
 
 
 
We did not face 
this problem.  
The effect of 
political 
instability on 
international 
investment  
When investing in Algeria what 
concerns did you have about the 
political instability? Did you take 
any particular safeguards to 
secure your investment? Do you 
still have these concerns today? 
Does this affect your investment? 
We received full 
guarantees from the 
government to 
protect our 
investment; we 
have Also taken 
measures to protect 
our asset in the 
country. 
 
Because of the 
political 
instability we 
minimised our 
investment to 
lower risks. 
 
FDI flows and 
government 
interventions  
 
 
 
 
 
Have you ever heard about the 
government interventions in the 
market? If yes, how did it affect 
your company? How do you 
perceive government 
interventions? could it be harmful 
for both multinationals and the 
host economy?  
We are operating in 
a very competitive 
market in which 
there is no 
government 
involvement. 
We faced this 
problem at 
multiple 
occasions as we 
found that the 
government 
intervene in 
favour of local 
competitors.  
 
The effect of 
the rent 
capture on the 
FDI spillovers 
 
 
 
How do you think could rent 
capture influence the extent and 
types of spillovers arising from 
FDI? 
 
How could rent capture via 
lobbying (pressure groups) have 
an influence on government 
intervention on the market (by the 
incentive given or specific 
benefits and regulations? 
The rent capture 
could strongly 
mediate the effects 
of FDI, particularly 
in developing 
economies like 
Algeria where 
markets tend to be 
inefficient. 
 
Rent capture could 
provide incentives 
The rent capture 
has no 
mediating effect 
on FDI 
spillovers. 
 
The rent capture 
via lobbying has 
no influence on 
government 
intervention on 
the market. 
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In your opinion does the rent 
capture generates potential 
negative or positive spillovers of 
technology,know-how, 
managerial skills and efficiency 
and effectiveness? Could you 
please illustrate with examples. 
 
 
for FDI to be 
channelled towards 
influencing 
government 
policies and the 
market structure. 
 
The rent capture 
could generate 
positive spillovers 
of technology, 
know-how, 
managerial skills 
and efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
 
The rent capture 
could generate 
negative 
spillovers of 
technology, 
know-how, 
managerial 
skills and 
efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
 
 the relation 
between 
investment 
incentives and 
FDI flow 
Did you get any grant, royalties or 
any kind of incentive to invest in 
Algeria? If yes, was it the main 
reason for your company to set up 
in the country? do you think that 
more incentives could bring more 
investment flow in the country. 
 
The advantages 
granted to investors 
has pushed 
investment in the 
Algerian telecom 
sector. 
the investment 
incentives are 
very low or 
inconsequential 
to the 
investment 
strategy.   
The effect of 
government 
subsidy in 
FDI growth  
 
 
 
Is the government subsidising any 
local firms in telecom market? If 
yes, how could it affect your 
business and any future 
investment in the country?  In 
your opinion is government 
subsidy FDI driver or restrainer? 
The government 
subsidy could 
benefit locals in 
detriment of MNEs. 
By subsidising. 
the authority  is 
trying to 
stabilize the 
market “win-
win situation”. 
The rapport 
between 
number of 
competitors, 
competitive 
rivalry and 
market 
structure  
What do you think about the 
degree of competition in your 
market? Did you analyse the 
market structure and competitive 
rivalry before entering the 
market? In your opinion, what do 
you need to do to be more 
competitive? Are you planning to 
expend your investment in the 
country? 
 
Is the decision of 
investment related 
to the market 
structure and 
competitive rivalry. 
 
The investment 
strategy does 
not take into 
consideration 
the market 
structure. 
The  
connection 
between the 
mode of entry 
and FDI 
spillovers 
What’s you type of investment? 
Do you think that the type of 
investment is strongly related to 
the FDI spillovers? In which way 
your investment could benefit the 
Algerian economy? In your 
 
Joint venture or any 
partnership forms 
offer more benefits 
for host countries. 
Joint venture 
could have 
more beneficial 
impact  
specially in case 
of technological 
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opinion, which mode of entry 
could be the most profitable to the 
Algeria telecom sector and why? 
gap between 
host and home 
countries. 
The  link 
between the 
mode of entry 
and FDI 
spillovers 
What did your company bring to 
the local market in terms of the 
shift of: Technology, know-how 
managerial skills efficiency & 
effectiveness 
 
What could you bring in the 
future for the local market?  
Depending of the 
mode entry 
emerging countries 
like Algeria could 
benefit from the 
transfer of 
knowledge, 
managerial skills 
and productivity.  
In general, 
SMEs prefer to 
keep their know 
–how and 
managerial 
skills in order to 
exercise a 
certain 
hegemony in 
the market. 
The rapport 
between  
Multinationals 
and change 
management 
in FDI 
recipient 
countries  
 
Which kind of management is 
your firm operating? Is it 
compatible with the Algerian 
style of management?  
 Have you ever faced any cultural 
clash or managerial issues? If yes 
how did you cope with that? 
Have you trained your managers 
before they come to Algeria? Did 
you train the Algerian staff to 
cope with your way of 
management? If no, how do they 
cope with the company style of 
management? 
 
 
 
 
The interaction 
between different 
cultures and styles 
could generates a 
positive spillovers. 
 
 
 
Cultural clashes 
might cause 
crisis within 
organisations.   
 
FDI impact on 
SMEs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you collaborate with local 
SMEs? if yes, how could you 
describe this relation ? What do 
you think about the role of SMEs 
in the Algerian market? How 
could you see, the impact of your 
market entry on SMEs? in your 
opinion, does the increase of FDI 
flow have a positive or negative 
effect on SMEs? 
 
 
We do believe that 
the increase of FDI 
would probably  
increase of local 
SMEs that  could 
benefit the Algerian 
economy. 
 
 
We do not have 
direct links to 
local SMEs. 
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FDI effect on 
stimulating 
the 
employment 
market  
Do you employ more local or 
foreign work force? How Could 
you describe your politic towards 
employment? 
 How is your company 
contributing in stimulating the 
local market employment?  
 
Indeed, knowing 
that more than 60% 
of the staff are 
locally recruited.  
 
Our staff is 
100% foreign.  
 
 
The relation 
between FDI 
flows with 
Algeria 
agreed 
partnership  
Is your company’s home country 
an agreed partner with Algeria? If 
yes, could you describe the 
advantages that you could benefit 
from bilateral agreements 
between home and host country? 
 
Is your investment linked to the 
partnership with Algeria? 
Do you think that the adhesion of 
Algeria to regional and global 
cartels could help attracting more  
FDI to the country? 
 
We are developing 
our activities thanks 
to the incentives 
offered by the 
mutual agreement 
between Algeria 
and our home 
country. 
 
 
There is no 
agreement 
between Algeria 
and our home 
country. 
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Appendix 06: The Gantt chart                                         
  
Source: Adapted from my interview strategy 
 
tools purpose 2009 2010 
  January-
February-
march  
May-
June 
December January may 
 
 
 
Sampling 
To select the participants  
who could effectively 
contribute to the study    
(looking into their profiles 
and selection criteria already 
stated on the sampling 
method) 
--------------
--------------
--------------
--------------
---------- 
    
 
 
Pilot 
interview 
Refine and evaluating 
questions, overcoming all 
potential problems that could 
arise during the interview 
process (miscommunication 
issues, misunderstanding...) 
--------------
--------------
--------------
--------------
---------- 
    
 
 
 
Individual 
interview 
Prior the interview I have 
send an email with all the 
details about the my research 
aims and objective, short 
overview of my research  
(provided on the appendix 
07,08) 
According to the length of 
the questions the interview 
process took an average 35-
40 minutes. 
 ------
------
------
------
------
------
------
--- 
------------
------------
------------
------------
------------
------ 
  
 
 
 
Review of 
the 
questionnai
res 
 
Data collection using 
triangulation summarising 
the mean findings (the full 
tables are provided on the 
questionnaires analysis 
chapter IV section 2). 
   ----------
----------
----------
----------
----------
----------
--- 
------
------
------
------
----- 
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Appendix 07: The secret of Djezzy success 
According to Hassan Kabbani Djezzy chief executives to an interview to the Algerian 
newspaper (Echrouk) , the secret of Orascom Telecom successful performance in 
Algeria is the trust factor ( customer loyalty) with its 14 million customers.“ Djezzy is 
now a trademark in every Algerian home on the basis on constant commitment to keep 
all promises in transparency and seriousness,” he said That makes Orascom Telecom 
Algerie considers itself as the pride of telecommunication in Algeria.” Regarding the 
relation between the company and its customers Hassan Kabbani confirmed that it’s 
getting better. “That makes Orascom Telecom Algerie considers itself as the pride of 
telecommunication in Algeria.” (Yahia, 2009:5-6).   
Hassan Kabbani said Djezzy is the first in terms of importance compared to the rest of 
the group’s branches in Asia, Africa and Europe. “In the current year, the investment 
reached 2 billion and 900 dollars.”  “This amount reflects the reality of the branch 
extension which records around 14 million subscribers,” he added.  (Yahia, 2009:5-6).   
 
Furthermore, he emphasis the prominent role of Djezzy in the success of the Orascom 
Telecom Holding stating  “Najib Sawiris considers himself now as a part of Algeria 
because of djezzy large investment in the country, which generate mutual benefits,” he 
added .According to him, the success of Orascom’s branch in Algeria is owing to efforts 
especially in investment. “That pushed Najib Sawiris, chairman of the board of directors 
of the Egyptian communications company to consider himself Algerian.” (Yahia, 
2009:5-6).   
 
Regarding the company management Kabbani value the role of Algerian know-how 
which represents the company’s backbone including technicians, engineers, marketing, 
sales and administration staff. “The 3,500 employees at the company are all Algerians 
except 19 only” he also added “It is wrong to think that Djezzy is a foreign company or 
belongs to a foreign investors. ”In this regard, he was sorry for the mentality which 
valorises foreign competences and underestimates local ones. “Djezzy has proved that 
Algerians can do the best.” (Yahia, 2009:5-6)  
 
Appendix07: The secret of Djezzy’s secret 
 
Appendix 07                                               Page 2 
 
Since, entering the Algerian market in 2001, Mr Nadjib Sawiris affirmed in different 
occasions that the Algerian Market is the backbone of Orascom Telecom Holding, with 
an investment reaching 2 billion and 900 dollars. 
 
According to the company report 2008, the total mobile subscriber in Algeria will 
dramatically increase from 30.02 million in 2008 to 35.8 million in 2010. 
This report also predicted that Djezzy will continue to receive a superior Average return 
per unit (ARPU) comparing to its competitors. In fact, in 2007 Djezzy ARPU was 
estimated at $12.32 far from the new entrant Nedjma $7.58 and more than 3 times higher 
than the national operator Mobilis $ 3.00.  
 
Djezzy investor report also forecasted that the company ARPU will increase slightly 
from 2008 to 2010 while predicted a sharp decrease on Nedjma ARPU -11.3% ( mainly 
explained by Nedjma politic of price reduction and promotional discounts offered to 
customers),  whereas Mobilis ARPU will remain stable at $3.00 at the same period. 
Regarding the Earning before taxation, Orascom Algerie will experience the highest 
EBITDA margin in Algeria with 61% from 2007 to 2010. Comparing to other OTH 
branches, Djezzy is currently experiencing one of the highest Earning before taxation 
(EBITDA) margins. 
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Appendix 08 
 
The conflict between Orascom group and the Algerian Government: 
 
The conflict starts when Orascom decided to sell its construction subsidiary in Algeria 
(AAC) to Lafarge, the government was surprised by this decision as it has contributed to 
this investment by granting credit, so in a way Orascom used the government money to 
setup its business and after 5 years sold the business for approximately 12 times the 
original investment, at the beginning Orascom did it react to the government 
announcement but when polemic started, the CEO Najeeb Swaress expressed his 
understanding regarding the Algerian authority concern and explained that Orascom, did 
not want to delude  the government and acted in booth interest as Lafarge has more 
resources and could serve better the growing demand of the local and international 
market, also, he promised the Algerian government to reimburse the credit granted by 
the government and emphasise on the excellent relations between the firm and the 
Algerian people and the continuous commitment to provide the best service possible 
insisting that the Algerian market is most important  and promising market for the 
Orascom group. 
This declaration did not calm the tensions between the two parties, in July 2009, the 
French written magazine Jeune Africain revealed a secrete negotiation between the 
Orascom group and the giant French telecommunication firm France Telecom, the actual 
firm is already with joint venture with Orascom on Mobinil ( the Orascom’s  Egyptian 
subsidiary), since Orascom group was badly hit by the global economic down turn it 
needed some cash flow to revitalise its financial situation specially after the fall of its 
market share in Cairo stock market by more than 15.8% between May to July (according 
to Oxford business group article), this revelation sustained a large political debate in the 
country since the Algerian and French  political relations where under a string tensions 
following president Sarcozy declaration regarding the positive effect of colonisation and 
the protest by the Algerian foreign minister and opposition by politics to this declaration   
considered as an  insult  to Algerian people who scarified more than 1 million and half to 
liberate  the country. In August 2009 the Algerian authority formally invited Djezzy to 
show it real intention ( either continue or withdrawn from the market), in late august a 
communication from the government expressed that in the case of the Djezzy intention 
to withdrawn from the market, the government is ready to take over the investment. Also 
Appendix08: The conflict between Algeria and Egypt 
 
Appendix 08                                                    Page 2 
 
the minister of the investment Abdelhamid Tamar for the first time criticise officially 
Djezzy in September 2009 for illicit practise saying that the government is aware about 
the firm practise in other countries such as Iraq and Pakistan while they setup their 
investment by the help of local authorities for 3 or 5 years and resold there investment 
for a much higher prices and precise that if this happened the Algerian authorities will 
strongly interfere to protect its economy. 
 
This declaration was followed by massive indignation but both politics and other 
competitors such as Mobilis and Nedjma who started a very aggressive Campaign to 
show their total commitment to the Algerian market.  
While Djezzy did not want to feed this polemic, the only reaction was made by Nadjeeb 
Swaress who stressed on long term relationship and good intention of the firm towards 
the host country.  
 
A football game poisoned the relations between the Algeria and Egypt: 
 
the decline of the relations reached the summit after the Algerian team bus was attacked 
by Egyptian fans in Cairo before the decisive match between the two nations on the 14th 
of November 2010 accounting for the world cup 2010 qualifiers, as political tensions 
started between the two nations, and Orascom was one of the official sponsor of the 
Egyptian football league, Algerian people start to boycott everything that was Egyptian 
starting by mobile phones, the worst is that Djezzy kept the silence and did not want to 
dissociate with its mother firm OTH so, this silence was interpreted as a conspiracy 
against Algerian people who welcomed the Egyptian, the situation got worst while 
Egypt denied the incident and claimed that the Algerian team played a theatre play, and 
refuse to make a public apology, so, the Algerian population start a big anti-Egyptian 
campaign putting pressure on government to ban all Egyptian products and people where 
demonstrating in the capital Algeria asking the government to recall the Algerian 
Ambassador in Cairo, after few days while the media in both countries where playing an 
important role on persuading the public that the other side is the enemy, few incidents 
occurred while some Algerian students and residents were attacked in Cairo, in the other 
hand the Djezzy headquarter and few shops were subject to vandalism act overnight that 
was estimated (according to Djezzy report around 2 million $), also a media and social 
networking starting building up anti-Algerian and anti –Egyptian groups in facebook, 
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twitter, blogs, video on you tube, the situation went beyond control when Egypt decided 
to recall its ambassador shortly after Algeria followed, the Arab league tried to organise 
a reconciliation summit but both parties refused, in the meantime, while the situation 
went impossible Djezzy and the Egyptian government send an open request to the 
Algerian authority to protect the Egyptian workers and investment and also asking to 
recompense the damage cost, but the local authorities insisted that all damage caused 
should be covered by the insurance. 
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Appendix 09: The VimpelCom potential Takeover of Djezzy 
 
In March 2010, the south African Telecom firm MTN was on negotiation for an eventual 
takeover of the Orascom’s telecom four sub-Saharan assets, grouped under the Telecel 
Globe firm. Therefore, MTN is most likely to end up paying around $8 billion for the 
assets. with five billion dollars allocated just for the purchase of "Djezzy" the Algerian 
subsidiary, as the firm is subject to a disputed tax bill and tension between the Algerian 
and Egyptian government but still attracting MNEs intention due to high prospect of the 
Algerian telecom market, Djezzy has around 50% of a market share 60% penetration and 
average EBITDA margin of 55-60 percent (Djezzy investor report available from the 
company website). According to telecom Analysts (Reuters source), the value of OTA 
could be estimated between $6 billion to $7 billion, but government pressure and the 
Algerian economic environment could lower down the price 
According to Reuters the negotiations by MTN and Orascom started after the fail of the 
negotiations between France Telecom and Orascom Telecom Holding, led in shadow by 
Nadjib Sawris and South African company MTN, with the support of Italian and U.S. 
governments, the discussions have resulted in the sale of shares of Djezzy for five 5 
Billion dollars, which is considered as a big amount as Djezzy benefited through its rent 
seeking from great advantages and privileges for more than 8 years of investment in the 
country .  
In the 4 October 2010, after secret negotiation rounds, VimpelCom the giant Russian 
Telecommunication firm took control Orascom Telecom as part of a $6.6 billion 
international acquisition. VimpelCom’s acquisition of Weather Investments  the owner 
of Orascom Telecom was considered as the most significant deal of the year in the 
telecom sector, creating the world’s fifth-largest mobile operator group with a network 
spreading all over the five continents. VimpelCom has announced that its preference 
would be to take control of Djezzy, one of the most profitable assets in the Orascom 
portfolio. However, the Algerian government responded to the deal by saying that it the 
government will oppose to any deal without its consent, and confirm its intention to buy 
Djezzy. VimpelCom declared that if the Algerian has the intention to nationalise Djezzy, 
they have no objection to sell it so at a price of US$7.8 billion, which was highly 
criticised by the Algerian government being unrealistic price as Djezzy suffer from a tax 
bill of $230 million for 2008 and 2009 adding to the already disputed tax bill US$597 
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million tax to cover the tax years 2005, 2006 and 2007. The Algerian government is 
offering between $2.5 to $3 billion. 
To an interview to the Financial Times, The VimpelCom CEO Alexander Izosimov told 
the he could resort to legal action should Algiers offer an unfavourable price for Djezzy.  
He added that “If the government makes moves or extracts the asset nationalises and so 
on we will try and defend our rights,” (The Financial Times, 2010). 
 
